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THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America as an area would yield to few if any other regions of the world in its devotion to what it considers the constitutional process and, indeed, the supremacy of constitutions in establishing and ordering the political life of the several states. If the mere number of excursions into the practical exercise of constitution-making were to be considered significant—which it probably is at most only in a limited way—it might lead to the conclusion that the Latins were affected by some form of legomania. A compilation of Latin America constitutions published a little more than a decade ago indicated that as of the beginning of 1948 the twenty states had written a total of 200 basic laws since their respective achievements of independence. Several additional ones have since been drafted.

This is evidence, or at least a straw showing the direction of the wind, but it needs to be evaluated. By itself it means little.

The segment of the highly stratified society which inherited the task of writing the new constitutions at the time Latin American independence was won was the creole, and within the creole fraction the *pensadores* or philosophers. They were a well, even if somewhat artificially, educated group and their intellectual interests and enthusiasm were beyond question.

The chief intellectual inheritance of the *pensadores* was Gallic. They admired and imitated the French penchant for logic and symmetry. In the absence of any large or significant experience with the hard realities of government through an apprenticeship during the colonial period they could make of constitution-writing only an intellectual exercise and in it they reveled and gave free rein to their love of high-flown rhetoric, philosophizing, and the devising of beautifully symmetrical even if impractical and unrealistic governmental machinery.

"The early constituent assemblies", I have written elsewhere, "were devoted to symbol words—the French trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity, of course, and federalism, democracy, unity, and others—and these were clothed with an almost sacramental virtue; in other words, the approach was ritualistic. . . . There long prevailed the unconscious feeling that a written constitution was the panacea for all political ills, and that if one proved unsatisfactory all that needed to be done was to draft another."

The situation in the early years of independence was, then, roughly this:

almost all sovereign units in Latin America were controlled, actually, by dictators, most of whom took the guise of a caudillo. The turbulence of the time, the lack of experience in democratic self-government, the uncertainty that Spain or some other European state would not again plant an alien flag over much of Latin America, the physical facts of a general frontier rawness and an absence of adequate transportation, all these and other factors scarcely permitted any other condition to prevail.

The early dictator thought, spoke, and acted in terms of force, violence, a complete self-assurance, and an impatience with the constitutional or other form of deliberative process. He distrusted and sometimes feared such processes partly because he was unfamiliar with them. Government was personal and the ruler's hold over his people was primarily charismatic, not rational. The personalistic element of the situation, though to a less extent the irrational one, was an inheritance from the colonial and precolonial periods; the impressive and in some ways logical institutional and constitutional system of the colonial era had largely broken down with the severing of Spanish authority in her erstwhile colonies but there were left the attitudes and tendencies which were characteristic and indeed almost inevitable under the circumstances.

The dictator, nonetheless, usually showed a profound respect, sometimes sincere, sometimes hypocritical, for the document known as a constitution. Several reasons probably contributed to this: the intellectual prestige enjoyed in the status-conscious society of the day by the *pensador* who wrote the document, the frequently happy and almost always stimulating experience of France and the United States in experimenting with written constitutions, and (on the more cynical side) the dictator's occasional realization that a constitution would give his regime a façade of legality and respectability which it might otherwise lack. It was only the exceptional dictator, such as Francia and, even to a greater degree, Rosas, who attempted to govern virtually without benefit of constitution.

Latin American public life of the time, then, displayed the diametric and usually immiscible contributions of the caudillo and the *pensador*. It was not often that the man of action was at the same time politically articulate, literate and well balanced; more typical were such extremes as the caudillo Mariano Melgarejo and the *pensador* Juan Egaña. This basic divergence between the important political stereotypes did not prevent the inheritance and continuation of several characteristics of political life. As I have described them previously:

"... until the last generation or so certain aspects of the historic political scene in Latin America remained almost undisturbed: (1) Power was centered in the executive branch, more specifically in the president, and, despite constitutional lip service to the principle of separation of powers, legislative and judicial machinery in virtually all instances remained abysmally and

pathetically subservient to the executive. (2) Even in those states which nominally had a federal form of government, this principle, too, was similarly honored in the breach and authority was concentrated in the national officials, which is to say especially the president. (3) The role of government remained formalistic, i.e., it involved, usually with haphazard performance, the minimal classic functions and showed little or no adaptation to changing economic and social circumstance. (4) Conversely, the attitude of most people toward government was that it was remote, alien, and even antagonistic, and that they had no responsibility for it or proprietary interest in it."

A search for the reasons for this peculiar situation is important. They would seem to lie, at least in part, in the dichotomy that existed between institutional organization and reality in nineteenth-century Latin America. The political institutions and practices which prevailed were of European, especially Spanish, origin and importation. The same was true of economic and social institutions, the religious organization, the educational system, et cetera. The "official" culture was an occidental overlay which suited the needs of the very small fraction of creoles who dominated society but meant little to anyone else.

The mass of the population in most parts of Latin America was Indian, mestizo, Negro, mulatto, or in other socio-ethnic strata which were in practically all ways widely removed from the ruling elite. It has been said that about the only government officials with whom the Indian came in contact were the tax collector, the recruiting officer, and the policeman and it goes without saying that he was unlikely to develop a close and automatic affection for any of them. Government was *of* the whole people; it certainly was not *by* them nor, until much later, even *for* them.

Being government of the people, it was scarcely recognized in the nineteenth century that it was in many countries a highly unrealistic government. It was readily seen to be, in a typical situation, undemocratic, harsh, insubstantial, and unimaginative but not so readily identified as being almost wholly unsuited to popular needs. It was quickly noticed, of course, that written constitutions—they are also called "paper" or nominal constitutions—departed from the realities of politics and Latin American states were frequently cited as offering examples of Bryce's distinction between written and unwritten constitutions. Professor Blanksten's apt terminology of the written as contrasted to the "real" constitution is perhaps more pertinent for Latin American application.

Now, any government will quickly develop an unwritten constitution. The United States has long had one; very probably even the young French Fifth Republic is in process of adding that encrustation of relationships, practices, and even offices, not defined or perhaps even implied in the written document, which we think of as the unwritten constitution. Perhaps we can make a valid and useful distinction between the divergences we find in most western

countries and those encountered in Latin America. It is as if the written constitution for the United States or most other western countries were a cone, sharp in outline and specific in size, and the unwritten constitution were a larger and vaguer cone enclosing it. The inner and more tangible cone is not composed of substance unrelated to that found in the outer cone; the material and relationship of the latter is merely supplementary. In the case of the Latin American analogy, however, the one cone is not superimposed on the other; they are separate from each other and sometimes well removed. In terms of color, texture, form, size, and content they may bear little relationship to each other.

Professor J. Lloyd Mecham, the dean of political scientists concerned with Latin America, is the author of a recently published, succinct and stimulating article dealing with the differences between "nominal" and "real" Latin American constitutions. His discussion points out with admirable clarity what is found in an average written constitution and how it differs from the facts of political life in Latin America. The author's conclusion is that "there are no constitutional formulae which, however well-suited to any practical situation or peculiar environment, will of themselves inaugurate a democratic regime. . . . Those requisites of a democratic society: fair play, tolerance, self-discipline, responsibility, human dignity, majority rule but respect for the minority, a spirit of compromise, and respect for the rule of law, are the qualities of a democratic citizen which have deep roots in his historical past. These qualities . . . cannot be legislated into existence [and] have not, unfortunately, prospered in the soil of the Latin American's historical past. Nor after 140 years of tortured experience in self-government does the present status of democratic achievement in Latin America augur much improvement in the foreseeable future."

Students of Latin American and comparative politics can accept Professor Mecham's conclusion and are certainly indebted to him for his able analysis of the sorry situation prevailing in Latin America. It may be in order, however, to speculate somewhat about possible circumstances or conditions which might in the future significantly alter what has prevailed, with few exceptions, for almost a century and a half in the picture of Latin American constitutionalism and constitutional practice.

It is too much to expect—and indeed no one wishes—that Latin American constitutions which are written in the future will either quickly or slowly become undemocratic in their prescriptions just so that they may more closely conform to reality. This, of course, takes into account only one aspect of the picture of change, but it is the one which immediately concerns us. Perhaps the only Latin American constitution which took such a course in considerable degree was the Brazilian basic law of November, 1937. That interesting document gave lip service to the fiction of popular control by proclaiming in the first article that "Political power emanates from the

people" but in the very next phrase obliquely withdrew this reassuring conclusion by adding that it "is exercised in their name and in the interest of their well-being, their honor, their independence, and their prosperity". Despite the fact that the third article conventionally maintained that "Brazil is a federal state", the actual specifics of assignment of power as included in the rest of the detailed document so concentrated authority in the hands of national officials, and especially the national executive branch, that in reality federalism, not to mention democratic government, became a fiction rather than a fact, to the extent that the growing dictatorship of Vargas had not already abandoned both principles.

Of course it might be quite correctly contended that this constitution of 1937 was much more in line with reality, with its concentration of power in the hands of the president at the expense of either legislative or popular control over it, than a more typically drafted document would be. By the same token, however, the very novelty (virtually the uniqueness) of the Vargas venture in constitution making simply emphasized the conclusion that the conventional design of constitutions would scarcely ever be departed from in such fashion.

If the mountain of constitutional content and form will not thus go to the Mahomet of political reality in Latin America is there much likelihood that Mahomet will consciously or unconsciously, visibly or invisibly, go to the mountain? The chance of it would seem to be good. Let us see what this involves: it means, I believe, that conditions, political and other, are likely sufficiently to change in Latin America over an indeterminate time so that the traditional sort of constitution which has been written in the past and which will probably continue to be written in the future will be more in accord with those changed conditions without the necessity of basically altering the type of document itself. This seems to posit an assumption that many will doubtless be unwilling to accept, viz., that a particular genre of written documents will show more permanence than the underlying conditions of life and society in a large segment of the world. It is argued that the qualities of the inner man are so deep-rooted and so little susceptible of change by fiat that the basic situation cannot be altered. But it can also be argued that conditions affecting human society can and do so fundamentally and radically shift that there is no recourse for humankind but to conform to its changed environment. An illustration may be found in the impact that the Industrial Revolution had on mankind in, say, the eighteenth century and after. Prior to it many of the ways of life, and certainly the total population of the western world, had remained little changed for centuries; after the impact of the Revolution was felt much of the organization of society had to be altered, a vast increase in population occurred within a few generations, and, in the political sphere, the relationship of government to governed inevitably had to be rethought and realigned.

In Latin America the Industrial Revolution is now introducing a ferment of significant proportions. A Sanitary Revolution has already taken place. The combination of the two (plus, of course, other circumstances) has resulted in a population explosion which, experts say, will give Latin America a population double that of the United States and Canada by the end of this century. It is inconceivable that a form of government which would serve the slow tempo of a pre-eighteenth-century society, whether colonial or independent, could serve for conditions in the latter half of the twentieth, complicated, as they undoubtedly will be, by the advent of an atomic age. Latin America is no longer in the backwash in which it slowly eddied prior to World War I. Granted that no Latin American state is a first-rank power in world affairs, it is still undeniable that the area as a whole and virtually all the states in it are to a far greater degree participants in international politics and economics than was true a half century ago. There are no more hermit Paraguays, as in Francia's day—nor can there be.

Latin American societies have been, by and large, notoriously unintegrated (and of course the term is not here used in the limited and technical sense in which it has been popularly employed in the United States in recent years). Their constitutional patterns, however, were very largely borrowed from countries, e.g., the United States and France, which enjoyed a far greater degree of integration (as used in this broader sense). If, then, social, economic, political, cultural, and perhaps other sorts of unification were to be introduced in greater degree in Latin America it follows that conditions would result which would presuppose a situation more in harmony with that on which the traditional constitutions of the area are based.

Integration is likely to come—slowly and erratically—to much of Latin America, though it is not safe to predict the time required for it. Several factors may be suggested briefly which will promote internal fusion and two which may retard it, or, in the case of one of them, a malign fate so willing, would prevent it. In their probable order of importance integration in Latin American countries would be (and is being) advanced by: (1) economic change, (2) the spread of literacy and education, (3) greater mobility of populations, (4) a more rational role for the "army", and (5) a potentially changed position for the Catholic Church. The negative factors, again in decreasing order of importance, are: (1) communism, and (2) a possibly unwise choice of policies by the United States government. These factors may deserve some slight amplification insofar as they are applicable to the process of constitution making in Latin America.

Economic change, now at flood tide in Mexico and Brazil, for example, involves not only industrialization but also the accumulation and domestic use of greater amounts of capital, diversification of agriculture and other aspects of the economy, growth of internal commerce relative to foreign trade, increased productivity and rate of productivity, and other aspects. In

its various ramifications it would seem to be the factor of greatest consequence in tying together more effectively the discrete parts of any given Latin American country.

Literacy and education are not synonymous but are obviously related. An illiterate person is not necessarily excluded from use of all media of communication in Latin America—the radio is probably a relatively more important medium there than in the United States—but he is undeniably limited in the contribution he can potentially make to the life of his community; he perforce dwells in a cultural and other sorts of isolation which not only makes him lonely but also keeps his country from making its best use of him. But literacy rates show spectacular improvement: a recent compilation indicated that only two Latin American countries had rates lower than 30 per cent and in one of those it missed that figure by only three-tenths of one per cent; nine countries had rates higher than 60 per cent. Educational programs are becoming more realistic, practical, and popular.

Population mobility, both physical and social, is improving. The former kind, in view of bettered highway and airplane facilities, needs no elaboration; it permits the actual removal of *estancia*-bound persons to cities and contributes to an intermingling of population which would otherwise be impossible. Social mobility is probably more important. The erosion of the plateau formerly occupied almost exclusively by the landed aristocracy means that the tightly knit social bonds which formerly held an *estancia* population together are now relaxed and the physical removal of the under-privileged and underpaid workers is facilitated. Industrialization and other changes in the cities permit an ascent on the socio-economic ladder which previously would have been difficult or even impossible.

The military bids fair to be "whittled down to size", at least psychologically, in various countries. This may be denied by those who read only the big headlines made by army activities in one or another Latin American country, but it may well prove true in the next two or three decades. The course of the Mexican army in the past quarter of a century is an omen. Other forces, especially economic, are deflating the military's traditional importance and weight and forcing it into a more rational role. Its previously abnormal position as a state within a state in many countries could not but retard integration; the modification of that position should operate in the opposite direction.

It is not suggested that the Catholic Church will cease to be a conservative institution and influence in Latin American affairs but rather that the breakdown of the traditional social pattern is bringing it to re-examine its position *vis-à-vis* the populations and areas which it has so long religiously dominated. This re-examination was foreshadowed by the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. The recent attitude of the Church in Latin America, or at least that of certain members of the hierarchy, has been one

of adopting a more active program pointed at solution of the social and economic problems of the peoples. A cautious surmise is in order that if continued and expanded this will contribute to integration.

On the other hand, one or two factors in the picture could operate in a contrary direction. One of them—and “would” rather than “could” is the auxiliary verb here needed—is communism. It is belaboring the obvious to point out that communism, until it were to take over in any Latin American country (as it came dangerously close to doing in Guatemala), thrives on setting class against class, on stirring up friction between Latin American regimes, on, above all, arousing general Latin American antagonism toward the United States. Disintegration is almost a consistent professional objective of Communist operations in Latin America.

Latin American politics is highly allergic to any presumption of interference by the United States and the policies of this government hence need to be very carefully considered indeed as they apply to the other American republics. The sensitization of the thin Latin American skin had many illustrations in times past, though more recent United States policies have been better conceived. Planning should be on a long-range basis, however, so that the breaking of a crisis, such as that in Guatemala a few years ago, will not prompt emergency measures which have after-effects that may be perhaps contrary to the permanent objectives of the United States government in Latin America.

On balance, the several plus and minus factors suggested above would seem almost certainly to point toward a progressively greater integration in Latin American social and economic organization. It will not be a quick transformation. We will see only individual trees and not until long afterward will we become aware that the appearance of the whole forest has changed.

The erosion of the social and economic mesas and the filling in of the barrancas will necessarily have political effects. As it stands, the only essentially new trend in Latin American constitution making thus far has been the spelling out of popular social and economic rights, in which connection we usually regard the Mexican constitution of 1917 as the prototype though the Mexicans themselves would assign major credit to their earlier constitution of 1857. This trend is of course merely in line with one which has been world-wide since the first World War. The amplification of these parts of new Latin American constitutions, sometimes in great and really legislative detail, was not in conflict with the democratic and usually unrealistic political structures inherited from earlier generations. Let us admit, however, that when detailed socio-economic bills of rights were written into such constitutions as the Nicaraguan it was only an imitative gesture and probably a cynical one at that. In several other instances we must realistically recognize that the advanced prescriptions represent merely ideals not yet attained in practice, as has so often been true in Latin American constitution writing.

As economic and social organization in at least the more advanced Latin American states comes to approximate what has been achieved in leading countries of the western world it follows that the constitutional pattern of political structure adopted in imitation of what in general prevailed in the latter countries will be less distant from reality than has heretofore been true. Mahomet will have gone toward the mountain.

Indeed, this change is already dimly in evidence. No Latin American constitution provides for or even sanctions, for example, a permanent continuance in office by one party, faction, or clique. Yet it has always been assumed that, barring a political miracle, the ins would stay in and the outs would indefinitely keep that position: it would be a naive president indeed who would not see to it that he or a handpicked successor succeeded himself. But let us look at the record: instances a few decades ago in which an opposition party or presidential candidate was elected, counted in, and allowed to take office were rare indeed. They occurred in Argentina in 1916, in Chile in 1920, and in Colombia in 1930, though in the second of those cases the circumstances were so unusual as to recall the disputed United States presidential election of 1876. In the last decade and a half, however, eight countries—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay—have offered examples of the sort. It is worth noting that seven of those countries (Peru was the single exception) ranked in the top half of the list of Latin American states as evaluated in 1955 by a panel of specialists in terms of democratic achievement. The correlation is significant. It also suggests that economic pressures are registering, that the military could be assumed to be less politically minded or less inclined to overt action, that political literacy and education are improving, et cetera. The greatly increased incidence of elections of this sort is at least *prima facie* evidence that some of those personal qualities of a democratic society such as Professor Mecham so well catalogued—tolerance, self-discipline, respect for the minority and for the rule of law—are beginning to have their innings in Latin American politics.

Let us now look at two of the current constitutions of Latin American states as case studies to see whether and how far this trend toward increasing susceptibility to economic and social change in one country or another is progressing. The two are the neighboring states of Uruguay and Paraguay. In the previously mentioned survey made in 1955 twenty specialists ranked them as respectively first and last among the Latin American states in terms of democratic achievement; indeed, in similar surveys made in 1945 and 1950 they had also been ranked first and twentieth each time. If the application of the single factor of democratic attainment, determined by a somewhat complex formula, has validity if projected to other phenomena, the contrast between these two Latin American states may tell us something about the process of constitution making in the area.

Paraguay's is a short constitution, drafted in general and sometimes vague terms; Uruguay's is long and detailed; the number of articles in the two is respectively 94 and 332. Neither the length nor the number of articles has much significance except insofar as it may indicate that the one is relatively unresponsive to popular pressures for dealing with matters constitutionally, and the other much more responsive. The Paraguayan constitution, drafted in 1940 and hence more than 150 years younger than that of the United States, still has similarities in subject matter to that of its far northern sister republic, and even a few resemblances in specific phraseology. It would be difficult to imagine two background situations as different as those in Paraguay and the United States. The fact that the constitution of the former state has any resemblance at all to that of the latter simply points up the unreality of the former document. Uruguay and the United States are more nearly comparable in terms of progress but the constitution of the smallest South American country bears no resemblance to that of the United States—it is far more the product of its own environment.

The bill of rights in the Uruguayan constitution is much more detailed than that in the Paraguayan; the latter basic law has references to social security in three articles whereas such provisions in the Uruguayan document are legion. Furthermore, these matters of personal and social protection as dealt with in the Uruguayan constitution give no impression of having been written in a vacuum; those in the Paraguayan law do convey that feeling: typical of the latter is the pathetic provision in Article 22 that "Every Paraguayan home should be located on a piece of owned land".

It is perhaps of some importance to try to determine (though it must be partially an arbitrary evaluation) how much of the respective constitutions is the product of peculiarly Paraguayan or Uruguayan circumstances, problems, or developments. In the case of the Paraguayan law only seven articles or parts of articles (less than a twelfth of the whole number of articles) bear a discernible relationship to the Paraguayan social, economic, or cultural landscape. Four of them involve matters dealing with the Church-State relationship and are of little substantive importance. One (Art. 5) simply states that Asunción is the national capital and the location of the governmental authorities. The only one of conceivable significance is Art. 62 which, in defining the composition of the Council of State (not an agency of great importance in the actual administration of the country), prescribes that among its members shall be "two representatives of the farming and cattle industries", a presumptive recognition of the importance of such activity in the economy of the country. In terms of voting strength on the Council of State the farming and cattle industries are thus incidentally put on a par with "the military institutions" inasmuch as the army and navy each have one representative!

In general, the Paraguayan constitution sounds as if it might have been

the graduation exercise of some student in a high-school class in constitution drafting. Or, except for its commendable lack of ornate verbiage, it might have been written by a *pensador* of a century and a half ago. It contains little evidence of having germinated in the good earth of the Paraguayan plains.

The Uruguayan law, by contrast, contains some eighty-six articles or parts of articles, more than a fourth of the whole number, which recognizably stem from situations or problems more or less peculiar to the country. A few illustrations will suffice: (1) Autonomous entities, as they are often called, are not unique in Uruguay but that country has developed and used them to a greater degree than any other in Latin America; they are dealt with in thirty-eight articles of Uruguay's constitution. (2) Political parties are an inevitable accompaniment of the democratic process and they, of course, proliferate in Latin America—only in the two dictatorships of Paraguay and the Dominican Republic do they become really fictitious. Uruguay has developed parties to a probably greater degree of influence in public life than is true of any other Latin American country; they are referred to in fourteen articles of the Uruguayan constitution. (3) The peculiar and complex voting system prevailing in Uruguay (the "double simultaneous vote") is at once the wonder and despair of many commentators; it also receives attention in fourteen articles of the constitution.

These and other instances give the impression that the Uruguayan basic law is much more tied to political reality in the country than is true in the case of Paraguay. Uruguay probably has progressed further toward over-all integration than any other country in Latin America. It is a difficult and thankless task to say which country has made the least progress—probably others would rank lower than Paraguay in that unenviable category. National integration, democratic attainment, and realism in constitution writing cannot be mathematically equated, of course, but it seems a tenable assumption that a relationship exists among them.

As various factors introduce greater unification or integration in one or another Latin American country it may be a reasonable conclusion that the political life of those countries will approach the general manifestations, though of course not necessarily the details, of those others of the western world which have already achieved a considerable measure of integration. In the latter we find less divergence between the written and the real constitutions; perhaps, then, in the former, too, the future will bring a condition of greater harmony and the task of constitution making can be approached more realistically.

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EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIAL ORDER

Observations on F. S. C. Northrop,
The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience *

I

The rise of the nations of Asia and, as one ought to add, Africa, and the invention of atomic weapons are two developments which threaten to shake the way of life the Western World has developed. Is there a way to ban these dangers and to provide for the world an harmonious order? These are the momentous questions to which the author of *The Meeting of East and West* has addressed himself in his new book. Although of the thirty-two chapters of this work, thirty are adaptations of articles published at earlier dates, the book constitutes a coherent whole and an impressive testimony to the consistency of the thought of the author as it has developed during his incumbency of the philosopher's chair at the Yale Law School. As the title of the book indicates, the author is concerned with human experience, i.e. epistemology in general, and more particularly, the relations between epistemology and man's ways of social order as expressed in ethics and law.

In his *Meeting of East and West*, Northrop engaged in a broad comparison of those epistemologies which he regards as constituting the bases of the different philosophies and different ways of esthetic expression respectively developed by Eastern and Western nations. In his new work Northrop carries his analysis to the field of Eastern and Western systems of social order and again he finds correspondence between these systems and the different systems of epistemology. Among the latter, the following three are distinguished: that of naive realism, that of empiricism, and that of postulational mathematics and physics. Naive realism, as represented especially by Aristotelianism, is the view in which the impressions of the senses are regarded as representing true reality. In empiricism it has been recognized that there is no guarantee of any reality corresponding to subjective experience. It represents itself in two variants, viz. first that of Western radical empiricism of Hume or James, in which no reality is recognized at all beyond impressions of the senses, and second, the view which is held in common by such Oriental philosophies as Confucianism, nihilistic Mahayana Buddhism

* F. S. C. Northrop, *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experiences* (Boston, 1959), XVI, pp. 331.

or Hinduism, in which the subject of experience is identified with the principle of the cosmos, Nirvana or the Atman. Finally, in the epistemology of Western mathematics and physics the concepts of experience are postulated by the mind and thereupon verified by the controlled experience of the experiment. Reality is not what it naively appears to be to the senses; it is not completely beyond the reach of experience, nor is it identical with the experiencing subject. It is tentatively posited by the mind; its elements, such as atoms or electrons, are not accessible to direct experience, but the appropriateness of the process in which they are posited can be verified in a way which is accessible to the senses.

For each of these three ways of epistemology Northrop now finds a correlation with one of the three basic types into which he finds that the legal systems of the world can be divided. He calls them the systems of mediational law, of status law, and of contractual law. In the mediational system, which is exemplified by Confucianism, Buddhist law or the legal thought of Gandhi, disputes are sought to be adjusted not so much by decision according to general rules as by mediation seeking to do justice to the unique and non-repetitive features of every individual case. This system of law corresponds to the epistemology of empiricism, particularly of the Oriental type. Each experience constituting a unique approach to that of the all embracing cosmic principle, general rules distort the uniqueness of personal existence so that no decision orienting itself by such rules can ever avoid distortion and thus alienation of the truth.

In the systems of status law each individual is held to occupy a fixed place in society and to be bound in his conduct to observe the rules which are customarily tied to that status, whether it be that of ruler or subject, master or slave, family chief or family member, citizen or stranger, priest or layman, etc. This system is exemplified by the oldest Roman society, by medieval Europe, Aryan India, tribal Africa, as well as by the living law of the South of the United States, where social status with its corresponding rights and duties is determined by color of skin. Determination of the rules of right social conduct by such externally observable facts as color of skin, birth in a particular family, or physical, economic or spiritual power characterise this system of status law as depending upon the epistemology of naive realism.

The third type of legal systems, the contractual, is characterised by the principles of universality, equality and individual freedom. In contrast to the mediational system, there are rules, but, in contrast to the system of status, they do not differ according to the individual's accidental position. They are valid for all mankind, they apply to the individuals as such as members of a society of equals in which they have consciously accepted the duties of membership and which correspondingly respects their fundamental rights and their basic dignity. Such a system was first conceived by the

jurisconsults of Rome. In modern times it was re-established by the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, and it has become the system characteristic of the Western World. Its epistemological counterpart is that of scientific physics and mathematics as developed by Euclid and the Stoa, by Newton, Locke and Einstein. As the atom in the postulational system of physics, so the individual's position in society must correspond to the postulate of the free contractual society, the truth of which can be verified.

The verification is developed in connection with the momentous problem of how to determine the ethical value of legal systems. According to a view which Northrop calls that of positivism and which he ascribes to such jurists as John Austin, Hans Kelsen, the late Professor Thayer of Harvard, Justice Frankfurter of the Supreme Court of the United States, and, above all, Judge Learned Hand, law is identical with the command of the sovereign and does not require any further justification. It must be obeyed because the sovereign has the power to enforce obedience, and the judge has no task beyond that of applying those rules which emanate from the law giver, who, in the United States is said to be identical with Congress.

To Northrop such a view appears as unsatisfactory. It has been equally unsatisfactory to those jurists to whom it is ascribed by him, but by none of whom it has ever been maintained in that form. In treating the positivists as blind to ethical values or social realities, Northrop has overlooked essential features of positivism. It will be shown that this misunderstanding, which is fateful for Northrop's approach, has been induced by his lack of awareness of the fact that the word "law" is used with different meanings by him and by the positivists.

Finding positivism unsatisfactory, Northrop turns to two other methods of jurisprudence, the psychological jurisprudence of Petrazycki and the sociological jurisprudence of such writers as Jhering, Roscoe Pound, Ehrlich und Underhill Moore. Since Petrazycki was interested in the problem of exploring the psychological phenomenon of what happens in the human mind when it develops such ideas as those of duty and right, it is no wonder that in his work no answer can be found to the question of how a system of positive law ought to be evaluated ethically. The attempt of having asked that question is ascribed by Northrop to Underhill Moore, for whose work, as for that of Ehrlich, he repeatedly expresses high respect and admiration. Starting from the thesis axiomatically held by American sociologists that the law must always lag behind the mores, Moore regarded it as the task of the creative lawyer to reduce this gap and to help the law to catch up with the mores. He thus concentrated his life's effort upon the development of a method accurately to determine those mores with which the law was held to be in need of catching up. While Underhill Moore was indeed interested in finding a standard to which the positive law was to be brought up, that

standard was not that of ethics. Such a standard can be found in Moore's work as little as in that of any other sociological jurist.

All the sociological jurists can do and have done is show that the positive law of a society does not necessarily correspond to what Ehrlich has called its living law or the inner order of the society in question, and that the positive law tends to be ineffective in the sense of being hard to enforce where it deviates from that inner order of society to a considerable measure. Northrop properly states that unless we are ready to accept as ethically of equal dignity the social orders of the Papuas, Communist China, Hindu India, Western Europe, as well as of all other actual societies of the present and the past, there still remains the question of evaluating these different social orders. In another place I have stated that there are offered to us the various systems of moral philosophy, that the necessity of choosing between them only postpones the ultimate choice by one degree, and that that ultimate choice cannot be made through the application of reason, but only by the irrational decision of individual predilection as determined by tradition, by the hormones, or by faith guided by divine grace.¹ Northrop finds such a position unsatisfactory. He regards it as possible for the ultimate decision to be found in the process of cognition rather than volition. Systems of moral philosophy are not above and beyond the mores of a society. In social anthropology it has been shown that philosophies constitute indeed the very core by which folkways and patterns of behavior are woven into unified inner orders of society. In each philosophy, Northrop observes, its ethics is inseparably connected with its epistemology. We, the citizens of the present world, are privileged to know the various systems of epistemology that have arisen. We can choose between them and that choice is one of cognition. The epistemology of naive realism can be demonstrated to be wrong. That of empiricism, especially of the Oriental type, can be shown to be inferior to, but not incompatible with, that of the postulational type. That latter, however, can be proved to be the true and correct one. Given the inseparable connection between epistemology and law, it follows that the contractual law of modern Western society is the right one for that order of mankind, national and international, in which Asian nations can live in peace with the nations of European stock, and in which atomic energy is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Being a lawyer rather than an epistemologist or cultural philosopher, I do not venture to criticize Professor Northrop's philosophical argument. My reluctance to accept it may be influenced by my inability to accept several of his statements about law, jurisprudence and sociology.

¹ "What Should be the Relations of Morals to Law", *Journal of Public Law*, I (1952), p. 287.

II

I have already indicated that I cannot accept Professor Northrop's description of legal positivism. It is based upon a double misunderstanding, one of positivism in general, and one of the position of those American jurists like judge Learned Hand, to whom Northrop ascribes not only insensitivity to ethical values, but also a tendency to nullify judicial review of congressional legislation. Positivism must appear to be insensitive to ethical evaluation if one defines law in the broad sense in which it is defined by Northrop. Although he does nowhere make explicitly clear his understanding of the much abused word law, he makes it at least apparent that he defines it more broadly than Austin, whom he reproaches for having defined law in the narrow sense of the command of the sovereign. In one place Northrop refers to law as the application of ethics to society in the settling of disputes.² Even though he does not limit the term to the settlement of disputes by courts of the state, and thus seems to include disputes settled by such authorities as arbitrators, elders, parents, or even just respected fellow citizens, that definition is not sufficiently broad to cover what law appears to signify implicitly in Northrop's thought. The term seems to cover not only those rules by which disputes are settled, but nothing less than all rules of social behavior of any kind, including those of ethics. But even this broad meaning corresponds only to what Northrop calls the positive law, which is only one part of law in general, the other part being constituted by the living law, which he presents as being constituted by the actual patterns of social behavior including the society's basic philosophy by which its law is made into its inner order. Northrop, in other words, equates law with social order. He is thus consistent when he demands that schools of law ought to provide their students with a full understanding of society including philosophy. Whether any law school, nay any school at all, can live up to such a comprehensive task, may well be questioned. The view that the task of a law school is of such breadth, seems indeed to be held by some of the members of the Yale Law School. This idea does not seem to be shared, however, by any other law school in the United States or anywhere else, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, where indoctrination with the Marxist-Leninist view of the world is as indispensable for the training of a lawyer, as it is for that of an officer of the army, an agronomist or the member of any other profession. Law schools in the United States, as in Western lands in general, have traditionally regarded it as the job of pre-law school education to provide the grounding in the inner order of society, and then to concentrate on the training in the proper handling of those rules of social behavior which are applied by the courts, i.e. those agencies whose decisions

² *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

are enforced by sheriffs, prison wardens, public executioners and other enforcement officers of the state. Law, as traditionally understood by law teachers, judges and attorneys, is thus indeed that set of rules of social behavior which, as Austin expressed it, is the command of the sovereign or, in a perhaps more correct formulation, the rules of social behavior insofar as conformity to them is enforced by certain specific officers of the sovereign power. It ought to be obvious that enforcement by sheriffs, policemen and other officers of government, is not the only, indeed not even the most important, sanction of rules of social behavior, and that there are many rules of social behavior which are not enforced by governmental action at all. The rule which forbids stealing is a rule of law insofar as its violation is to result in punishment through governmental power. But that rule has other sanctions too: the remorse experienced by the ethically sensitive individual, the fear of supernatural detriment experienced by the religious man, and the informal disapproval spontaneously expressed by the fellow citizens which may occur in subtle ways as well as in the harsh sanction of boycott. Insofar as the rule is sanctioned by informal social disapproval, it is a rule of convention; insofar as it finds its sanction in the fear of supernatural retaliation, it is a rule of religion; and insofar as it finds its sanction in the heart and conscience of the individual, it is one of ethics. Clearly there are many rules of social behavior which are not sanctioned by governmental action at all, and which thus are not rules of law, such as the rules of etiquette and fashion, the rules of charity and refined conscience, or, in our society, the rules of religious ritual. But not even the totality of all these different rules constitutes the whole of the social order. In each society there are the rules of art and prudence, as well as those set patterns of behavior which are observed without consciousness of any rule and simply in the reflexive ways of imitation and tradition. Law as understood by lawyers thus constitutes but a small segment of the social order. Indeed, as long as a society remains of that comparatively small size and homogeneous kind which characterize so-called primitive society it can dispense with law completely. In a larger and more heterogeneous society, law, i.e. enforcement of some rules of social behavior by governmental power, can, it is true, not be fully dispensed with. But in no society has law constituted the totality of the social order, except perhaps in the theory of the legalists of ancient China. Law thus being but one of the several standards of social behavior, its making, maintenance, and enforcement are subject to evaluation by other standards, i.e. those of convention, ethics and religion. As it has been shown in a remarkable inquiry of Professor Jenkins,³ positivists have taken exactly this position. While neither law nor any other standard can be measured or evaluated by itself, nothing prevents the standard of the law from being subjected to evaluation

³ "The Matchmaker, or Toward a Synthesis of Legal Idealism and Positivism", *Journal of Legal Education*, XII (1959), p. 1.

by other standards of social behavior. Evaluation of the law by the standard of ethics appears impossible only if the term law is defined so broadly as to include ethics. If that is done, one ought not to impute ethical insensibility to positivists who do not accept such a broad definition. The very narrowness of their definition, for which they are blamed by Northrop, enables them to do what Northrop erroneously claims that they omit, viz. to recognize and to demand the evaluation of the law under higher standards. Being people of modesty, most positivists recognize, it is true, that their training as lawyers has not necessarily prepared them for the task of evaluating the law, and that, if they engage in that task, they are doing so not as lawyers, but as citizens who are looking for guidance to leaders in philosophy or religion.

Insofar, however, as a lawyer is to act as lawyer, especially as a judge, he must be a positivist, i.e. a man who follows the law and nothing but the law, irrespective of what his personal convictions may be about the justice of the law. If he has accepted appointment to judicial office, the Roman Catholic must pronounce a divorce where the law requires him to do so, and the liberal must pass capital sentence however deeply he may ethically disapprove of it. Obedience to the law is what society expects of its judges, especially democratic society. This insistence upon judicial obedience to the command of the sovereign, i.e. legal positivism, has above all been a postulate of the French revolutionaries, who had many reasons for distrusting a judiciary largely recruited from circles hostile to the Revolution. For similar reasons Austin found it necessary with all acuteness to formulate a theory which should guarantee that the enactments of Reform parliaments were not to be emasculated by an unsympathetic judiciary. Like any other social theory, legal positivism cannot be appreciated *in abstracto*, but only from within the social framework within which it has been formulated and to which it is to apply.

As simply demanding obedience to the legislature, positivism cannot be understood, however, in the constitutional setting of a country like the United States of America, in which positive law appears in two layers, viz. that of the enactment of the Congress and, above it, the rules of the Constitution. Positivism requires that both sets be observed, and that they be observed in that order which is determinative in the superior set, i.e. that of the Constitution. Judicial review of congressional legislation and, incidentally, of state legislation too, is required in the United States, not by a jurisprudential theory, but by the command of positive legislation, i.e. the Constitution. Under the positive law of the United States only the constituent power is of that unlimited character which is usually ascribed to the sovereign. That government which has been established by the present Constitution is one of limited powers, especially of limited legislative powers. Under the positive law of the Constitution of the United States certain things are not to be done by the legislative branch of the government. The Congress is not

to enact a law regulating a matter left to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the states such as, for instance marriage and divorce, conveyancing or taxation for local purposes. Even within the field generally opened by the Constitution to federal law making, Congress is to stay within the limits established by the Bill of Rights. Congress is thus not to abolish for common law cases the trial by jury in the federal courts, it is not to enact a statute allowing double jeopardy or constituting an *ex post facto* law, it is not to allow the trial of civilians by military courts, etc. Just as federal legislative power is limited by the federal Constitution, so is that of the states, which in each state finds additional limitations in its own state constitution. The limitations of state legislative power by the federal Constitution are numerous. No state legislature may, for instance, enact a law allowing a violation of the obligation of contract, or authorizing the issuance of currency, or, generally, entering a field which Congress has preempted by legislation permitted to it by the Constitution of the United States. In addition, there is the broad limit of the 14th Amendment, which forbids any state to deny a citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

It has been in connection with this last named provision of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, that there has arisen a controversy in the course of which American jurists like Justice Holmes, Chief Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter, or Judge Learned Hand have made statements which have been misunderstood by Northrop and thus induced him to charge these men with having advocated a positivism which would eliminate all judicial control of Congressional legislation, and of finding themselves in contrast to such judges as Warren, Douglas or Black, who are said to have insisted upon judicial control upon the basis of a jurisprudential theory other than positivism. What has actually taken place has been a controversy moving entirely within the framework of positivism, i.e. a controversy about the proper interpretation of the 14th Amendment as well as of other provisions of the Constitution, whose text is formulated so vaguely that it does not unequivocally demand of the judge a clearly determined decision. What does it mean that a person is not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law? Everybody agrees that the clause guarantees a certain minimum fairness of procedure. But does it also forbid the enactment of laws which affect some person's liberty or property in a way that appears unfair or unreasonable? If so, who is to judge reasonableness? Is it permissible for a state to subject corporations to certain controls or taxes, or to prescribe minimum wages, or maximum hours, or to forbid child labor? Is it permissible for Congress in times of economic depression to regulate agricultural production, to establish a moratorium for municipal corporations, or to enact a comprehensive scheme of economic national recovery? It was about these problems of protection of corporations, of social legislation, and

of New Deal laws that there arose the struggle about so-called substantive due process, which culminated in the struggle between the Roosevelt administration and the Supreme Court, and finally resulted in the almost complete abandonment by the Supreme Court of the idea of substantive due process. It was in the course of these debates that the defenders of social legislation and the New Deal resorted to every conceivable argument by which the powers of the Nine Old Men or their conservative majority might be curbed. Some of the liberals went even so far as to suggest that the limitations set to legislation by the Constitution of the United States were not meant to empower the courts to treat as ineffective a law that had been properly enacted, but that these rules were addressed only to the legislative branch itself, i.e. the Congress and the President. That view was never accepted, however, by the Supreme Court itself, not even by any one of those of its justices who dissented from the conservative majority. Yet, even those who held the view that judicial review was not provided in the Constitution, based themselves not upon any jurisprudential theory, but upon positivistic arguments of constitutional interpretation. They did not prevail; they never were more than a small voice which was not ineffective, however, in persuading the Court that popular indignation about its anti-liberal attitude might some day assume such proportions that its power of review of legislation might indeed be swept away unless it came to exercise it with greater self-restraint.

Some of the arguments which had been voiced against the once conservative majority of the court are now being used by conservative critics of the present liberal Court's efforts to protect civil liberties and racial equality against restrictive activities of the federal and of state legislatures. But just as in the Supreme Court fight of the 1920s and 30s, the new dispute is carried on entirely within the framework of positivistic constitutional interpretation.

A need to go beyond the limits of positivistic application of the existing law can arise only in countries in which, unlike the constitutional system of the United States, the constitution does not set limits to the powers of the majority of the legislative bodies or of a dictatorial or otherwise absolutist ruler. It has been in such situations that defenders of individual liberties or minority rights have taken refuge in the idea of a higher law which would set to the law-making power such limits that a command contrary to the higher postulates would not be "law" at all. Since the days of Saint Thomas and his precursors such higher law has usually been called natural law. The insistent preaching of this idea has indeed been effective to some extent to persuade medieval rulers or 17th century monarchs to limit themselves in the exercise of their powers. It can be of little effect, however, as against a dictator who sees to it that either the judiciary is permeated with his own ideas or takes away judicial activities from the judiciary to be handed over

to more trustworthy agencies of the administration or the ruling party. Retroactively to apply, with the late Gustav Radbruch, a doctrine of natural law to the enactments of a dictatorial regime that has been overthrown, and, as it is presently done in Germany, to deny the character of law to certain enactments of the National-Socialist regime, can only result in meting out punishment for acts which the actor believed not to be punishable at the time of acting. Such a result may satisfy the desire for revenge or feelings of outraged revulsion against tyranny, but it can hardly promote confidence in the security and predictability of the law.

Since positivists limit the term law to those norms of social behavior which are enforced by the organized power of government, it is unjustified to impute to them, as Northrop does, advocacy of the doctrine of the omnipotence of governmental compulsion. Even in the United States with its widely held popular belief that any social evil can be uprooted simply by passing a law against it, the positivist thinker will be rare who would share such a naive idea. The effectiveness of the law is limited, and certain cherished ends of social reform can be achieved more effectively through the norm systems of convention, ethics or religion, which, in turn, can be influenced by education, preaching, propaganda or advertising. Of course, what in a given situation the limits are to the effective use of the heavy weapon of the governmental sanction, is a problem which the lawyer is not competent to answer *qua* lawyer. It belongs to the spheres of the statesman, the politician or the sociologist. Among the last-named, the problem has been tackled by Ehrlich, whose results are marred, however, by his failure to distinguish between *ius strictum* and *ius dispositivum*. The latter consists of those innumerable rules which private law holds in store to provide the solution of a problem which arises in connection with a private transaction, but for which the parties have failed to provide a solution of their own. What is to be done, for instance, when merchandise bought in a sale turns out to be defective? Experienced, well-advised traders will insert in their contract a clause exactly providing for that contingency. What is to be done in his will when uncle Zachariah has left to his nephew Ned his 100 shares of stock in A.T. & T., and no A.T. & T. stock is among the assets of the estate when uncle dies ten years later? Of course, a well advised testator should have provided for the contingency that he might sell his A.T. & T. stock and stated what, if anything, Ned is to have in such a case. However, not all contracting parties or testators are experienced and well-advised. In innumerable cases they fail to provide for contingencies which later happen to arise. For such cases the law holds ready its rules of *ius dispositivum* (stop gap law, yielding law). To argue, as Ehrlich did, that the law is ineffective because in numerous cases parties to private transactions provide their own rules rather than let the rules of stop-gap law take their course, is no argument against the effectiveness of attempts by law compulsorily to

prescribe certain patterns of conduct and to proscribe others. That problem can arise only with respect to the *ius strictum*, the unyielding, compulsory, prescriptive law. What are the limits to its effectiveness as a means of social control? This problem is known in sociology as that of the legitimacy of a legal order, and its most searching analysis has been that by Max Weber.⁴ He has shown that compulsion alone will rarely be effective unless it be supported by a general belief in the rightness of its being exercised by the yielders of power. Upon the basis of a far flung analysis of social systems of Eastern, Western and primitive societies, Weber came to distinguish three main patterns in which a legal order can find its legitimation, viz. either the belief in charismatic qualities of the holders of power, or sheer tradition, or the rationally formed conviction that the existing system of power and law is ethically right and proper. It would be challenging to investigate in what ways these "ideal types" of Weber's correspond to Northrop's three systems of epistemology and law. It would be of interest to investigate in what ways Northrop's acceptance of Kluckhohn's discovery that knowledge of a society's basic philosophy is necessary for the understanding of the inner meaning of its social order corresponds to Weber's thesis that sociology cannot be satisfied with the mere observation of patterns of behavior, but has to be a "sociology of understanding" in the sense of investigating the meaning with which such behavior is carried on.

That such meaning can be of infinite variety has also been recognized by Weber. In one species of meaning, the religious, Weber came to be particularly interested in the course of his inquiries. Religion being intrinsically connected with epistemology, further pursuit of Weber's ideas would again appear fruitful in a work of the kind of Northrop's, in whose impressive list of sources the name of Weber is absent. This absence is all the more regrettable as Weber has done what Northrop has been urging, viz. systematically carrying on the comparison of East and West, including the comparison of legal systems. Indeed, one of Weber's main concerns was one which is also one of Northrop's, that of comparatively defining the peculiar characteristics of Western law, especially its Civil Law branch, and to trace its roots and bases. Weber's analysis of what he calls the legal system of formal rationality corresponds in essential respects to Northrop's system of contractual law. Weber also recognizes, of course, the role which was played in the development of this system by the jurists of ancient Rome. By indicating the connections between the work of these men and the epistemological theories of pre-Aristotelian Greek philosophy and science, especially Euclid, as mediated by the Stoics, Northrop ascribes to the Roman jurists a decisive role in the development of that legal and social order of the West in which rules of universal validity safeguard the freedom and dignity of the individual.

⁴ *Law in Economy and Society*, ed. Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, 1954).

There is no doubt that the Roman jurists, or at least a good many of them, were steeped in the ideas of Stoicism.⁵ There can be no doubt either that the work of the Roman jurists has had a profound influence on later developments of Western law, especially the Civil Law. But can it really be said that the decisive factor consisted in that epistemology of Greek science which was mediated to the modern West through them? The breaking down of the ancient *ius civile* of the City of Rome and its transformation into the *ius gentium* uniform for all parts of the Roman Empire, to what extent was it the fruit of a cosmopolitan philosophy and to what extent a response to administrative and commercial needs, provided it ever was reality at all rather than theory?⁶ While it is true that the law which was developed by the Roman jurists was appropriate to free contractual dealing among equals, one must not forget that the equality consisted in the equal subjection to the absolute rule of often despotically arbitrary emperors. The rule of freedom was not extended to the sphere of public law, and even in that of private law status continued to play its role. Legal position continued to be profoundly different for a pater familias and a filius familias, not to speak of the continuation of slavery, upon the refined definitions of the incidents of which the jurists spent much loving effort. Indeed, when they wished to illustrate some rule of the law of sale of goods, or property, or tort, the sale of, or bodily injury to, the slave Stichus was their stock example, in which Stichus consistently appeared not as a person but as a thing. If systematization and rational elaboration upon the basis of unified, postulational concepts is regarded as a major characteristic of modern Civil law, it must be remembered that this feature of it has been much more the work of the Commentators of the late Middle Ages and their successors, such as the Dutch jurists of the 17th century, Pothier, or the Pandectists of the 19th century, than of the jurists of Rome, who were anything but systematists.

Many ingredients have gone into the making of the modern Western laws and Western society, among them one which is hardly mentioned anywhere in Northrop's account: Christianity. Would Christian insistence upon the equal value of all souls before God not have had anything to do with the development of the modern ideal of equality of all human beings before

⁵ It is not fully certain, however, whether this holds true for those classical jurists of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, who were the master architects of Roman law. Of the much older Scaevolas, who are repeatedly mentioned by Northrop, we know too little fully to estimate their significance. See W. Kunkel, *Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen* (Weimar, 1952), pp. 8, 10, 12, 14, 18. On the Roman jurists' general attitudes toward Greek philosophy, see F. Schulz, *History of Roman Legal Science* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 62, 69, 70, who states the result of his inquiries as follows: "Although a number of the leading lawyers drank deep of the well of Greek philosophy, a philosophy of law was not developed, and philosophy stopped at the frontiers of Roman law."

⁶ Cf. L. Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs* (Leipzig, 1891).

the law? The reduction of the inner order of Western society to that one factor of epistemology would, if it really is Northrop's idea, appear to be as much an oversimplification as the sole emphasis placed upon the relations of production by Marx, upon war by Franz Oppenheimer, or upon race by Gobineau. History has woven a seamless web. To disentangle its threads is one of the great tasks of social science, but pursuit of one thread must not let us overlook that there are others.

If read as an attempt in the course of human history to trace the role of the factor epistemology, to recognize by cultural comparison its varying species and their varying influences upon other social factors, Northrop's new book is a work of considerable significance, theoretically and from the practical approach to the great problems of national and international social order. It is challenging in its originality of thought, stimulating in the richness of its comparative base, and replete with fascinating insights. It is a major contribution to the comparative sociology of cultures and to the present efforts to expand, nationally and internationally, the rule of law.

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IMMIGRANTS AND ASSOCIATIONS:
CHINESE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY SINGAPORE

INTRODUCTION

The society built up by Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has always been remarkable for its wealth of voluntary associations. In the various historical and sociological studies of Southeast Asian Chinese which have appeared the importance of associations has been duly stressed, although in respect of only two settlements have we been given full treatment of their structure and significance.¹ In this paper I shall consider the associations which Singapore Chinese created and modified in the course of the nineteenth century. Studying this earlier period of Singapore history we can see how the Chinese members of the colonial society adapted their social organization to the conditions of a trading settlement in which, while they often amassed great riches, they were not their own political masters. At the end of the paper I shall consider the Singapore evidence within the wider setting of Southeast Asia and put forward certain general conclusions which may be taken up in other papers on the same theme.

CHINESE IN SINGAPORE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

When Raffles acquired Singapore for the East India Company in 1819 the Chinese numbered a mere handful in a total population which was itself tiny. By the end of the century the Chinese were more than seventy per cent of a population of over a quarter of a million, having begun to outnumber the non-Chinese in the 1840s. The mass coolie traffic developed in earnest about the middle of the century, and Singapore as the main Malayan port of entry

¹ See T'ien Ju-k'ang, *The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure*. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology (London, 1953); and G. W. Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), and *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958). For Indonesia see W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, 1936); and Ong Eng Die, *Chineez in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Assen, 1943). Some forms of association are discussed in M. Freedman, *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore* (London, 1957). For the region as a whole see V. Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, 1951). The general historical background to the material of this paper is to be found in the last work and in V. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, 1948). I should like to thank Mr. J. M. Gullick for criticising an early draft of this paper and for making a number of historical and sociological comments, and Mr. W. L. Blythe, C.M.G., for his expert advice on a number of matters,

took in great numbers of Chinese many of whom remained for some time in the settlement. Certainly, before modern times the Chinese population had a markedly transient character. At the end of the century about ten per cent of Singapore Chinese were locally born and only a fifth of the total Chinese population was female. During the period we are discussing Singapore Chinese were preponderantly able-bodied men; women, girls, boys, and old men were relatively few in number.

The Chinese who found their way overseas were nearly all either peasants or small business men and craftsmen from the countryside. To get the numbers of emigrants demanded by the labour market in Southeast Asia the recruiters scoured the rural area; the urban concentrations of poor people were too small to act as adequate reservoirs. From the countryside of Fukien and Kwangtung, Chinese left to find a living overseas—as refugees from official displeasure, as banishees from their local communities, as captives in “clan” wars sold to dealers, as free emigrants seeking their fortune, and as contract coolies.

The organised coolie traffic led Chinese from narrowly defined areas of the homeland to concentrate in particular parts of Malaya. Singapore, however, was not a mining territory, while the plantations played only a small part in its development; as a result it was rarely the final destination of the coolies brought over by recruiters. At the cross-roads of Southeast Asia Singapore built up a very heterogeneous population of Chinese. Within this population were found speakers of all the dialects of Fukien and Kwangtung, and on the basis of differences in their spoken language the Chinese in Singapore, as elsewhere, proceeded to organise their social life. Writing of his fellows in the middle of the century a prominent Singapore Chinese divided them into six categories: Hokkien, Tiuchiu, Malacca Chinese, Cantonese, Hakka, and Hainanese.² In 1881 the official census broke down the Chinese population of the settlement in the following manner:³

	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Total Chinese</i>
Cantonese	9,699	5,154	14,853
Hokkien	23,327	1,654	24,981
Tiuchiu	20,946	1,698	22,644
Hakka	5,561	609	6,170
Hainanese	8,226	53	8,319
Straits-born	4,513	5,014	9,527
Not stated	259	13	272
Totals	72,571	14,195	86,766

The Malacca Chinese referred to by Siah U Chin in 1848 and the Straits-

especially those touching the secret societies. Part of the work on which this study is based was made possible by a grant from the Department of Sociological and Demographic Research, London School of Economics and Political Science.

² Siah U Chin, “The Chinese in Singapore”, *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* (Logan’s *Journal*), II (1848), p. 290.

³ *Census of the Straits Settlements, 1881* (Singapore).

born Chinese enumerated in the censuses between 1881 and 1901 were people otherwise known as Babas. Although not a dialect group in any literal sense, they formed a distinct element of the Chinese population both in respect of their cultural differentiation and their economic and social position. The Malacca Babas were Chinese in their social identity, but in language and some other cultural respects they resembled the Malays among whom they lived. Many of these Babas moved into Singapore on its establishment as a British possession, and there, joined by recruits from the general Chinese population, they continued their distinctive way of life. During the nineteenth century the great dearth of women in the non-Baba section of the Chinese population ensured that a large proportion of those born in the settlement were in fact born into Baba families.

When the Chinese went to Singapore they were in search of a livelihood. They found it in the growing of gambier and pepper, in the practice of labour and crafts which were necessary for the building up and maintenance of the new settlement, and in various forms of trade. For the most part, these economic activities kept Chinese in the town, but some of them established clearings in the wild countryside which was remote from British authority in the early period. When the Chinese population later increased by leaps and bounds and the growing of pepper and gambier ceased to play an important part in Singapore's economy (as it began to do in the 'sixties), the role of the agriculturalist in Singapore Chinese society declined. Trade, the pursuit of crafts, and the performance of unskilled labour characterised a largely urban economy.

The commercial economy provided ample opportunities for immigrants to make money, and many of them succeeded handsomely. Immigrants found themselves in a free economy by means of which some of them managed to climb to the top. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the Malacca Babas, their descendants, and those who had become assimilated to them appear to have maintained a consistently high position in the economic scale. From Siah U Chin's data for 1848 we can see that the "Malacca Babas", as he calls the whole category, were predominantly traders and business men and lacked the working class elements strongly represented in the other dialect groups. The dominance of Baba culture in the nineteenth century was due not simply to the passage of wealth from generation to generation, but also, and perhaps mainly, to the absorption of successful immigrants into Baba society. The poor newcomer in an overwhelmingly male society could hardly find a wife in Singapore; the successful immigrant could secure a wife from among the Straits-born. So preponderant was the influence of the Babas, at least in Western eyes, that as recently as 1913 an observer could regard them "as the most highly educated and the most influential section of the Chinese community in the British possessions. . . ."⁴

⁴ The Rev. W. G. Shellabear, "Baba Malay. An Introduction to the Language of the

On the other hand, as time went on the Babas tended also to concentrate on "safe" clerical jobs and withdrew from economic enterprise, so that at the end of the century their status as a whole was in fact declining.

In a society based economically on business and recruited largely from peasant China, social differentiation was geared very closely to the distribution of wealth. Men who made money moved up in the social scale, and those who lost it declined. Except at the end of the century when cultural nationalism promoted studies in Mandarin among a few Chinese, and except for the Babas who went to English schools, little attention was paid to education. Not only was it uncalled for in a political system which did not recruit administrators from among the Chinese, but it was also largely unnecessary, except in a rudimentary form, for the kinds of economic activity in which Chinese engaged. (The imperial examination system of China provided Singapore Chinese with something to gamble on at the end of the century, but it did not attract them to classical studies.⁵ Their ambitions were channelled along commercial lines.) The poor immigrant was at a disadvantage in lacking capital, but once he had amassed some he could go ahead without fear that his lack of education would prevent him either from exploiting his economic position fully or from reaping the social benefits of economic success. The power and prestige of the illiterate or half-literate rich man were not challenged by Chinese bearing the stamp of the cultivated gentry.

The men who acquired riches and came to occupy positions of power sought to differentiate themselves in a number of ways from their humbler fellows. In 1869 "a circular was issued by some Chinese requesting their friends to draw a line between the higher and the lower classes of the Chinese community by the wearing of stockings".⁶ Some Singapore Chinese availed themselves of the opportunity to buy imperial degrees when in the last decades of its existence the Manchu dynasty was especially given to raising funds in this manner.⁷ Club life and the lavish celebration of weddings, birthdays, and funerals were other means by which the rich could at once display their wealth and validate their status. The speculative nature of the

Straits-born Chinese", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*, no. 65 (Dec. 1913), p. 52.

⁵ See the sour comment of the Acting Protector of Chinese in *Straits Settlements Annual Reports for the year 1895* (Singapore, 1896), p. 166 and G. T. Hare's fascinating monograph, *The Wai Seng Lottery. Publications of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, I (Singapore, 1895).

⁶ Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (London, 1923), p. 153.

⁷ But it would seem that imperial honours were sometimes forced upon Singapore Chinese. Large sums of money were subscribed during the war with France, in some cases because the Singapore Chinese feared reprisals on their families in China. See *The Straits Settlements Government Gazette* [hereafter cited as *Gazette*] (Feb. 12, 1886), p. 131.

business in which many rich men engaged did not ensure for them a safe place at the top of their society, nor was wealth so regularly and securely transmitted down the generations as to procure a class system based on descent. The class of rich and influential Chinese established itself early in the history of Singapore,⁸ but it was a class the personnel of which appears to have been subject to constant change.

Certain social correlates of Chinese economic life in Singapore are clear. The individuals and organizations controlling the "pig business" (by which labourers were shipped from China and distributed to the Southeast Asian markets) were well situated to exercise power within the Chinese ranks. The clipping together of riches and social status (with no intermediate qualification), and the reliance by the Singapore authorities on rich Chinese to be spokesmen for their fellows, produced a structure of control in which the relations between employer and employed and between creditor and debtor were likely to be political as well as economic. Moreover, these political and economic relations might be expressed in the setting of voluntary associations, so that various forms of ritual and secular solidarity could enter into the ties between men unequally balanced in wealth and status.

One further aspect of Chinese social organization in Singapore must be considered before we can understand the significance of voluntary associations. The Babas built up a system of family, kinship, and marriage which tied them into a wide network of social relations. Some of the immigrants married into the Baba camp, but for the great mass of the China-born Chinese family and marriage played a relatively small part in the ordering of their lives. Certainly, the immigrant was not likely to have a wife and children in Singapore. Whatever residential, economic, and political framework he succeeded in fitting himself into he was not likely to find himself mainly in the company of kinsmen. Although men sometimes grouped themselves in voluntary associations on the basis of surnames, the major structural features of Singapore Chinese society were generally remote from kinship.

SECRET SOCIETIES

One of these structural features was the secret society.⁹ In comparison with other matters touching the social life of the Malayan Chinese in the nine-

⁸ Cf. Raffles's statement in 1822 that the Chinese were roughly divided into three classes: those who gained their living by handicrafts and personal labour, a "higher and more respectable class engaged in mercantile speculation", and cultivators. See Song, *op. cit.*, pp. 11f.

⁹ Among the more recent works on this topic are W. L. Blythe, "The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya", *Eastern World* (London, March and April 1950), and L. Comber, *Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, a Survey of the Triad Society from 1800 to 1900. Monographs of the Association for Asian Studies*, 6 (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1959).

teenth century, there is a considerable body of writing on the secret societies, not only because they were important in determining the behaviour of Chinese, but also because they offer more dramatic and colourful material than other facets of Chinese social organization. One can scarcely assert that this literature affords us a satisfactory account of the secret societies and their role, but at least we may expect to find in it some important clues to their structure, working, and significance.

The society or group of societies known as the Triad was especially associated with the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, where by the nineteenth century it had come to play an important part in the political relations between the people and the state.¹⁰ Emigration to Southeast Asia took it overseas to enjoy a major role in Chinese social life and prove a source of dismay to colonial administrators. It is even possible that after the end of the T'ai-p'ing period in China the main centre of Triad activity lay overseas.¹¹ Singapore, at the hub of the region, must have been the scene of many secret society meetings and decisions which affected a wide area.

We may begin with a very brief chronological survey of the data on secret society activity in Singapore. We know that secret societies were established there at a very early date. In an eyewitness account which probably relates to 1824 Abdullah Munshi, Raffles's tutor, gives us a picture of a secret society meeting held in the interior of the island.¹² By the 1840s the secret societies had won a reputation for lawlessness and were said to number perhaps 10,000 members¹³ when the total Chinese population of the settlement was some 20,000. At this period the "Teian Tay Huey" (that is, the Heaven and Earth Society, an alternative name for the Triad) was thought to be governed by a council of four officers, each of whom represented a "tribe": Amoy (that is, Hokkien), Kheh (Hakka), Teouchoo (Tiuchiu), and Macao (that is, Cantonese).¹⁴ We catch a glimpse of the pervasiveness of the secret societies at this time and of the cleavages within their ranks from a statement made in China by a Chinese who had been in the Straits for many years. "Secret societies have risen up in all the settlements. But they are all emanations of the *Triad Society*." There were two great societies, the "*hae-shan-hwuy*, 'the sea and land society'; and the *e-ching-hwuy*, 'the righteous rising society'. These two associations are scattered over all the settlements. . . ." As soon as a newcomer arrived in the Straits he was invited to join. If he refused he was at once persecuted. However, the two societies

¹⁰ Cf. M. Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeast China*. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology (London, 1958), pp. 117ff.

¹¹ Cf. H. A. Giles, *Freemasonry in China* (Amoy, 1880), p. 27.

¹² See A. H. Hill, "The Hikayat Abdullah, An Annotated Translation", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*, XXVIII, part 3 (June 1955), chap. 21.

¹³ An Old Resident [W. H. Read], *Play and Politics, Recollections of Malaya* (London, 1901), p. 91.

¹⁴ C. B. Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* (Singapore, 1902), pp. 365ff.

often wrangled, "and if you belong to the one and not to the other, you are equally persecuted".¹⁵

In 1851 secret society men attacked Chinese Roman Catholics living in the interior, when over five hundred Chinese were said to have been killed,¹⁶ and in 1854 there was a ten days' riot which accounted for some six hundred dead.¹⁷ (J. D. Vaughan, writing of the 1854 riot a quarter of a century later, asserted that it was a fight between natives of Fukien and Kwangtung and had nothing to do with the secret societies.¹⁸) There were further riots in the 1860s. The Governor, Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, and a large section of the European population were in favour of submitting the secret societies to strict control. In the first year of his governorship Cavenagh wrote:¹⁹

There is no doubt that the Societies do lend themselves to the obstruction of the course of Justice, and it is generally believed that they are ambitious of drawing all criminal cases among their countrymen to their own tribunals. In civil matters their settlement of disputes is looked upon rather with favor than otherwise, and to their apprehensions, their claim to adjust criminal cases is equally well grounded . . . Murder and kidnapping are said to be of frequent occurrence in order to remove obnoxious witnesses out of the way, but there is probably some exaggeration in the reported frequency of such crimes.

The only way in which Cavenagh and his colleagues could hold the societies in check when trouble broke out was to swear in their leaders as special constables and parade them up and down in order, as Cavenagh says with nice irony, "to entice them to take a warm personal interest in the preservation of the peace".²⁰

The mounting official resentment over Chinese brawls finally found its way on to the statute book in an ordinance aimed at suppressing dangerous societies which was brought into force in 1869. Under this ordinance began the registration of secret societies.²¹ In 1876, the year before he was appointed the first Protector of Chinese, W. A. Pickering wrote that the registration of the secret societies was a farce because their real leaders kept out of the limelight,²² but after a little experience in his new office he ap-

¹⁵ "Chinese Emigrants", *The Chinese Repository*, II, no. 5 (Canton, Sept. 1833), pp. 230f. The two societies mentioned here are the Hai San and Ghee Hin of later writings.

¹⁶ Song, *op. cit.*, pp. 82ff. Cf. *Gazette* (April 9, 1880), p. 223, on secret society hostility to Christian Chinese. Christianity did not make great headway among the Singapore Chinese.

¹⁷ Read, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

¹⁸ *Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements* (Singapore, 1879), pp. 92f.

¹⁹ *Administration Report, Straits Settlements, 1858-59*, p. 53.

²⁰ *Administration Report, Straits Settlements, 1861-62*, p. 3, and Cavenagh's book, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* (London, 1884), p. 255. Cf. Read, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 107f.

²¹ *Gazette* (Feb. 28, 1878), p. 90.

²² W. A. Pickering, "The Chinese in the Straits Settlements", *Fraser's Magazine* (Aug. 1876), p. 440.

peared to believe that the society leaders were generally cooperating with the Government and that the system was working well.²³

In 1879 the official register of dangerous societies showed a total membership of nearly 24,000, the societies appearing individually as follows:²⁴

	<i>No. of office- bearers</i>	<i>No. of registered members</i>	<i>Subscribers</i>
Ghee Hin (Hok Kien)	187	4,291	3,380
Ghee Hin (Tie Chew)	45	1,453	1,187
Ghee Hin (Hailam)	60	1,576	1,156
Ghee Hok	304	4,728	3,234
Ghee Sin	61	1,212	972
Ghee Khee Kwang Hok	61	2,331	1,377
Hok Hin	92	3,109	1,575
Kong Fooy Sew	55	1,576	1,026
Song Peh Kwan	40	2,224	1,160
Haisan	19	1,358	821
Totals	924	23,858	15,888

In Vaughan's list of the secret societies, which consists of the same as those given in the official register, the name Ghee Hin is extended to the Kong Fooy Sew and the Song Peh Kwan, which are regarded respectively as the Cantonese and Hakka branches of the Ghee Hin. Vaughan says further that the Ghee Hok, Ghee Khee Kwang Hok, Hok Hin, and Ghee Sin were branches of the Ghee Hin but now at odds with it.²⁵ Pickering's *Annual Report* for 1878 supports the thesis that all the societies (with the apparent exception of the Hai San) were organisationally connected, for he writes: "In cases when the headmen of a lodge offend against the general laws of the Ghee Hin (or mother) Society, they are tried at the Rochore Kong-si house, before a general council of the nine branches. . . ." ²⁶ In 1881, when the total male Chinese population of the settlement was 72,571, the secret society books showed 33,103 members, of whom 16,195 had actually paid their subscriptions in that year. It is clear from this and other evidence that the influence of the societies was widespread.

An effect of registration and supervision by the police and the Chinese Protectorate was to keep the headmen in check and to prevent quarrels between societies from being realised to the full. At the same time the superimposition of an outside power weakened the headmen *vis-à-vis* their followers and sometimes affected their ability to keep order within their own

²³ *Gazette* (Feb. 21, 1879), p. 11, and W. A. Pickering, "Chinese Secret Societies", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Straits Branch*, no. 3 (July 1879).

²⁴ *Gazette* (April 9, 1880), p. 228. The romanization of the names of the secret societies was very erratic.

²⁵ Vaughan, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

²⁶ *Gazette* (Feb. 21, 1879), p. 111.

ranks.²⁷ Increasing governmental control of the societies curbed what seemed to be their undesirable activities but loosened their internal disciplinary force, so that registration was not entirely successful. Authority had to be taken to suppress a dangerous society (in 1882 the Hai San met this fate), while locally born Chinese were forbidden to be members of the societies because the weapon of banishment could not be used against them.

So-called Friendly Societies also began to be registered as dangerous societies because of their obnoxious activities; some of them were later suppressed, as were several of the secret societies. Difficulties were brought to a head in 1887 when Pickering was attacked by a man said to have been incited by the headman of the Ghee Hok society. Pickering now thought the time had come to bring about a gradual abolition of the societies,²⁸ and on the first day of 1890 a new ordinance came into force which suppressed them altogether. From this date the secret societies began to decline to the status of small-scale criminal organizations as we have known them in more recent times. Once removed from the political plane they became, insofar as they survived, small groups without a larger framework of organization.²⁹ At 1890, therefore, we may draw a line across the chronological narrative and try to analyse the evidence on the secret societies during the first half of Singapore's history.

In the first place, it is apparent that although all, or nearly all, the secret societies in Singapore continued to operate under the anti-Manchu banner which had furnished them with their *raison d'être* in China, and retained an elaborate ritual of initiation which enshrined this political purpose, their activities overseas—except when they supported rebellion in the homeland³⁰—were not really concerned with anti-dynastic policy. When the Manchus were finally overthrown in the twentieth century the secret societies continued underground in Singapore much as before; and we may argue for the nineteenth century that once the anti-dynastic apparatus was moved overseas it adapted itself to new aims. These aims included the assertion of the independence of the Chinese in territory under the control of "foreigners" and the building up of some kind of community organization to meet the needs of new settlements.

While the anti-Manchu aspect of the secret societies in Singapore was unimportant, their general political aspect was not, for they were for a long time the means by which control was exercised within the Chinese fold by

²⁷ *Gazette* (Feb. 22, 1878), p. 90; (Feb. 22, 1879), p. 111; (April 9, 1880), p. 224; (April 29, 1881), p. 355.

²⁸ *Gazette* (April 27, 1888), pp. 901f.

²⁹ Cf. L. Comber, "Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, an Introduction", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*, XXIX, pt. I (May 1956), p. 155.

³⁰ Singapore Chinese played a prominent part in the Amoy uprising of 1853. See G. Hughes, "The Small Knife Rebels (An Unpublished Chapter of Amoy History)", *The China Review*, I, no. 4 (1873).

Chinese and a way of regulating the contact between the mass of the Chinese and the "alien" administration. We should remember that, although clandestine in China, where to belong to one was treason, the secret societies were not really secret in Singapore (except in a ritual sense) until the suppression of 1890. The leaders were usually well-known to the authorities. Failing to establish an administrative system by which the Chinese were brought under British control by orthodox means, the Singapore authorities found themselves making use of the secret societies as an instrument of government.

From the foundation of British Singapore in 1819 until 1826 the Chinese were put under the jurisdiction of a *Capitan China*; Raffles set out to induce the non-Malay settlers to police themselves under the supervision of the authorities.³¹ But the system was shortlived; the Chinese were left largely to their own devices, and from 1826 until the establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 there seems to have been no official institution for administrative contact between the Government and the Chinese.

There were of course points of contact between the Chinese and the Europeans on both commercial and political grounds. The Singapore Chamber of Commerce was from its creation in 1837 until 1860 open to Chinese. (The Chinese Chamber did not come into existence until 1906.) It is clear that business made a number of Europeans familiar with Chinese affairs. An eminent Chinese business man was made a member of the Legislative Council in 1869 and a few years later an extraordinary member of the Executive Council; during most of the years which followed this man's death in 1880 a Chinese member sat in the Legislative Council. The first Chinese Municipal Commissioner was appointed in 1870. A number of Chinese were appointed as justices of the peace and as jurors. Throughout the century the revenue farms provided another important connexion between the administration and the Chinese.³²

But despite these many contacts there was no recognised system for consulting Chinese opinion at large or passing down information in a systematic fashion. Three rich Chinese appear to have acted during much of the century as unofficial "Captains of the Chinese". "Though possessed of no legal power, they exercised very considerable control over their countrymen, and on several occasions rendered important services to Government."³³ Yet certainly by the 'seventies the Europeans were greatly dissatisfied with the independence of the Chinese. Proposals were several times made to put the Chinese under recognised leaders who would be responsible for them.³⁴ By the time the Chinese Protectorate came into being (1877) the Chinese popu-

³¹ Song, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 13.

³² See *ibid.* at many places for the details of the facts referred to in this paragraph.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 174, and Pickering, "The Chinese in the Straits Settlements", p. 443.

lation of Singapore had had over half a century in which to build up political institutions of their own devising, and these institutions seem to have been very intimately connected with the secret societies.

Looked at from one point of view the secret societies were criminal gangs rather than what we are used to thinking of as political groupings. Mills's description of the secret society as a Pirates' and Robbers' Cooperative Association³⁵ could be supported by much evidence of piracy, armed robbery, assault, and murder. It is possible that some of the societies were at an early date what all of them were later to become: criminal groups whose overriding aim was robbery and extortion. But the majority of them seem to have had a weightier significance. They set up mechanisms of "law" within the Chinese community. They provided immigrants with an organised group in which they could find a place for themselves in the absence of traditional territorial and kinship systems. They distributed political power among the Chinese in such a way as to harmonise with the economic system which grew up.

Before we go any further, we must satisfy ourselves about the nature of the units which are spoken of in the literature as societies, lodges, and branches, and we must examine the correspondence between these units and other types of alignment in Singapore Chinese society. All or nearly all the secret societies in Malaya about which we know employed some version of the Triad ritual and were anti-Manchu.³⁶ Historically, that is to say, they were closely connected. But there seems to be no reason to suppose that there was ever a single secret society in Malaya with which all other societies were organisationally linked.³⁷ At any given point in time some of them might be banded together, but the principles of alignment do not seem to have been constant.

As far as Singapore itself is concerned, the Ghee Hin group of societies appear to have been part of one organization for a considerable time. In 1872 a house was bought to serve as the "mother temple";³⁸ here the "nine branches" of the Ghee Hin (that is, all the societies listed in the register for

³⁵ L. A. Mills, *British Malaya, 1824-1867* (Singapore, 1925), p. 203.

³⁶ Comber asserts that the Triad Society was the "common ancestor of all Chinese secret societies in Malaya..." *Op. cit.*, p. 147. Another view was put forward by M. L. Wynne in *Triad and Tabut, A Survey of the Origin and Diffusion of Chinese and Mohamedan Secret Societies in the Malay Peninsula A.D. 1800-1935* (Singapore, 1941). Wynne's thesis was that there were two groups of secret societies, always at loggerheads, one deriving from the Triad, the other from the "Han League". The fact that the Hai San society stood apart from the Ghee Hin group for a long period may perhaps mean that some variation of Wynne's thesis may prove on further investigation to be valid.

³⁷ Comber seems to think that the various societies were coordinated, for he speaks of the Triad society in Malaya and Thailand having a headquarters which "only moved to Singapore about 1850". *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

³⁸ J. S. M. Ward and W. G. Stirling, *The Hung Society or The Society of Heaven and Earth, I* (London, 1925), pp. 13ff.

1879 less the Hai San) foregathered for twice-yearly rituals.³⁹ The temple remained the centre of Ghee Hin life until the suppression of 1890, for, although there was often conflict between the "branches",⁴⁰ they were ritually bound together in respect of the "temple", where in addition the settlement of their differences was supposed to take place and in fact was sometimes achieved.

What was the basis of the rivalry between the various societies composing the Ghee Hin group? Five of the nine societies in the list for 1879 were apparently single-dialect organizations: Hokkien, Tiuchiu, Hainanese, Cantonese, and Hakka. But these five societies accounted for only about a half of both the registered and the subscribing members. The other half of the Ghee Hin membership was distributed over four societies which were probably each heterogeneous in dialect. In 1887, when the Tiuchiu Ghee Hin was no longer legally alive, the four remaining dialect societies numbered some half of the total Ghee Hin membership and somewhat over half of the subscribing membership. The lines between the various Ghee Hin societies, then, were not simply the lines between dialect groups. We might suspect that when members of one dialect group appeared in two or more societies, those in one society in fact belonged to a particular subdivision of the dialect group, so that a correspondence was maintained between the two kinds of alignment. But there appears to be no evidence which suggests this; the destruction of the secret society records in 1889-90 may prevent us from ever knowing the facts.

Yet it is more plausible on sociological grounds to argue that the two kinds of alignment cut across each other.⁴¹ For although there was violence enough, there might well have been more if societies had always been ranged against one another in such a way that there were few ties between members of different societies. Writing in the 'seventies, Vaughan asserted that in several of the riots the opposing parties were not secret societies but provincial or dialect groups. "The solemn obligations of the secret societies were cast to the winds. . . ." ⁴² If opposition could switch from one principle of alignment to another, there was less risk that Chinese society in the settlement would break into segments irreconcilably hostile to one another.

If dialect affiliations were not unambiguous pointers to membership, what determined that a man should join this and not that society? It may be that some societies exercised territorial jurisdiction, so that a man's residence

³⁹ Pickering, "Chinese Secret Societies", p. 2.

⁴⁰ See e.g. *Gazette* (April 9, 1880), p. 223; (Feb. 12, 1886), p. 129; (April 24, 1890), p. 845.

⁴¹ There is one fact on record which shows that even the gulf between the Hai San and the Ghee Hin group could be spanned by one dialect group. In 1874 a street fight took place which arose from a dispute between the two as to which should carry the coffin of a man who had a son in either camp. Song, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁴² Vaughan, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

brought him within the sphere of control of a particular society. And because there was a tendency for people of the same dialect group to cluster in special parts of the town,⁴³ some societies may have been able to establish themselves on the dual basis of locality in Singapore and place of origin in China. On the other hand, in the first year of his Protectorship Pickering seems to imply that the individual societies were dispersed in their membership, for he reports that in the new registers "the members have been entered according to districts under the Headman in charge of each district. . . ." ⁴⁴ There may have been occupational and commercial homogeneity in society membership, societies sometimes grouping men according to their economic interests, but there could have been no neat and regular division of the societies by the economic role of their members.⁴⁵

Obscure as these matters are, the general significance of the societies for the steady stream of newcomers from China is quite clear. His secret society provided the *sin-kheh*, the greenhorn, with something equivalent to a local community. It furnished him with assistance when he was in need, organised funerals, defended his rights, and established a focus for loyalty in a social setting far removed in its structure from the kind of society he had known at home.

The means by which societies maintained their position were of course often poorly regarded by the non-Chinese observer, but it is difficult for us to see how far the immigrant ensconced within a society looked with disapproval on the "protection rackets" and exploitation of brothels and opium dens. Some societies at some time certainly oppressed the newcomers. Societies appear to have been intimately concerned with the importation of coolies in the "pig business" in the latter part of the century; and the thugs used as "police" and the barbarous practices often employed in disposing of the newly arrived labour could hardly have commended themselves to those who suffered from them.

The sanctions at the disposal of the societies for coercing men into membership and holding them to the rules once they had joined seem to have been drastic. Violence (sometimes assassination) was a real threat. But physical force and self-interest were evidently not the only means of ensuring adherence and loyalty. In the records of the Triad initiation ritual which have come down to us⁴⁶ we find good evidence of the religious pressures working to produce a faithful brotherhood. Two opposite and equally in-

⁴³ This pattern is still discernible at the present day in the old quarter of the town. See B. R. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore", *The Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, I (Oct. 1953).

⁴⁴ *Gazette* (Feb. 22, 1878), p. 90.

⁴⁵ See e.g. *Gazette* (Feb. 12, 1886), p. 129.

⁴⁶ Several texts of the ritual from Malaya, Java, and Sumatra have been published. See especially Ward and Stirling, *op. cit.*, and G. Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui, The Hung League or Heaven-Earth-League* (Batavia, 1866).

complete views of the Triad ritual have been held by Westerners. Ward and Stirling thought that the ritual was essentially apolitical and mystical.⁴⁷ Purcell speaks of the "wealth of mumbo-jumbo with which these hoodlums and gangsters surrounded their conspiracy to suck the life-blood of the community".⁴⁸ Perhaps the elaborate esoteric ritual was so much empty noise and movement to the ruffians who, in the days after suppression, formed the membership of the Triad societies. Doubtless too, the moral and mystical significance of the ritual was at times of great importance. But the ritual of initiation as we know it from the literature and as we know it was practised—Abdullah Munshi witnessed an initiation in 1824 and Pickering saw a similar rite in its entirety in 1878—was also clearly a religious means of forging loyalty to a political group. The ritual practised in Singapore was not of course devised for overseas circumstances; it was in essentials the same ritual as that used by the Triad societies in Fukien and Kwangtung. But while its elements were not always adapted to local conditions, its creation of a sworn brotherhood and the repetition of solemn oaths served to bind men together in ritually sanctioned solidarity.

Politically the secret societies broke up the Chinese population into groups which furnished their members with economic and "legal" facilities. Within this framework certain men raised themselves to positions of power, perhaps making use of the societies to aid them in their amassing of riches, probably converting wealth into prestige by their exercise of leadership. Miss Campbell cites the case of a Penang secret society headman who was a powerful broker and took charge of all the coolies landed in Penang until they were disposed of. "It is no doubt true that the Sinkhehs were unaware of the existence of any other institution of Government in the Straits Settlements."⁴⁹ A fluid and commercialised society threw up men who united political and economic power by controlling their fellows through the secret societies and acting as their representatives to the Government. By 1889 the unruliness of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements had grown to a point where the authorities would no longer tolerate it; then the secret societies really became secret by being put down. From "communities" the societies changed into purely criminal associations. New forms of grouping and leadership emerged among the Chinese, while the Government came to make its influence more directly felt.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

The secret societies were sometimes more than voluntary associations. They were not always voluntary and they covered a far greater area of the social

⁴⁷ Ward and Stirling, *op. cit.*, p. iii.

⁴⁸ Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 167.

⁴⁹ P. C. Campbell, *Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire* (London, 1923), p. 8.

lives of their members than is implied in the word "association". Alongside the secret societies there existed voluntary associations of a less ambiguous kind. Two of the principles on which these associations rested sprang directly from the nature of the society from which the immigrants had come. Solidarity could be created or strengthened overseas between men bearing the same surname and between men originating from the same area or dialect group in China.

To some extent at least, as we have seen, the dialect principle determined the inner division of the secret societies; outside the secret societies this principle served to construct a number of associations which, in common with those recruiting on the basis of surname, were often regarded by the Singapore authorities as harmless benevolent organizations. On the other hand, the Government was aware that voluntary associations of this kind were sometimes powerful enough to make trouble. A decade before the suppression of the secret societies Pickering wrote that even if these societies were done away with, "there are several large clans in this Colony, which would readily take the place of the present secret societies, and would perhaps cause even more trouble".⁵⁰

In an account written by an anonymous Straits Chinese nine years after the banning of the secret societies we learn that each dialect group in Singapore maintained one or more organizations based, at least in name, on religious worship. The Hokkien people were grouped in one large body centred on a famous temple, but divided the town into five wards in connection with the annual and triennial ceremonies. The Tiuchiu people were organised in a similar way. The Hainanese were also grouped in a single organization, but both the Cantonese and Hakka were broken up into a number of bodies according to territorial divisions in the homeland.⁵¹

From the same source we can extract a Chinese view of the surname associations of the nineteenth century. "Taking advantage of the clannish spirit inherent in the Chinese race, . . . powerful families . . . form themselves into organisations for mutual protection and aggrandisement. So influential were these associations that even during the existence of the dreaded Triads they were able to hold their own in their struggle with each other." These surname associations were formed for the worship of ancestors and for rendering mutual assistance at weddings and funerals, but they interfered in quarrels and lawsuits and opposed government measures. Although regarded as friendly societies, both dialect group and surname associations were really obstructive.⁵²

In a number of respects the associations recruited on the basis of like

⁵⁰ *Gazette* (April 9, 1880), p. 224.

⁵¹ A Straits Chinese, "Local Chinese Social Organizations", *The Straits Chinese Magazine*, III, no. 10 (June 1899), pp. 43ff.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 44f.

surname or territorial origin in China resembled the secret societies. But, unlike the secret societies, the associations continued legally to exist after 1890. From this date it was the associations which provided the major framework of "mutual aid" for Singapore Chinese. Ceasing to be overshadowed by the secret societies, they became the only "community" organizations which Singapore Chinese could devise.

A man was free to belong to both kinds of association, surname and territorial or dialect. Why did they emerge in this form? The territorial association was not invented overseas. The "guild" of fellow provincials living in a strange part of China was called by the same name as that applied to territorial and dialect associations in Singapore: *hui-kuan*. In foreign parts the Chinese grouped themselves on the basis of much smaller territorial units than in China itself, but the overseas groupings were essentially of the same order as those found in the large towns of China where people from other areas congregated for trade, work, or, in the case of the capital, examination-taking. To some extent the groupings by territorial origin corresponded to a grouping by economic interests; this was so both in China and overseas. A pattern of economic specialization by dialect group was apparent from the early days of Singapore Chinese history, and it clearly persisted in part through the nineteenth century.⁵⁸ But whether or not territorial and dialect associations functioned directly as traders' or workers' organizations, they were economically important in providing financial help to their members, especially at times of bereavement and in cases of destitution. They acted as what we should nowadays call social service agencies, providing shelter, religious worship, and fellowship for men thrown down in a strange environment.

It is not so immediately understandable why the surname principle should have been brought into play. Yet if we consider the role of the surname in the homeland society, we can see that it could enter upon the Malayan scene in two different ways. First, if in fact any association was built on the basis of membership of a single-lineage village in China, then what from one point of view was a territorial association was at the same time a surname association. Second, the structuring of the homeland society by the lineage system and the dependence of an important part of the religious system on agnatic grouping clearly induced overseas Chinese to use surnames as bases for cooperation, both secular and religious. In reality, because no doubt of its very heterogeneous Chinese population, Singapore does not seem to have produced many surname-villages associations in its earlier period. The surname associations which grew up recruited from among men coming from a wide area of country in the homeland, and the agnation implied by like surname was more general in its nature than the agnation inherent in the

⁵⁸ Cf. Siah U Chin, *op. cit.*, p. 290 for occupational specialisation by dialect groups in the middle of the century.

lineage structure of local communities in China. But just as at home similarity of surname could link lineages together in wider patrilineal groupings, so in Singapore it could bring together men who came from widely separated communities in China.

Under the new law which suppressed the secret societies the voluntary associations were allowed to continue provided that they were registered. By the end of the century 68 associations were registered in Singapore, all but 13 of them probably being Chinese; the 51 associations for which membership figures are given total over 13,000. In addition, there were at least 31 Chinese associations on the list of bodies so innocuous as to be "exempted from registration".⁵⁴ In this period the territorial associations were probably the main controlling bodies of ordinary Chinese in Singapore. They sometimes behaved like the old secret societies and incurred the displeasure of the Government in arrogating to themselves the right to try crimes.⁵⁵

The purposes of territorial and surname associations were expressed largely in welfare and ritual terms. Whatever direct intervention they may have made into the business or labour worlds, their functions were not generally intended to be of this order. That is why there existed alongside these voluntary associations bodies which determined their membership by the nature of their economic aims. The account of Singapore associations by the anonymous Straits Chinese mentions industrial guilds and commercial organizations.

"Carpenters, builders, blacksmiths, tanners, shoemakers, tailors, and barbers organize themselves each under its exclusive guild and its own patron-god."⁵⁶ The guilds furnished mutual aid and set out rules for the training of apprentices and for regulating the wages of trained men. The writer says that the best known of the commercial organizations were the Gambier and Pepper Society and the Sago Dealers' and Pineapple Preservers' guilds, the main aim of the traders being to prevent "illegal" sales by planters in their debt. There is also mention of a recently expired guild of passage-brokers which had attempted to keep up the price of fares. Bodies of this kind tried to restrict particular fields of activity to their members and to maintain economic order within these fields. The strength of the economic controls so set up clearly disturbed British administrators, who thought them unfair. Of the Gambier and Pepper Society the Protector of Chinese wrote that it "arrogated to itself the combined powers of a ruling sovereign and the Supreme Court in that it collected revenue on imports by means of custom officers, imposed fines and ordered confiscations after enquiry".⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Straits Settlements Annual Reports for the year 1899* (hereafter cited as *SSAR*), pp. 318ff.

⁵⁵ See e.g. *SSAR 1897*, p. 224.

⁵⁶ *A Straits Chinese*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵⁷ *SSAR 1897*, p. 228. And cf. *SSAR 1895*, p. 344.

The author of "Local Chinese Social Organizations" also refers to money loan associations and friendly societies.⁵⁸ The former were of a kind well known from the literature on China.⁵⁹ They were small *ad hoc* groupings of people for short-term credit and investment. Friendly societies assumed welfare functions also performed by territorial, surname, and economic associations: primarily the provision of death and funeral benefits. Friendly societies, at least in form, were indifferent to the surname and territorial origin of their members, although the social ties which preceded their formation and the limits naturally imposed on the area of recruitment doubtless produced some significant degree of homogeneity in the membership.⁶⁰

The nameless Straits Chinese writer makes no mention of the social clubs which were already a fairly important kind of grouping among the Chinese in Singapore. These clubs were probably modelled on those maintained by the Europeans. While they were not likely to embrace more than a small part of the Chinese population, they served to add to the complexity of its organization. In the eyes of the administrators the clubs were perhaps most significant as scenes of gambling.⁶¹

"A Straits Chinese" concludes his article with a general reflection on the place of associations in Singapore Chinese life. In China the care of the sick and the indigent and the provision of education were "usually left to the family, the guilds there being merely supplemental in their operations. In the different conditions under which the Chinese live in this colony, these organizations should therefore rightfully supply the shortcomings of their family arrangements."⁶² That is to say, the structure of Chinese society having changed overseas, essential welfare functions had to be transferred from one type of grouping to another. When the secret societies flourished these functions together with the political organization of the Chinese were left mainly in their hands. After 1890 the network of voluntary associations gradually expanded, providing a loosely knit Chinese society with some means of political coordination and a measure of social insurance. From this time, in fact, we begin to see Singapore Chinese society in its modern form.

DISCUSSION

By confining our attention to the nineteenth century we are able to study Chinese associations before they were affected by modern political and

⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵⁹ See e.g. Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China, A Short History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 77f.

⁶⁰ Cf. Song, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 264.

⁶¹ See *SSAR 1896*, p. 285.

⁶² *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

cultural developments. We can see them more clearly in relation to the conditions of an immigrant settlement in which the Chinese were ultimately controlled by a colonial authority.

The Chinese in Singapore were overwhelmingly composed of immigrants throughout the nineteenth century, and in this fact we look for our first clue to the importance of associations. When immigrants are thrown down in a strange setting where they must make their social life among themselves, they are likely to divide into units which express the solidarity of homeland ties. The village, the county, the prefecture, and the dialect area provided overseas Chinese with lines along which to organize themselves. On these lines they constructed their *Landsmannschaften*. Dialect grouping became the major frame of organization, but an immigrant might belong to a territorial association which mediated his ties with the dialect association which stood above it. Instead of being an anonymous individual the immigrant was organisationally a man from, say, such and such a county and then from such and such a dialect area. Grouping themselves in this fashion the Chinese in Singapore established their rights *vis-à-vis* one another and attempted to deal with non-Chinese authority.

Dialect grouping was everywhere in Southeast Asia a framework for Chinese social organization, for it was a "natural" way of differentiating immigrants into units which defined and protected rights. In Indo-China the external political authority actually seized upon the dialect grouping of the Chinese as a means of formal control. The French took over from the Annamite imperial government the system of grouping Chinese in *bang*. Under the French the Chinese in every province were normally grouped in *congrégations* according to their dialect, the headquarters of each *congrégation* being in the provincial capital. The system was political, fiscal, and judicial. The heads of the *congrégations* helped in the assessment and gathering of taxes, in the policing of their members, in the regulation of their disputes, and in the dealings between their members and the administration.⁶³ Elsewhere in the region dialect grouping was less formal, but at least in the earlier phase of settlement it always placed the individual immigrant in such a way that there was a small group which claimed his loyalty and attached him to the wider society.

The surname associations of the Chinese in Singapore did not necessarily cut across territorial and dialect associations; they usually restricted their membership to men from particular areas in China. The surname became the basis for formal associations in Singapore because it was in fact the only way in which large numbers of kinsmen could be brought together; the

⁶³ See Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, pp. 221, 224ff.; J.-A. Lafargue, *L'immigration chinoise en Indochine, sa réglementation, ses conséquences économiques et politiques* (Paris, 1909), pp. 206ff.; and R. Dubreuil, *De la condition des Chinois et de leur rôle économique en Indo-Chine* (Bar-sur-Seine, 1910), pp. 33ff.

ideology of agnatic kinship remained important, while the kinship arrangements of the homeland could not be reproduced overseas.

After the suppression of the secret societies in 1890 territorial-dialect and surname associations emerged clearly among the Chinese in Singapore. They did so precisely because the solidarities which they enshrined were not sufficiently expressed in the other arrangements of social life. The secret societies had gone (at least as far as the mass of the Chinese were concerned); men originating from the same parts of southeastern China were often dispersed in Singapore; people of the same surname were not likely to live near one another; mobility in economic life had made it less usual for men of like origin or surname to work or trade together; the solidarities of origin and surname were not sufficiently caught up in the run of ordinary social life. From these conditions flowed the formal associations based on territory or dialect and surname. If we compare the situation in Singapore with that in Sarawak we see how the formal associations fail to emerge when the solidarities to which they are devoted are otherwise expressed.

In his study of the Chinese in Sarawak in modern times T'ien makes a basic distinction between the social organization of the rural and the town-dwelling Chinese. In the countryside social and economic relations are based mainly upon "clanship"⁶⁴ (that is, identity of surname), and there is a tendency for people of the same surname and deriving from the same locality in China to cluster together.⁶⁵ Apart from, as T'ien put it, enjoying an irreducible value of its own, "clanship" in the rural area is the framework on which economic relations are hung. The rubber smallholders, permanently in need of credit, are tied to shopkeepers who are to a very great extent their fellow "clansmen".⁶⁶

In the countryside people in one area tend to be of the same dialect group. In the town, on the other hand, there is a multiplicity of dialect groups, and there we see the emergence of a close relationship between dialect group (or territorial origin) and economic pursuit.⁶⁷ Not only is there a close correspondence between the type of business or occupation engaged in and dialect group, but in the all-important rubber-dealing business, for example, different dialect groups can be shown to cluster at different levels in the hierarchy, so that dialect groups are differentiated economically both in type and status.⁶⁸

Voluntary associations appear in this general setting, but they differ significantly from those of Singapore. In the Sarawak countryside surname ties are implemented in everyday life, economic and otherwise. In the town, since there is a tendency for particular surnames to predominate in each

⁶⁴ T'ien, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-45.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-57.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-68.

group⁶⁹ and there is a close relationship between dialect group and economic life, formal expressions of the surname tie appear in associations which are not specifically concerned with surname solidarity. In 1947 there were only five surname associations among 156 Chinese associations in Sarawak.⁷⁰ As T'ien shows, in the majority of these associations there is a close interweaving of solidarities and shared interest on the basis of both provenance and occupation. "As we have seen there is no way of differentiating sharply between associations based upon shared dialect, shared locality, shared clan-ship, or even, as a rule, shared occupation. All these primary social relationships tend to overlap, so that many of the members of an Association organised on the basis, say, of locality, may be expected to be related also by clan-ship, and most of them will also share the same occupation. Obviously, too, they will be speakers of the same dialect."⁷¹ If we take Sarawak as the model of a simple and relatively small-scale overseas settlement, we may assume that in their earliest phase the Singapore Chinese bound all their solidarities together in a similar fashion, the secret society acting as the knot. In later times increasing complexity and growth of scale forced individual principles of grouping to crystallise in different types of association. Later Singapore is presumably the model of the most developed form of immigrant Chinese settlement in Southeast Asia. In contemporary Singapore the network of territorial-dialect and surname associations can be shown to be relatively independent of economic groupings and to some extent of political groupings.⁷²

Through most of the nineteenth century Singapore Chinese were dominated by the secret societies. Why did the internal control of the Chinese community take this form? Perhaps we can approach this question best by looking at the evidence on the Chinese in West Borneo.⁷³ In this area we find overseas Chinese setting up a self-contained political system modelled fairly closely on the homeland pattern; secret societies apparently came into being among the Chinese here only when this political system was destroyed.

When the Dutch established their control over the Malay principalities in West Borneo in the nineteenth century there had for long existed independent Chinese local communities, which are referred to in the literature by the Hokkien name of *kongsi*. Only one of these *kongsi* survived the Dutch conquest of 1854; this was the Lanfong *kongsi* over which the Dutch allowed

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17f.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 24.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷² See Freedman, *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore*, pp. 92ff.

⁷³ See J. J. M. de Groot, *Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo, eene Verhandeling over den Grondslag en den Aard der Chineesche Politieke Vereenigingen in de Koloniën, met eene Chineesche Geschiedenis van de Kongsi Lanfong* (The Hague, 1885); G. Schlegel, "Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo . . ." (*compte rendu* of de Groot's book), *Revue Coloniale Internationale*, I (1885); B. E. Ward, "A Hakka Kongsi in Borneo", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, I, no. 2 (Hong Kong, July 1954); and Purcell, *op. cit.*, pp. 489-94.

its own chief to rule until 1884.⁷⁴ The Lanfong *kongsi* had been founded in Mandor in the late eighteenth century by a Hakka who had emigrated to the gold lands of Pontianak, taking with him over a hundred kinsmen.

Although de Groot is at pains to stress the basic similarity between the *kongsi* and the Chinese village community from which its members derived, the Borneo local settlement was much more complex than the village at home. The Lanfong annals say that its members numbered 20,000 at the end of the eighteenth century,⁷⁵ while at the beginning of the nineteenth century it could put 6,000 fighting men in the field.⁷⁶ The Lanfong *kongsi* appears to have been organised at three territorial levels: the *kongsi* as a whole, the district, and the settlement. There seem to have been eight districts, including the headquarters district, when the *kongsi* was at its widest. Before the advent of the Dutch each district had a complement of four officials. The men in each settlement elected their local officers, who in turn elected the district and *kongsi* officers.⁷⁷ The settlement enjoyed autonomy in the regulation of disputes among their members and in respect of certain minor offences.

When the Dutch assumed direct control of the Lanfong *kongsi* in 1884 they encountered great resistance, as they had done earlier when the other *kongsi* had been destroyed. De Groot concludes his monograph with some pertinent thoughts on the relation between the *kongsi* and the troublesome secret societies with which other writers had linked them.⁷⁸ His thesis in brief is that if immigrant Chinese are not allowed to exercise some measure of political independence, secret societies will spring up. When the *kongsi* in West Borneo were put down secret societies emerged; they had not been heard of before. If the historical facts are correct, we may conclude that secret societies were likely to appear only when the Chinese were faced with a challenge to their control of their own affairs. The "challenge" may of course need to be loosely interpreted, because it may not amount to more than the relatively mild interference of an authority trying to maintain public order. (De Groot's remarks on the emergence of secret societies in the Straits Settlements from *kongsi* which had been suppressed by the British are wide of the mark.⁷⁹) Let us say that secret societies were a response to external government.

It then becomes easier to understand why the Triad flourished in South-east Asia when anti-Manchu sentiment was hardly relevant to the local situation. The Triad was an instrument forged in China to oppose central government; it was a rebellious and not a revolutionary movement (although

⁷⁴ De Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 1f.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷⁶ Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

⁷⁷ See Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 365ff.

⁷⁸ De Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-93.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

it came later to be linked with the republican overthrow of the empire). It expressed a solidarity of opposition to the state which cut across the opposition between communities.⁸⁰ In Singapore the constituent units of Chinese society were not local communities but rather dialect groups; these groups opposed one another and yet were linked together in the face of the external authority. The Ghee Hin group of societies in Singapore were ritually connected and yet fought bitterly among themselves. Their determination to settle accounts in their own way was an aspect of their unity against colonial claims to rule them.⁸¹ Moreover, secret society alignment did not exactly coincide with dialect grouping,⁸² so that overlapping ties were likely to reinforce the solidarity of the Chinese *vis-à-vis* the outer world even as they temporarily weakened a dialect group or secret society by distracting the loyalty of some its members.

The secret societies were able to keep their hold on large numbers of Chinese in Singapore because of the constant flow of immigration. In this immigration the secret societies to some extent participated, because their leaders were sometimes principals in the "pig business". The poverty-stricken newcomer without kinsmen or protectors was peculiarly subject to a discipline which rested not only on the exercise of force but also on appeals to primary loyalties and ritual sanctions. Furthermore, while it may be true that many "respectable" Chinese in Singapore held themselves aloof from secret society activities, the very principles of status in a commercial society drew rich men on to validate and exert their authority within the institutions which dominated social life. At home in Fukien and Kwantung rich merchants put their sons into the public examinations in order to turn them into gentlemen and officers of the state;⁸³ money could be converted into political strength and the high social status which flowed directly from ties with the bureaucracy. In Singapore rich men might sometimes dress themselves up in the (purchased) robes of a mandarin, but in fact the marks of the cultivated gentry of China were largely irrelevant to the local system of stratification. Money was turned into political power by being invested in relations with Europeans (which required no education) and with humbler Chinese who could be controlled by a mixture of protection and thuggery.

The most general conclusion from this analysis is that in the study of Chinese associations in Southeast Asia—and perhaps also in other parts of the Chinese diaspora—we are likely to find two major regularities. First, the associations which in a small-scale and relatively undeveloped settlement express social, economic, and political links in an undifferentiated form tend,

⁸⁰ Cf. Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*, pp. 119ff.

⁸¹ Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, p. 141, puts great emphasis on the "divisive force" of the secret societies in Thailand; I am suggesting that there is another, and opposite, aspect of secret society conflict.

⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*: "Membership was almost exclusively along speech-group lines . . ."

⁸³ Cf. the remarks by Hare, *op. cit.*, p. 9 on Kwantung.

as the scale and complexity of the society increase, to separate into a network of associations which are comparatively specialised in their functions and the kinds of solidarity they express. Second, secret societies came into being in the pre-modern era as a means both of insulating the Chinese from outside interference, and of balancing the relations between the segments of a relatively closed Chinese community.

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THE FRONTIERS OF "BURMA"

The thesis underlying this essay may be summarized as follows: The modern European concepts *frontier*, *state* and *nation* are interdependent but they are not necessarily applicable to all state-like political organisations everywhere. In default of adequate documentary materials most historians of South-East Asia have tended to assume that the states with which they have to deal were Nation-States occupied by named "Peoples" and separated from each other by precise political frontiers. The inferences that have been made on the basis of these initial assumptions sometimes conflict with sociological common sense. It is not the anthropologist's task to write history, but if history is to be elaborated with the aid of inspired guesses then the special knowledge of the anthropologist becomes relevant so as to point up the probabilities.

What then do we mean by a frontier? In modern political geography a frontier is a precisely defined line on the map (and on the ground) marking the exact division between two adjacent states. Most such frontiers, as they exist today, are the outcome of arbitrary political decision or military accident; very few correspond to any economically significant feature of the natural topography. Yet wars are fought to defend such frontiers and from such wars there has emerged a European myth which asserts, not only that every political state must, *ipso facto*, have a definite boundary, but also that the frontiers in question *ought* in some way to correspond with differences of culture and language.

This attitude to frontiers ties in with the dogma of sovereignty. In the ideology of modern international politics all states are sovereign and every piece of the earth's surface must, by logical necessity, be the rightful legal possession of one and only one such state. There are no longer any blank spaces on the map and, in theory at least, there can be no overlap between the territories of two adjacent states. Whatever practical difficulties this may entail—as for example in Antarctica—the principle is not in doubt; territorial sovereignty is absolute and indivisible.

The universality of this dogma is quite a recent development. In its present form it is a by-product of the clash of European imperialist interests. In Asia and Africa nearly all the present political frontiers were first established

during the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries either as a compromise between the rival aspirations of European Great Powers or else as an *ad hoc* invention designed to suit the administrative convenience of some colonial agency. Even today in the few cases in which genuinely non-European regimes still survive, the determination of frontiers is often impossible. The boundaries between Sa'udi Arabia and Trucial Oman are a case in point; the boundary between North-East Burma and China is another. This last instance is relevant to my theme.

By the "Burma" of my title I wish to imply the whole of the wide imprecisely defined frontier region lying between India and China and having modern political Burma at its core.

In this region the indigenous political systems which existed prior to the phase of European political expansion were not separated from one another by frontiers in the modern sense and they were not sovereign Nation-States. The whole of "Burma" is a frontier region continuously subjected to influences from both India and China and so also the frontiers which separated the petty political units within "Burma" were not clearly defined lines but zones of mutual interest. The political entities in question had interpenetrating political systems, they were not separate countries inhabited by distinct populations. This concept of a frontier as a border zone through which cultures interpenetrate in a dynamic manner is not a new one¹ but it needs to be distinguished clearly from the precise MacMahon lines of modern political geography.

Existing histories of the Burma region do not interpret the facts in this way. Instead it is constantly assumed that frontiers of language correspond to frontiers of culture and of political power. The population is said to consist of a large number of separate "peoples": Mons, Arakanese, Karens, Burmese, Kachins, Shans, Lisu and so on, each group being assumed to have a separate history. Such peoples are never treated as indigenous to Burma; each group arrived separately by migration from some remote original homeland. Such fables are like saying that the original home of Man was in the Garden of Eden. The theory that the Burmese came from Tibet is based on linguistic similarities between the modern Burmese and Tibetan languages. Similar arguments might be used to demonstrate that the original home of the English was in Italy or Persia or even Iceland.

This myth of philological origins, with its illusion of multiple discontinuities, has distracted the historian's attention from those elements of the modern Burmese social scene which have been persistently present throughout the last 2000 years. In particular, the historians have tended to neglect the continuing interaction between processes of political action and the permanent structure of ecological relationships.

In what follows I shall ignore the problems posed by language distributions

¹ Lattimore (1940).

and I do so intentionally for I insist that very few valid inferences can be constructed solely on the basis of knowledge thus provided. Anyone who doubts this need only consider the relations between history and the facts suggested by a linguistic map of contemporary Europe. Language groupings are of sociological rather than historical significance.

Those who speak one mother-tongue necessarily share a certain sense of social solidarity with one another, but this has no necessary implications for the historical antecedents of the individuals concerned. In present-day Ceylon most of the ruling élite speak English in their homes and have Portuguese surnames; it would be completely erroneous to suppose that any significant proportion of these people are of European descent.

The analysis and classification of the languages and language distributions of "Burma" is an important scientific exercise, it cannot be a contribution to history.

As an alternative I argue that the historically significant contrasts in present-day "Burma" are differences of ecology and differences of social organization. The two sets of differences nearly coincide; roughly speaking the Hill People are patrilineal and hierarchical, the Valley People have a non-unilineal kinship organisation linked with charismatic despotism. This coincidence is not a *necessary* coincidence; if we are to explain why it exists then we must seek an historical explanation. The explanation, which I offer is that the Valley People took their social organisation and their politics from India while the Hill People took their social organization along with their trade and their kinship system from China. It is a possible explanation; I do not claim more than that.

In place of the usual linguistic categories I would substitute ecological categories and these I shall now specify.

"HILL PEOPLE" AND "VALLEY PEOPLE"

The terrain of Burma is very mountainous but not uniformly so. There are parts of the area where the valleys between the mountain ridges are narrow gorges where no human habitation is possible except for those who are prepared to scarp a livelihood from the steep mountain face. But elsewhere the valleys form flat well-watered alluvial basins perfectly adapted to the needs of the rice farmer. My terms "Hill People" and "Valley People" are intended to denote the diametrically opposed modes of subsistence associated with these two types of terrain. These two modes of subsistence have been present in the area throughout historical times² and any hypothesis concerning historical process must take this into account.

² E.g., Pelliot (1951), pp. 20-25. This is a translation of the only first hand account of Angkor at the height of its splendour. The original author was a Chinese who

The term "Hill People" is unambiguous; the people so described do in fact live in steep hill country. In the main they enjoy a somewhat meagre standard of living sustained through the aid of shifting cultivation, though certain exceptions to this generalization will be considered later. Among the "Hill People" there is a great range of variety both in language and tribal organisation. The indigenous religion of most groups comes within Tylor's category of animism; it usually involves some form of ancestor worship. Over the past century the Christian missions have made many converts, but true "Hill People" are never Buddhists.

The term "Valley People" is not quite so straightforward; it is not the equivalent of "Lowlander". The major populations of the lowland plains of Burma, Thailand and Assam are "Valley People", but so also are the dominant elements in the population of the Shan States, South-West Yunnan and Laos—all of which are upland districts. The characteristic alluvial terrain which makes wet rice cultivation a profitable enterprise often occurs at high altitudes. Some settlements of "Valley People" are located nearly 6000 feet above sea level.

My term "Valley People" also covers other ambiguities. The greater part of "Burma" is a region of high annual rainfall, in which every level stretch of ground can readily be developed into a rice field. But "Burma" also includes certain Dry Zones in which the characteristic rice farming techniques of the Valley People are only possible in association with large scale irrigation engineering. Consequently, in these Dry Zone valleys, the population is divided between two distinct sociological categories. On the one hand there are the prosperous rice farmers who are concentrated around the areas of artificial irrigation; on the other there are the people of the parched outlands, whose living standards are at an altogether lower level. In this essay I shall ignore this distinction. My Valley People are all assumed to be wet rice cultivators living in conditions highly favourable to wet rice cultivation.

The languages of the Valley People are diverse but much less so than is the case with the Hill People. The majority of Valley People speak Khmer (Cambodian), Tai and Burmese dialects;³ these languages are not spoken by any Hill People as a mother-tongue, though bilingualism is common.

The most distinctive cultural characteristic of the Valley People—apart from the practice of wet rice farming—is their adherence to Hinayana Buddhism. The Valley People think of themselves as the civilised sector of

travelled with an embassy from the Mongol Emperor in the year 1296. He distinguishes three elements in the population, the Cambodians proper of the city area, the savages who sell themselves as bond slaves to Cambodian masters and work for them in the city, and the brigands of the mountains who form a race apart. The first two categories are dependent on intensive rice agriculture.

³ This ignores the highly complex language pattern among the Valley People of Eastern Assam and Manipur.

the total "Burma" population, and in that context Buddhism and civilisation are synonymous. In Burma proper, the Valley People are mostly either Burmese or Shan; they express their contempt for their hill neighbours by using the epithet *Kha* ("slave", "savage"). Nevertheless, a *Kha* who becomes a Buddhist is thereby civilised, he has "become a Shan", and within a generation or two the barbarian origin of his descendants may be forgotten. This type of assimilation has been going on for centuries. What is recorded of Cambodia in the 13th century is strictly in accord with what we know of North Burma in the 19th century.⁴

My generalisation that Hill People are never Buddhist needs further qualification. Apart from individual conversions there are certain exceptional circumstances in which whole groups of Hill People have become economically sophisticated and have adopted the religion and manners of their Valley neighbours. For example, the Palaung inhabitants of Tawngpeng in the Burma Shan States who are prosperous cultivators of tea have become Buddhists and have organised their Tawnpeng State in exact imitation of the political model provided by their Shan neighbours—who are typical rice growing Valley People.⁵ In general however it is only the true Valley People who can afford to be civilised and Buddhist.

The fully documented history of "Burma" goes back only for a few centuries and is very largely concerned with the relations between European colonialists and native rulers. For periods more remote than the fifteenth century we have only a kind of proto-history, a mixture of legend and inspired guesswork comparable to those histories of Troy which ingeniously manage to fit the stories of the *Iliad* to the latest findings of Turkish archaeology. If such proto-history is to be convincing it must be sociologically probable; it must not neglect the fixity of ecological facts and it must not postulate sharp cultural and political boundaries in a region where none exist even to this day.

Besides the two internal continuities—the ecological categories Hill People and Valley People—there have been two external continuities, the persisting influence of India and China. What is their nature?

INDIA AND CHINA

Throughout recorded history there have been two main foci of cultural development in Eastern Asia; one in India and the other in China. Every society in South-East Asia of which we have knowledge which has possessed even a modest degree of cultural sophistication has been quite emphatically subject to Indian or Chinese influence; usually to both.

⁴ Pelliot (1951), p. 19; Leach (1954), p. 293.

⁵ Milne (1924).

The manifestations of such influence are very diverse and I only propose to consider certain major aspects. Within these limits I shall propound the theses that the influence of China has been mainly in the fields of trade and communication and has affected the Hill People rather than the Valley People and that, in contrast, the influence of India has been felt particularly in the fields of politics and religion and has affected the Valley People rather than the Hill People.

There is no mystery about this—the Chinese have never been interested in “Burma” as a potential dominion—they have believed it to be too unhealthy. But they have had a persistent interest in overland routes to India and also in the natural resources of “Burma’s” mountains and forests. The early Chinese records tell us nothing about the political organisation of the region but they record detailed itineraries⁶ and also such facts as that the land of the *b'uok*⁷ tribes living South-West of Yung Chang produced rhinoceros, elephant, tortoise-shell, jade, amber, cowries, gold, silver, salt, cinnamon and cotton, hilly-paddy and panicked millet, a catalogue which, apart from the cinnamon, is accurate and comprehensive to this day.

Even in the 13th century when China under the Mongols was adopting blatantly imperialistic policies her ambassador remarks of Cambodia that “this country has long had commercial relations with us”. He does not claim any ancient political suzerainty.⁸

So also in recent centuries when Northern Burma had been the main source of jade for all China, the jade mines were owned and worked by Hill People and Chinese interests remained basically commercial rather than political. The Valley People of the jade mines area benefited only indirectly.

I shall return again to this matter of the economic interrelations between the Chinese and the northern Hill Peoples, but first let us consider some features of the political structure.

Already in early Han times, in the first millennium B.C., the Chinese had developed an idea of the Nation State comparable to the concept of *imperium* which the Romans developed in Europa a few centuries later. This ideology postulates a central government which is the ultimate political authority for the whole of a large territorial area delimited by frontiers. The administration of this empire is in the hands of office-holders, an Emperor with an administrative staff of bureaucrats.⁹ The authority of the central government is maintained by military force, exercised by garrison troops permanently dispersed throughout the country and at appropriate positions on the frontier. Administration is financed by taxation which is levied in a systematic

⁶ Pelliot (1904).

⁷ See Luce and Pe Maung Tin (1939), p. 267. Chinese sources date back to the 4th century A.D. Certain of the Kachin groups of North Burma are still referred to as *p'ok* by their Shan neighbours. See Leach (1954), p. 248f.

⁸ Pelliot (1951), p. 10.

⁹ I use Weber's terminology; cf. Weber (1947); (1951).

"legitimate" manner and not according to the arbitrary whim of local warlords.

No doubt the practical application of such theories often deviated very far from the ideal, yet the basic structure of both the Chinese and the Roman systems possessed an extraordinary degree of stability. In both cases the Empire was able to survive long phases of catastrophic incompetence and corruption at the centre; the structure of administrative authority was almost impervious to the effects of palace revolutions and dynastic change.

The Indian political model is very different. Here the ideal ruler is not an office-holder, the Emperor, but an individual, Asoka; the pattern is one of charismatic leadership rather than bureaucratic continuity. Now it is an established fact that all the early historical states of the Burma region which achieved any international renown were of an Indian style. Coedès calls them *les états hindouisés*, and Hall, elaborating this, says that their organisational pattern always had four common elements which he lists as:

- (i) a conception of royalty characterised by Hindu or Buddhist cults;
- (ii) literary expression by means of the Sanskrit language;
- (iii) a mythology taken from the Epics, the Puranas, and other Sanskrit texts containing a nucleus of royal tradition and the traditional genealogies of royal families of the Ganges region;
- (iv) the observance of the Dharmashastras, the sacred laws of Hinduism and in particular that version known as the Laws of Manu.¹⁰

It is quite outside my field to discuss just how this Indian colonisation came about but what I must emphasize is the pervasiveness and wide extent of the political influence in question.

In the second century B.C. the Western border of China lay along the Salween but after 342 A.D. the official frontier was withdrawn much further to the North-East. This was a consequence of the development of Nanchao as an independent political entity centred near modern Tali. Now Nanchao, despite its remote position, was unquestionably a state of Indian rather than Chinese type. It had no bureaucratic stability and its fortunes fluctuated violently according to the individual aggressiveness of successive rulers.

Nanchao provides an excellent example of the confusion which arises when such states are thought of as nation states of modern type. Nanchao was inhabited by people of Tai speech; it ceased to exist as an independent political entity in 1253, following conquest by Kublai Khan. In the centuries which follow, monarchs with Tai sounding names are recorded as the rulers of petty principalities all over "Burma". This has been interpreted as evidence that, following the destruction of Nanchao, there was a mass migration of Tai-speaking peoples to the South-West.¹¹ This in turn is linked with the

¹⁰ Hall (1955), p. 13. When Hinayana Buddhism replaced Saivite Hinduism, Pali replaced Sanscrit.

¹¹ Hall (1955), pp. 144-146.

more general thesis that since Tai is a language of Chinese type it must have "originated" somewhere in Central China.

Yet in fact there is no evidence at all of any migration of Tai-speaking peoples into "Burma" from the North-East, and recent trends in linguistic research seem to indicate that Tai speech has no close affinities with Chinese. Its closest links appear to be with languages further south such as Mon and Indonesian.¹²

Moreover Nanchao should not be thought of as a state with borders but as a capital city with a wide and variable sphere of influence. The inhabitants of Nanchao had no specific identification with the state, there was no Nanchao nation which would be dispersed by the elimination of Nanchao as a separate political entity. Indeed Kublai Khan's occupation of the capital—which was notably peaceful—need have had no effect on the population whatsoever.

The common-sense assumption is that there must have been Valley People in "Burma" in the fifth century just as there were Valley People in "Burma" in the fifteenth century and that the Valley People of the two periods spoke much the same sort of language or set of languages. The migration hypothesis of the historians is both improbable and unnecessary.

CHARISMATIC KINGSHIP

What then are the empirical characteristics of *les états hindouisés*? Most of them have been small, most of them have been shortlived; the continuity of the state depends upon the personality of the monarch; every monarch has a successor, but every succession is an issue of dispute; the state dies with the King, the successor must create a new state from his own personal endeavours.

There was continuity of a sort, for the states were in every case built up around a heartland of irrigated rice cultivation and, whatever the vicissitudes of politics, the rice-land stayed in one place. But the state had no fixed frontier, no permanent administrative staff.

Scott's comment on the Shans is applicable to all the Valley Peoples of "Burma":

Shan history more than that of any other race, seems to have depended on the character and personal energy of the Sawbwa (Prince). An ambitious ruler seems always to have attempted, and often to have effected, the subjugation of his neighbours. When there were two or more such there was perpetual war; when there was none there were a number of practically independent chieftains dwelling in their own valleys. Hence the astounding number of huge ruined cities which are found all over Indo-China.¹³

¹² Benedict (1942); Taylor (1956).

¹³ Scott and Hardiman (1900/01), Part II, Vol. II, p. 333.

In this respect the historical kingdoms of Arakan, Pagan, Pegu, Thaton, Ava, Ayut'ia, Manipur, and Assam (as well as some hundreds of smaller principalities located within the same general area) all had much in common. Hinayana Buddhism was everywhere the state religion mixed, as in Ceylon, with many explicit elements of Saivite Brahmanism. Everywhere royal polygyny was an exaggerated feature of the royal prerogative. The King was regarded as a Chakravartin—a "Universal Emperor"—or else as an incipient Buddha.¹⁴ Ritual and myth both implied that he was playing the role of the secular Gaudama prior to his enlightenment. Every feature of the system implied that government was regarded as personal rule by a divinely inspired monarch considered as an individual.

Let me elaborate these sweeping generalisations so as to bring out the difference between the Indian model and the Chinese.

In China the succession was governed by law; each Emperor had a single legitimate heir specified by rules of descent. If the heir was a minor at the time of his succession he still became Emperor even though a close relative might act as regent. Usurpation was relatively rare and occurred only with a change of dynasty or in times of political chaos. Day to day government was in the hands of the *literati*, persons whose status as bureaucrats was, in theory, based on personal merit and not on royal favour or aristocratic blood. In practice the *literati* constituted a largely hereditary class but they were not close relatives of the Emperor. The Princes of the blood royal held highly privileged positions but this did not give them office as administrators.

In the "Indian" states of "Burma" any one of a King's very numerous offspring might "legitimately" succeed him and palace murders were the norm. The first act of any successful claimant was to carry out a holocaust of his most immediate rivals—that is to say, his half-brothers and step-mothers. He then apportioned out his realm in fiefs to those of his close relatives who had survived and were considered trustworthy; that meant, in the main, the King's own wives and sons. The nature of this fiefdom is well indicated by the Burmese term for a fief holder—*myosa*—"the eater of the township". Since the *myosa's* tenure of office was notoriously shortlived, he made the most of his opportunities.

It is true that in addition to these licensed royal plunderers the structure of government included a hierarchy of commoner officials with fanciful and elaborate titles—the Burmese *wun*, Shan *amat*, Siamese *brahya*. But these offices too were directly in the King's personal gift. There was no criterion of achieved qualification as in the case of the Chinese *literati*. In thirteenth

¹⁴ Quaritch Wales (1931), Chapter IV; cf. Cady (1950), Chapter I; cf. Hall (1955), pp. 93-94. Pelliot (1951), p. 16, credits the 13th century Cambodian monarch with 5000 concubines.

century Cambodia the two recognised ways of obtaining administrative office were (a) to make oneself the client of a royal prince or (b) to donate a daughter to the royal harem.¹⁵

First hand observers of Thai and Burmese monarchs during the 19th century were all unanimous in emphasising the complete absolutism of the monarch's authority¹⁶ and the arbitrariness of the resulting administration. The position is thus summed up by Scott:

The coolie of today may be the minister of tomorrow; and a month hence he may be spread-eagled in the court of the palace with a vertical sun beating down upon him and huge stones piled on his chest and stomach . . . When King Tharrawaddy succeeded, he made Ba-gyee-daw's ministers work as slaves on the roads for a time, and when this exercise had quite worn them out, charitably put them to death . . . When an official displeased the king (Mindohn Min) in some way, he said emphatically "I don't want to see that man any more" . . . A day or two afterwards his majesty would ask where so-and-so was. "Alas Sire," was the answer, "he died of chagrin shortly after the lord of the earth and ocean cast eyes of displeasure on him."¹⁷

Absolute tyranny was tempered only by the fact that the King, though also head of the Buddhist church, had relatively limited power to manipulate clerical offices. A hierarchy of relatively permanent Church officials operated in parallel to the secular hierarchy of royal appointees and seems to have introduced at least a few elements of stability and mercy into a governmental system ordinarily controlled by arbitrary whim.

The typical "Burma" state consisted of a small fully administered territorial nucleus having the capital at the centre. Round about, stretching indefinitely in all directions, was a region over which the King claimed suzerainty and from the inhabitants of which he extracted tribute by threat of military force. These marginal zones all had the status of conquered provinces, and their populations were normally hostile to the central government. Insurrections were endemic and the political alignments of local leaders possessed the maximum uncertainty. Practically every substantial township in "Burma" claims a history of having been at one time or another the capital of a "kingdom", the elleged frontiers of which are at once both grandiose and improbable.

It is consistent with this general pattern that those who are now remembered as great Kings were practitioners of banditry on a grand scale whose fame rests solely on their short-term success in carrying fire and slaughter into the territory of their more prosperous neighbours. The "Just Ruler", that archetypal figure upon whom the Confucian ethic lays much stress, had no

¹⁵ Pelliot (1951), p. 14.

¹⁶ For summarised evidence see in particular Quaritch Wales (1931); Graham (1924); Scott and Hardiman (1900/01).

¹⁷ Scott (1896), pp. 484-5.

place in the value system of "Burma" kingship. The kings of Ava, Arakan, Pegu and Ayut'ia were forever pillaging each other's capitals, but conquest by the sword was never followed up by any serious attempt to establish a permanent political hegemony. Military success was simply a manifestation of the monarch's personal power, it did not serve to establish authority and it did not alter political frontiers.

But in what sense did these explosive, ephemeral, yet recurrent states really possess "frontiers" at all?

POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF HILLS AND VALLEYS

Let us go back and resume our consideration of the ecological as distinct from the politico-historical factors in the situation. The political states which we have been discussing have always included elements of both my main population categories, Hill People as well as Valley People. The heartland of the state, with the King's capital, was *always* a rice-growing valley inhabited by Valley People but the outlying parts of the state normally included Hill sectors as well as Valley sectors. The pattern of development was as follows. The King would first establish authority over his own home valley—ideally by succession, but more frequently by usurpation. He would then spread his authority to a neighbouring valley. This might be achieved by conquest or by marriage treaty or sometimes simply by colonization. Finally the King would claim sovereignty over all the hill country separating the two valley sectors of his total domain. Thus most Hill People were, at least in theory, the subjects of a Valley Prince.

But the control which the Valley Princes were able to exercise over the Hill subjects was seldom more than marginal, and the Hill People were quite indiscriminate in their favours. If it suited his convenience a Hill chieftain would readily avow loyalty to several different Valley Princes simultaneously. There were two recognised methods by which the Valley Prince might assert his authority; he could organise a punitive expedition and levy tribute, or he could pay protection money to the hill tribesmen as a reward for their loyalty.¹⁸ Some form of the latter procedure seems to have been the most common.

What I must emphasise is that the nominal overlordship of a Valley

¹⁸ In Assam there is a special term *posa* for this type of payment. Even the British authorities with their overwhelming military superiority found it convenient to make *posa* payments to the hill tribes throughout most of the nineteenth century. Another method of appeasement was for the Prince formally to grant his Hill Chieftains the right to levy toll on trade caravans passing through the mountains. This practice likewise was kept up by the British colonial authorities for many years.

Prince over a tract of Hill country did not entail the merging of the Valley People with the Hill People in any cultural sense. Whatever the overall political structure the two categories remained distinct in language, religion and ecological adaptation. It is true that the manners and customs of the Valley People provided, in certain respects, a model of politeness even for the hill barbarians. In Burma proper the Hill Chieftains whom the first European travellers encountered were often dressed in Chinese, Shan, or Burmese style and took pride in listing the honorific titles which had been bestowed upon them by their elegant Valley overlords, but at the same time they themselves claimed to be lords in their own right, subject to no outside authority.

But it would be equally misleading to represent the Valley People and the Hill People as permanently ranged in implacable hostility. The two categories of population are symbiotic on one another; they interpenetrate territorially and politically as well as culturally for, in the course of centuries, "civilisation", as represented by the culture of the Valley People, has fanned out along the river valleys and infiltrated upwards into isolated pockets right in the heart of the hill country.

Some of these small pockets of upland Valley People may have originated as military garrisons guarding a strategic route, others may have been started by private colonists seeking to escape the burdens of war and tyranny, but the fact that they have survived and still managed to retain their characteristic Valley Culture shows that the professed hostility of the surrounding Hill People is seldom carried to extremes.

The high degree of political interconnectedness between adjacent groups of Valley People and Hill People may best be demonstrated from an example. The far North-West of Burma is dotted with tiny Shan settlements surrounded by vast areas of mountain country inhabited only by Kachins. Chinese documents show that some of these Shan settlements were already in existence in the 8th century A.D. Though widely scattered, these various Shan statelets claim a cultural unity; they are Hkamti Shans and formerly fell within the domain of the Prince of Mogaung. The Kachins of the surrounding hill country admit no kinship with the Shans nor do they admit that they were ever the subjects of the Prince of Mogaung. They point out that the jade and amber mines which were the main source of Mogaung prosperity lie in Kachin and not in Shan territory. The Kachins, they say, were the allies but not the servants of Mogaung. It is a matter of history that the independent principality of Mogaung was extinguished by military force in 1765, but the ancient ideology persists. The present day Kachin chieftain who owns the jade mines has appropriated to himself the title of Hkamti Prince (Kansi Duwa).

The Shan statelets of the former Mogaung realm were widely scattered as the following table shows:

<i>Modern Map Names</i>	<i>Distance (miles) and Direction from Mogaung</i>
Mogaung	—
Kamaing	22 N.W.
Mohnyin	50 S.W.
Mainghkwan	73 N.N.W.
Möng Kong (Maing Kaing)	93 W.S.W.
Singkaling Hkamti	90 N.W.
Taro	90 N.N.W.
Hkamti (Headwaters Irrawaddy)	140 N.N.E.
Hkamti (In Assam)	160 N.N.W.

Each of these localities is a small rice plain inhabited by a Tai-speaking Buddhist population ranging in numbers from a hundred to a few thousand. In addition the Mogaung Prince claimed suzerainty over all the hill country lying in between, that is an area of some 10,000 square miles. For that matter, he also claimed overlordship over all Assam. In turn the Prince himself offered ambivalent allegiance to both the Emperor of China and the King of Ava, a circumstance which proved disastrous when, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the King of Ava went to war with China over the control of the jade trade.

My point is this. The seventeenth-eighteenth century realm of Mogaung may be regarded as a typical "Burma" state. It had from certain points of view a very real existence; there was a Mogaung Prince and his kingdom had a name (it appears in the records as Nora, Pong, etc.); yet in another sense the kingdom was a fiction. Its Shan inhabitants were widely scattered and by no means numerous. The Prince could only undertake effective military or political action with the aid and consent of the Hill "subjects", who were not subjects at all. His claims regarding territorial suzerainty were optimistic in the extreme.

This Mogaung example is in no way an extreme or a typical instance nor have the conditions which prevailed in the 18th Century altered substantially in recent times. The authority exercised by the central government of the Independent Sovereign State of Burma over its outlying regions in the year 1959 is of a very similar kind. I believe that nearly all the Indian style states of "Burma" history have been of this general type.

My main purpose in citing this example was to indicate the kind of relationship which existed between the civilised, nominally dominant Valley People on the one hand and their barbarous Hill neighbours on the other. In the Mogaung case, Kachins fought in the Shan armies and they traded in the Shan markets and they admitted the lordship of the Shan Prince. But the Shan Prince exercised no administrative authority and levied no tribute. Shans and Kachins did not intermarry and the Kachins had no truck with the Buddhist priesthood. Yet assimilation could and did take place. The labourers on the Shan ricefields were mostly settled Kachins living in volun-

tary serfdom. We have actual historical evidence that such groups, by adopting the manners, and dress and language of their masters tended to merge with them completely in the course of a few generations.¹⁹ The Valley People of today should not be thought of as the descendants of an immigrant alien race, they are simply descendants of Hill People who have settled in the Valleys and adopted civilised customs along with the practice of Valley-type wet rice agriculture. But in making this cultural transfer they have cut themselves off completely from their former associates in the Hills. In this part of the world a Buddhist cannot be a kinsman of a non-Buddhist.

Certain other aspects of the argument from ecology deserve attention. The Valley People because of their wet rice farming live in locally dense aggregates of population and this is an important factor in their cultural cohesion; in contrast, most of the Hill People, being shifting cultivators, live in small widely scattered settlements. I have no means of computing the precise figures but, very roughly, in Burma proper, the Hill country takes up ten times as much space as the Valley country but there are ten times as many Valley People as there are Hill People.

The Hill People are not in every case shifting cultivators; some of them resort to fixed cultivation on irrigated terraces. But the groups which do this are not a distinct category in any linguistic or cultural sense and their existence does not affect the general argument. Hill farming of *any* kind requires a very high labour effort in relation to yield and consequently it can very seldom provide any economic surplus over and above the immediate subsistence needs of the local population. It is the existence of such a surplus in the Valley economy which permits the Valley People to maintain their more elegant style of life.

The converse is likewise true; throughout the whole Hill region wherever a particular group has become exceptionally prosperous its members show a tendency to adopt a Shan (Tai) or Burmese style of living and to become converted to Buddhism. It follows that the contrasts of culture and language which have led to the conventional classification of "tribes and peoples of Burma" have no intrinsic permanence. Any individual can start as a member of one category and end up in another.

Although the greater part of the "Burma" hill country has been for centuries under the (nominal) political suzerainty of Valley princes, the Valley influence has not been evenly distributed. Valley culture has spread only to areas where there is suitable alluvial farming land so that in some of the more remote areas an indigenous Hill population has been allowed to develop on its own without political interference from would-be Valley rulers.

If then we want to consider the nature of Hill Society as an ideal type so

¹⁹ Cf. *supra*, note 4.

as to contrast it with Valley Society as an ideal type then it is here in the more remote hill areas that we can observe it.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF HILL SOCIETY

On this basis Hill Society can be said to possess the following general characteristics:

(1) The Valley pattern of a semi-divine Prince, surrounded by a harem, and ruling by divine right in his personal capacity, is wholly absent.

(2) Two contrasted patterns of authority structure stand out and are nearly always juxtaposed in immediate association...

These are:

(a) an ideology of rule by aristocratic chiefs. The chief is not endowed with personal charisma but holds his office by hereditary right as senior member of a royal lineage;

(b) an ideology of "democratic" rule by a council of elders. Each elder acts as representative of a particular lineage but no one lineage is intrinsically superior to any other. The elder may achieve his office either by seniority or as a consequence of passing some test of merit.²⁰

In either case offices of authority are representative offices and are derived from status at birth. The granting of office is never linked with political patronage as in the Valley society.

It is very remarkable that both types of ideology, the aristocratic and the democratic, are regularly found to coexist side by side throughout the whole of the northern and western parts of the "Burma" hill country. I will list only a few examples:

<i>Hill Group</i>	<i>Aristocratic</i>	<i>Democratic</i>
Kachin ²¹	<i>gumsa</i>	<i>gumlao</i>
Konyak Naga ²²	<i>thendu</i>	<i>thenkoh</i>
Southern Naga ²³	Sema	Chakrima (Angami)
Central Chin ²⁴	Zahau	Zanniat
Western Manipur Hills ²⁵	New Kuki (Thado)	Old Kuki

For the more easterly hill tracts of the Southern Shan States, Karenni, Northern Thailand and Laos, the ethnographic descriptions are too defective to permit confident generalisation, but here too the same two contrasted types of political ideology appear to coexist.²⁶ Elsewhere I have argued at

²⁰ Stevenson (1943).

²¹ Leach (1954).

²² Von Fürer-Haimendorf (1941).

²³ Hutton (1921a); (1921b).

²⁴ Stevenson (1943).

²⁵ Shakespear (1912).

²⁶ Scott and Hardiman (1900/01), Part I, Vol. I.

length that these two types of political organisation represent different aspects of a single "cyclic" type of system viewed at different phases of its growth.²⁷

(3) In the aristocratic type of regime a single Chief usually claims dominion over a number of scattered villages. Each of these villages has a headman who holds office by hereditary right. The headman's lineage and the chief's lineage are usually linked by ties of affinity.

In contrast, in the democratic regime, each village is on its own. Democratic villages are not necessarily weaker politically than aristocratic chiefdoms, for some democratic villages are relatively very large.

(4) The great majority of the Hill People are organised in exogamous unilineal descent groups of lineage type. The Karens may be an exception to this rule but the available information is inadequate and inconsistent. In contrast, among the Valley People unilineal descent groups are not a normal feature of the social structure. Where such descent groups occur, as sometimes among the aristocracy, they are not exogamous.

(5) Hill Society attains its highest elaboration in areas which are remote from the contaminating influence of Buddhist civilisation. This proposition is not self-contradictory. From the viewpoint of the external observer it is legitimate to regard the Buddhist Valley People as the *civilised* element in the total population in contrast to the Animist Hill People, who are, by comparison, *barbarians*. But Hill Society has its own scale of values and these show up best when they are unadulterated. The following remarks by Scott concerning the Wa headhunters of the Eastern Shan States might be applied to almost any of the Hill Peoples:

Material prosperity seems to exist in inverse ratio to the degree of civilisation. The Headhunting Wa have the most substantial villages and houses, the broadest fields, the greatest number of buffaloes, pigs, dogs and fowls. They also have the greatest conceit of themselves, the most ornaments and the least clothes. The Intermediate Wa fall some way behind in material possessions. The Tame Wa with their civilisation, find their houses dwindle to hovels, their fields shrink to plots . . . and beyond this there are Wa who put up no heads at all; some of them claim to be Buddhists, others make no claim to anything, not even the pity of their neighbours.²⁸

There is a genuine paradox here. The Valley People as a whole are vastly more prosperous and sophisticated than the Hill People as a whole, yet in the context of a hill ecology the trimmings of civilisation are disadvantageous. Certain features of this pattern deserve attention.

In the first place, it is very clear that the process of interaction between the Hill People and the Valley People has not been one of simple cultural diffusion. Hills and Valleys stand in radical opposition and there is evidently a certain level at which Hill culture and Valley culture are totally inconsistent with one another just as one might say of early mediaeval Europe that

²⁷ Leach (1954).

²⁸ Scott and Hardiman (1900/01), Part I, Vol. I, p. 511.

Christianity and Paganism were inconsistent. There are cultural elements which are common to both groups but these similarities are remarkably few. Culturally there is far more in common between the Lakher in Assam and the Lamet in Laos²⁹ than there is between either group and their nearest Valley neighbours. The same is true of any of the Hill peoples throughout the area.

Yet the pattern of political relations which I have previously described might have led us to expect something different. After all, the Hill People and the Valley People are racially the same and languages are very easily changed, so what is it that keeps the two groups apart?

I do not think that the anthropologist or anyone else can say *why* the distinction exists but I think it may be illuminating to point out some of the associated correlations.

CHINA AND THE HILL PEOPLE

Earlier in this essay I remarked that although the Hill People of "Burma" have for centuries come under the spasmodic political influence of Indian style states, their most direct economic contacts have been with the Chinese. In some cases this is true even at the present time. I myself have first-hand acquaintance of a number of North Burma localities which were "unadministered territory" throughout the period of British colonial rule; all of them were regularly visited by Chinese traders, but never by Burmese.

It is relevant here to remember that Chinese society, like that of the Hill People, is structured into a system of unilineal descent groups and also that the "animism" of the Hill People is fundamentally a cult of dead ancestors which has many Confucianist parallels. These similarities make it possible for the Chinese and the "Burma" Hill People to communicate with one another and to establish permanent social relationships in a way which is impossible for the Hill People and the Valley People.

Chinese villagers actually settle in the hill country and then live much like ordinary hill folk. They will even intermarry with their "barbarian" neighbours; but the Valley People will never do either of these things. The contrast in the pattern of marriage seems to me particularly significant.

In the Valley culture the population of each local rice plain tends to be endogamous. The Prince, who has many wives, may take daughters from neighbouring Princes but he also takes women from his own immediate followers. He receives the latter women as tribute. Thus, in terms of kinship, Valley society as a whole forms a closed system; the Valley People do not give their women away to strangers. Furthermore, each marriage is an individual affair between a particular man and a particular woman; it

²⁹ Parry (1932); Izikowitz (1951). These two "tribes" are about 500 miles apart.

does not establish an alliance between kin groups. All this is consistent with the fact that elements of Hindu caste ideology have all along been present in the Valley culture. Valley People repudiate marriage with the barbarians even when they are willing to accept their economic services.³⁰

In contrast, in the Hill culture, marriage is closely mixed up with trade. Girls are married against a bride-price and the objects involved in bride-price transactions are the same sort of objects as are met with in dealings with a Chinese trader.³¹ Thus the ties of affinal kinship ramify widely, following trade routes and jumping across language frontiers and political boundaries. In 1942 a Gauri acquaintance of mine from East of Bhamo found himself in a Singfo village in Assam 250 miles from home, but it took him only a day or so to persuade his hosts that he was one of their relatives.

I am not arguing that a single kinship network ramifies over the whole of the "Burma" Hill country but everywhere in the hills a very high valuation is placed on extended kinship relations and also upon the permanence and stability of such relations. Individuals are regarded as representatives of particular lineages and particular places and they are classed on that account as friend or foe. Women who are given in marriage serve to establish a relationship between lineages—a relationship which is likely to be repeated later in further marriages or further trade. This is the antithesis of the Valley Culture theory which treats women either as separate individuals or as chattel slaves. A Valley Prince receives women as tribute; a Hill chieftain gives them out as pledges of economic cooperation.

Hill culture is not a direct imitation from the Chinese but it parallels the Chinese system in a way that the Valley culture does not. Just as we can say that the Valley culture has an Indian style without implying that the Shans are Hindus or that the Burmese have a fully developed caste system, I think we can say that the Hill culture has a Chinese style without implying that Naga tribesmen are devout adherents of the Confucian ethic.

The really crucial distinction here is that between charismatic (individual) authority on the one hand and traditional office on the other. In the Valley system all authority is individual and temporary and for that reason tyrannical. The Valley tyrant does not display his merit by justice but by acts of self-glorification.

In the Hill system, as in the Chinese, all offices are vested either in particular lineages (which are conceptually immortal) or else are reserved for individuals who have achieved a particular social status (e.g. by passing examinations or by working through a graded series of sacrificial feasts). The acts of the ruler are themselves governed by rules, everything he does carries the sanction of legitimate custom.

My suggestion is that this contrast of ideologies about the nature of

³⁰ Cf. Pelliot (1951), p. 19; Milne (1910), p. 50.

³¹ Cf. Leach (1954), references to *hpaga*.

authority illuminates, even if it does not explain why 2000 years of Indian rule has not eliminated the radical separation between Hill and Valley society.

SUMMARY

"Burma" is a region lying between two great centres of civilisation. Throughout history it has been influenced simultaneously from India and from China, not only at the trivial level of Court politics but fundamentally in terms of the cultural system as a whole.

But this influence has not been an indiscriminate diffusion of ideas. Politics, ecology, kinship and economics provide in some degree separate and separable frames of reference, and I have therefore invited the historian of Burma to look upon the present as part of a continuing process of interaction between two kinds of political structure, two kinds of ecology, two distinct patterns of kinship organisation, two sets of economic interests.

There are other frontier regions where a very similar style of analysis might apply and it is on that account that I feel justified in offering this as a contribution with potential comparative value.

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COMMENT

It is only human perhaps to approach a problem from the point of view of a discipline one knows and to find this approach illuminating and the approach from any other discipline obfuscating. Nevertheless some scholars have been able to utilize without confusion the results of other disciplines. Still others have wisely admitted their incompetence to control the results of the other disciplines and have ignored them entirely and proceeded to deal with their problem in their own way.

Leach has presented a reasonable argument to classify the people in the Burma, Thailand, Vietnam area into Hill people and Valley people. If the groups in this area are divided into Prosperous-and-Wet-Cultivating (PWC) and those who are not (NPWC), this division corresponds—as nearly as can be determined—with Leach's classification into Valley and Hill people respectively. All NPWC's live in steep hill country; some resort to fixed cultivation on irrigated terraces despite the fact that most are shifting cultivators. All of the PWC's are Buddhists as are also some of those NPWC's who, becoming prosperous by a means other than the wet cultivation of rice, have adopted the Shan or Burmese style of living of their PWC neighbors and have become converted to Buddhism. An example is the Palaung inhabitants of Taungpeng who have become prosperous cultivators of tea. The social organization and politics of the PWC's suggest an Indic origin and the social organization (including the kinship system) of the NPWC's has features in common with that found in China.

The PWC's are speakers of Khmer (Cambodian), Thai, or Burmese dialects. The NPWC's are speakers of languages other than these, though some of the languages are linguistically related to those of PWC's. For example the languages of the Kachins, Chins, Nagas, and Lisu, who are NPWC's, are Tibeto-Burman and thus related to the Burmese of some of the PWC's. It is nevertheless possible to say that NPWC's who are geographically remote from one another like the Lakher in Assam and the Lamset in Laos have more in common from the cultural point of view than either has with their nearest PWC neighbors.

One who practices the discipline of history and looks to define the forces which impel the particular activities of groups for which records are available

might wish to define the groups by common interests or activities or modes of life rather than by their language. It is hardly surprising that such criteria can be correlated more simply and perspicuously with the changes and interaction of groups so determined than can linguistic criteria.

This is not however to say that language distribution can make no contribution to the history of an area. Wherever there are collections of speakers of different languages in contact, there has been population movement. A distribution of interrelated languages is subject to a limited number of explanations and in some instances only one. However such explanations depend for their reliability on the facts which they are intended to explain. It happens not too infrequently that explanations are offered for 'facts' of language distribution and classification which are inaccurate. Nevertheless to the extent that they are offered for facts as best determined at a particular time, such explanations are correspondingly the best available.

The hypothesis that the Burmese language reached Burma by a migration of people from Tibet is an attempted explanation of the language distribution of the Tibeto-Burman languages. If the Tibeto-Burman languages of Burma are more diverse than those of Tibet, it would appear possible to entertain the hypothesis that the Tibetans came from Burma. The necessity of considering this a possibility is increased by the fact that Leach, a reputable specialist in Southeast Asian culture, doubts the migration from Tibet into Burma of speakers of an earlier stage of the language which became the modern Burmese dialects. Strictly speaking, the possibility with the least probability is that Tibetan was always spoken in Tibet and Burmese always spoken in Burma, for 'always' would include the time at which Tibetan and Burmese were the same language; to meet the requirement, proto-Tibeto-Burman would then have always had to be spoken on both sides of the non-existent border between Tibet and Burma.

A third possibility is brought forward by H. Maspero in *Les Langues Tibéto-Birmanes*¹ who suggests Western China as the 'habitat primitif' of these peoples. He says (p. 530): "L'habitat primitif des populations parlant les langues de cette famille paraît avoir été dans l'Ouest de la Chine, d'où les Tibétains progressant vers l'Ouest allèrent occuper les hautes vallées de l'Indus et du Brahmapoutre, les Lolo essaimant vers l'Est s'installèrent au Sseu-tch'ouan et au Yun-nan, les Birmans, descendant le cours de la Salouen arrivèrent jusqu'au golfe du Bengale."

The argument that is involved here could not possibly be used to demonstrate that "the original home of the English was in Italy or Persia or even Iceland". The argument which establishes the homeland of a set of interrelated languages depends on the principle of least moves.² This principle makes it probable that the homeland of a set of interrelated languages was

¹ A. Meillet et M. Cohen, *Les langues du monde* (Paris, 1952), pp. 529-70.

² For a fuller statement than the following of the implications of this principle see

(1) in an area now occupied by at least one of the languages rather than one not occupied by any, and (2) (where a choice must be made) in an area occupied by a more diversified chain of languages rather than one occupied by a less diversified chain. There are certain conditions under which an area of a less diverse chain is also probably part of the homeland. One of the conditions is that there be an inhabitable land connection to the more diversified area, for then it could be imagined that this area was now occupied by invaders. In the absence of such a connection the less diversified area implies a migration from the more diversified area. Within diversified areas a general argument for picking one section over another is somewhat more difficult to make. The principle of least moves seems to suggest that a central area has a greater likelihood than a peripheral area.

The measure of the diversity of a set of languages which constitute a chain of contiguous languages is the number of languages which are coordinate with each other and with the languages of a different chain. Since English is coordinate with German, Dutch and Scandinavian—given that Scandinavian does not merge into German near the Danish-German frontier—it would follow that the homeland of the Germanic languages and therefore of English was in the territory of the chain constituted by German-Dutch and Scandinavian. Since Icelandic is isolated, it too must have come from the same chain regardless of whether it is regarded as a different language from Scandinavian and thus coordinate with it or not. Since English is coordinate with Romance or Indo-Iranian languages only as a member of the Germanic languages, the homeland of English could be placed in Italy or Persia only to the extent that the home of all the Germanic languages is placed there likewise. For otherwise these areas are extraneous to the area of the Germanic languages (see consequence 1 of the principle of least moves) and is not likely to be a Germanic homeland of a Germanic language. We are rather now considering the possible location of the Indo-European homeland of the Indo-European languages among which are included the Germanic languages of which English is one. The home of the Indo-European languages is more likely to be in the area of the chain consisting of the Celtic (Breton), Romance, Germanic, Slavic and Greek languages than in the area of the isolated Indo-Iranian branch or in the area of the extrusive Romance peninsula constituted by Italy.

The argument selecting a central area over a peripheral area would suggest the area of the Germanic-Slavic boundary as a site of the Indo-European homeland. This would compare not too badly with P. Thieme's conclusion in his article "The Indo-European Language".³

I. Dyen, "Language Distribution and Migration Theory", *Language*, 32 (1956), pp. 611-26. An application appears in A. Richard Diebold, Jr., "Determining the Centers of Dispersal of Language Groups", *IJAL*, 26 (1960), pp. 1-10.

³ *Scientific American*, 199 (1958), pp. 63-74.

The map accompanying Maspero's article allows us to divide the Tibeto-Burman territory into the following areas: (1) Western China in which are found Lolo, Moso, Lisu and the doubtful Miao-Tseu; (2) the Assam area (in which we will include Northwest Burma) in which are found a large collection of Tibeto-Burman languages (having the numbers 8-17 inclusive); (3) the Indian area (including a small portion of eastern Tibet) in which the languages Kanaurī, Kanāchī, Manchātī, Chamba-lāhulī and Bunan are found; (4) the Nepalese area in which Dhīmāl, Limbu and Vāyu are spoken; (5) Tibet; (6) the coastal area in which Burmese and the doubtful Karen are spoken.

Of these areas the Assam area would at first blush appear to be the one with the greatest diversity and if so would be a reasonable candidate for the homeland. It should however be kept in mind that a real family-tree specifying the degrees of relationship among the various Tibeto-Burman languages has not yet been drawn up. It is still possible that the degree of diversity in the languages of the other areas should be greater than that of the languages in the Assam area. The Assam area hypothesis is however a proposition which can be tested and is a possibility. Under it we would expect the languages in the Indian area to be quite closely related with each other and with Tibetan. The position of Karen and Miao-tseu need play no role in our considerations until their relationship has been demonstrated. It could turn out that their immediate relationship is with Tibeto-Burman as a whole rather than with any lesser groupings.

Now to say 'that language distributions are bad historical evidence anyway' is to distort the facts. At each point in historical determinations, as in other scholarly and scientific pursuits, we must work with the best available evidence. It is not inconceivable that the inferences from language distribution might contradict reliable records. In that case we should accept the evidence of the records and seek the reason for the error in the inference. On the other hand it is often the case that the evidence of language distributions is the best available. Shall we then ignore it?

Language distributions do not play an immediately determining role in historical events. Language boundaries rather reflect political and social changes. It is just as possible for a people who speak the same language to fight each other as it is for those who speak different languages. It is only slightly more difficult for people who speak different languages to trade with each other than for those who speak the same language. It takes very little time for partial bilinguals to develop among speakers of different languages who have come into contact.

Differences in languages impede communication and to this extent they affect historical events. To cooperate with each other groups need language and in this very general way language determines historical events. Since however language is found in all human groups, it is a social constant which

can be disregarded as a historical determinant except as its diversity plays a role in characterizing groups and impeding communication.

Thus a historian looking to deal with groups for which records are available might wish to define the groups in the first place by criteria other than language, for such criteria might yield a simpler set of groups for his purposes than a linguistically determined collection. At the same time his view might be broad enough to regard the analysis and classification of the languages and language distributions of Burma as more than an important scientific exercise.

Linguistics has advanced much too far as a scientific study to require defense from a casual remark. A careful historian interested in all phases of his subject would already be aware that linguistics does make a contribution to history in the sense that under certain conditions the inferences contributed by it are the best available or even the only available.

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THE GREAT HUNGARIAN PLAIN: A EUROPEAN FRONTIER AREA (I)*

I. THE TANYA

The Nagy-Magyar Alföld, the Great Hungarian Plain, lies within the Carpathian crescent, between the last foothills of the Alps and the South Slavic and Transylvanian mountain ranges.¹ The Danube and the Tisza meander slowly through it, carrying their muddy waters to the narrow passage of the Iron Gates. The landscape here—the wide horizons shimmering in the heat of summer with unreal outlines, the crossed well-poles like slanting T's, the endless fields alternately of wheat and maize, the alkali-rimmed lakes, the lack of trees, the occasional stretches of empty steppe with not a single human being in sight—is to anyone from the tree-clad mountain slopes across the Danube a startling contrast. The visitor will soon discover that the character of the region and the traditions of its people have combined in the course of history to create here unique social forms.

West of the Danube (in Transdanubia) Hungarian settlement follows the pattern that is common to the rest of Central Europe: city and town districts are compact and peasants are villagers, cultivating the fields around each village. The pattern in the Alföld is quite different. It is true that there are a few small villages, but for the most part we find isolated farmsteads (*tanyák*), each house with its stable, barn and other outbuildings being set in the middle of the fields to be worked. The official map of Hungary shows the whole country between the Danube and the Tisza speckled with *tanyák*: from the Budapest-Cegléd-Abony line south to beyond Subotica, in the low land east of the Tisza, south to the Maros, and north through the districts of Nyíregyháza, Debrecen and the Haiduk cities east down to the county of Bihar. There are even some in the plains west of the Danube.

Lying like islands in this tanya-world are giant villages, big enough to be called urban yet with a rustic air: the streets are unpaved, the houses are of one storey only, and the occupations of the people are largely agrarian.

* The second part of this article, dealing with the evolution of the Hungarian Plain from the 18th century to the present day, will appear in *CSSH*, III, no. 2.

¹ The Plain comprises 41,901 sq. km., almost half of what remained as Hungary after World War I. For further documentation of the subject see my book, *Nederzettingvormen en Problemen in de Grote Hongaarse Laagvlakte: een Europees "Frontier" Gebied* (Amsterdam, 1947).

These peasant towns are a feature almost peculiar to the Alföld; nowhere else in the world are there so many large agglomerations of this type. Again, although isolated farmsteads occur in other countries—along the Baltic, in Denmark and Frisia, in North and South Holland, in the Alps, and throughout the United States and Canada—the origins of the Hungarian tanya are unique. The reasons for this are worth investigating. Research in the social history of Hungary is fairly young, and since the sources are scant and the problems complex, many of the findings are still uncertain. I offer only some general clues to the history of settlement in the Alföld, without attempting to solve minor problems or local variations.

The tanya lands traditionally form part of the administrative district of some peasant town.² These districts are very extensive, particularly in the Subotica-Kunszentmiklós triangle.³ Such towns as Szeged, Kecskemét and Debrecen treat their tanya population as a kind of colonial element. They seek to exploit these people and to spend as little on them as possible. The latter have never made any collective effort to assert themselves, perhaps mainly because they have thought of themselves as townfolk.

There are prosperous tanyas, as around Kecskemét, where one sees white-washed houses standing among mulberry and nut trees, with orchards and vineyards around them and wide cornfields. Others are wretchedly poor, the house a mere clay hut without the shade even of a wild acacia. The majority of the tanya peasants have a very low standard of living.

The tanya peasant who can afford it will have a house in town to which he will retire in old age. Until then he may perhaps use it only for sleeping in after going to the market. I found it customary in the south, between the Danube and the Tisza, to reserve a room for this purpose even when the rest of the house had to be rented out. On retiring a man would leave his eldest son on the tanya but would have the grandchildren with him in town while they were going to school. Among well-to-do peasants east of the Tisza it was the custom for the whole family to stay on the tanya through the summer and to move to town for the winter, leaving a servant to look after the animals. There are many different arrangements, but always there is the common habit of looking on the tanya as only a temporary home. The town house is the more solid one. A family hates to give up its stone house in town, for to do so means a definite loss of status. In the 1930's a new

² Of the 732 counties in the Alföld, 644 had a tanya territory before World War II, containing in 1930 a population of almost 1,500,000. In the county of Csongrád in that year 69,822 of the 140,529 inhabitants lived in tanyas. In the territory of the town of Szeged the tanya population numbered over 40,000.

³ The municipalities with 5,000 to 50,000 inhabitants included 42.8% of the plains population in 1930; those with over 50,000 had 33.9%. The counties of the autonomous towns of Szeged, Debrecen and Kecskemét covered 764, 957, and 939 sq. km. respectively, before World War II. Subotica (after the treaty of Trianon transferred to Yugoslavia) had the largest territory of all, 974 sq. km. Villages could also have extensive territories, e.g., Törökszentmiklós with 330 sq. km. and Sövényháza with 320.

class of poor tenants and owners arose who had nowhere to live but the tanya, yet even these people have shown a tendency or at least a desire to buy a town house for their old age.

One may say then that the typical peasant of the Alföld has two homes: in this he clearly differs from other European peasants. He may move in the spring and fall of the year; he will move in the spring and fall of his life. It has been said—although this is hardly a serious explanation—that the habit must be a survival of the old “nomadic instinct” of the Magyars who originally migrated from the southern steppes of Russia as semi-nomadic herders. Yet we do in fact have to look at the early Magyar forms of settlements in Hungary to find an explanation of the two-home custom. It was not brought from the east but developed on Hungarian soil. The basic idea of the tanya system is nevertheless to be sought in the winter camps of the Turkish and Finno-Ugrian nomads.

II. THE WINTER QUARTERS OF ASIATIC PASTORAL NOMADS

The present state of research into the origin and early migrations of the Magyars (whose language belongs to the Finno-Ugrian group) suggests that they came from the eastern slopes of the Urals, where they were neighbors of the Vogouls and the Ostyaks. There they were nomad hunters and fishermen, used metals, rode horses and lived in tents. At some undetermined period they migrated south, encountering the Alans and other Caucasian peoples. They lived in close contact with the Bulgars, probably subject to them, before these split into eastern and western groups. Under Bulgarian influence, probably between the fifth century A.D. and the ninth, they became semi-sedentary, cultivating as well as herding.

Towards the end of the ninth century the Magyars, under their leader Arpad, left the lower Don, conquered Hungary and occupied large parts of the country. Their racial type and their culture predominated.⁴ Neither their agriculture nor their stock-breeding was intensive. They gradually improved their methods of cultivation and tended to use more land for agriculture. Yet they preferred to live by the old Asiatic method of raising stock and repeatedly let their fields revert to grass. Over most of the Alföld there was no definite transition to agriculture until the 19th century.

The flocks and herds of the early Magyar tribes grazed in the open, perpetually moving. In the circumstances there was no sense in putting up any kind of buildings for man or beast except for winter use. When it turns

⁴ See István Kniesza, *Ungarns Völkerschaften im XI Jahrhundert*. *Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis*, IV (1938) for disproof of the view that formerly prevailed, that the Magyars were so few in number as to form only a thinly spread ruling class over the Slav population.

cold pastoral nomads establish winter quarters in a sheltered spot, preferably near water. First they erect tents for themselves. Around these, but some distance off they put up stables, sufficiently solid to last several years, for ailing and pregnant animals and those they are milking, with room enough to shelter some others in time of storm. A few men live out in the stables to take care of things. As for the rest of the livestock, it stays in the open. The ethnographic literature shows these customs to have been common to a number of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe. Winter stabling is arranged around the camp center but some distance off, the pastures being still further away. There are obvious conveniences: tents can stand close together, the center of the camp gets maximum protection from wind and at the same time is kept free of trampling beasts and manure piles. To make sure of keeping the livestock out of the center the Kara Kirghizeans and related people put a fence around it. These people, along with the Kazan Tatars and the Bashkirs, call the stables *agil*, *aul*, or *ól*, the two latter peoples referring to the whole camp as *aul* or *ól*. The Bashkirs replaced the tents by huts but continued to call a winter village of this type *aol*, the term for the stable then becoming *otlik*, which means, literally, "hearth". The same is reported of the Crimean Tatars and others. This form of winter village, found among so many of the Finno-Ugrian and Turkish people, is clearly the antecedent of the form of settlement in the Alföld.

The Alföld suited the Magyars well. In summer they let their beasts graze in the hills that surround the plain, and in winter they came down to camp by a river or swamp. This is shown by many dual place-names in the Tisza area and the Mátrá-Bükk mountains, dating from the time of Arpad. The places were a day's journey apart, or two, but belonged to the same clan. Communities along the middle Tisza, such as Tiszanána, Tiszaszalók, Tiszaszederkény, Tiszavárkony, Tiszatarján, Mezőtárkány, Mezökövesd and Mezőnád, were the winter quarters of the mountain communities Felsőána, Egerszalók, Mátraszederkény, Sajóvárkony, Gyöngyöstarján, Salgótarján, Felsőtárkány, Erdőkövesd, Felsőnyád, etc. At first mere summer stopping-places, these later became permanent and independent communities.

Population increase and government measures under King Stephen the Saint (997-1038) put an end to long-distance migration; the warlike Magyars had to curb their *Wanderlust* and settle down quietly. Christianity helped to tame them. It was difficult for pastoral nomads to attend church regularly, yet the Church demanded that at least ten families be present at Sunday mass. Although a herder could easily ride to church in summer, in winter he could not go far from camp. Winter quarters had to be set up as near the churches as possible, and tended for this reason to become permanent. Foreigners, above all monks invited by Stephen to settle, promoted new economic development. Many villages grew up and agriculture spread.

Progress was however hindered, up to about 1300, by a continual influx of steppe nomads. Hungary had always attracted these people, even before the time of the Magyar migration. Petchenegs, Usbekes, and Wallachians arrived, and finally, fleeing before the Mongols in 1239, about 40,000 families of Cumans and Jacygians. Bela IV granted them land in the districts along the Danube and the Tisza, the Körös, Maros and Temes, land that was either too swampy or too sandy for agriculture. The Cumans were heathen nomads, standing culturally where the Magyars had stood three and a half centuries before; they were further divided from them by speaking a different language. Not until the Turkish era were the Cumans fully assimilated to the Magyars.

Some of the Cumans still lived in tents as late as 1339, but under pressure from the Hungarian clergy they were in process of converting their winter camps into villages. Of the conventional circular pattern that has been described, these were called *szállás* (meaning "shelter" or "refuge"). Town place-names such as Szabadszállás, Jakabszállás, Jászászállás, Kiséjszállás suggest that some of these villages evolved into peasant towns. The Cumans had however reinforced the element of nomad pastoralism in the economy, and the invasion of the Tatars in 1241-42, who plundered and burnt agricultural villages, was a further influence in the same direction. Agriculture did not recover until the second half of the 15th century. By that time, under King Mathias Hunyadi, Hungary was populous, prosperous, and well-governed. In the Alföld population was distributed in little villages and towns. Among the towns, however, only Szeged and Debrecen were of any importance, and the central part of the plain was still largely empty.

II. THE MATYÓ-VILLAGES: THE KERT AS PROTO-TANYA

Turkish devastation was so thorough that we actually know very little about the forms of settlement in the Alföld in the pre-Turkish era. To my mind, however, István Györfly definitely proved that there was a genetic connection between the plan of the old nomad winter camps and of the later permanent settlements in the Alföld.

Some of the evidence that Györfly used is as follows. In the northern counties of Bórsod and Hévíz, in a Protestant area near the town of Miskolc there are three Catholic villages—Mezőkövesd, Szentistván and Tárd—whose people are called by their Protestant neighbors Matyó. Until a short time ago they had a characteristic way of living, and recognizable traces still remain. Each family had two pieces of land, one in the middle of the village and one on the edge. On the former, which until the middle of the 19th century was unenclosed, stood the dwelling-house. On the second piece, eight or ten times larger than the first, and enclosed by a low wall of dried

dung, stood the stables. All supplies of fodder and firewood were kept here, threshing and winnowing were carried on here and moreover it was here that the men of the family, all except the old men, lived. Until quite recently only women and children, with the old men, lived in the center of the village, and many families have kept up this custom. A boy moved out to the stable, which the Matyó call *ól*, at the age of twelve, when he is considered to be no longer a child, and he might stay there for the rest of his life, in any case until after his eldest son married. He might then leave his sons to look after the livestock and retire to live with his wife in their house. For perhaps forty or fifty years he would have gone home only for dinner.

The stable in the old-fashioned *ól* included special quarters for the men. There was a semi-circular whitewashed stove in one corner where the men sat in the evening, burning straw, frying bacon and talking over the affairs of the day. The owner's tenants and laborers would join the company. The men slept on benches. The center of this male club was formerly not a stove but an open hearth, a circumstance that recalls the Bashkir name for the stable. The main stable, housing cattle and horses, formerly had neither chimney nor windows, the smoke from the hearth serving both to ward off flies and mosquitoes and to preserve meat hung from the beams. There is rarely, even now, any flooring.

Over the last fifty years, owing to population growth, the situation has changed. The Matyó birth rate was always high, and public health measures have been reducing infant mortality. Except in Szentistván, many of the peasants can no longer have two plots of land. New houses have to be built on the stable-lands, and stables have to be permitted in the village. The animals have to be moved through the streets, which are in consequence filled with dust, manure and flies.

Men and women live in closer proximity, yet not under the same roof. The women avoid the stable, the men doing all the work there, including the milking. Even a married man may visit his wife only stealthily, at night. Weeks may pass after a wedding before the groom has a chance to do so; it is considered a scandal if he is discovered.

These villages formerly lived mainly by animal husbandry and turned more to agriculture only during the 19th century. The Matyó still keep to the three-field system with communal decision as to what shall be planted and when operations shall be carried out. The roads are so bad that they have great difficulty getting the harvest to the village and the manure to the fields. Their livestock feeds on a communal pasture, on the fallow fields and on the stubble, living in the open all summer, but stabled for the winter.

The pieces of stable-land at the edge of such a village are styled in Hungarian *kert*. This term is ordinarily but quite wrongly translated as "garden", villages and towns of this type being known as garden towns

(*kertes város*). The participle *kerit* from which it is derived means not "tilled" but "enclosed"; *kerites* is a fence or partition. Among the Bashkir *kert* still means a stable.

It is the essence of Györffy's theory that the *kert* is the proto-tanya. It seems to me that in general outline the theory is confirmed both by historical data and by modern observation.

IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE TURKISH PERIOD: URBAN CONCENTRATION AND FRONTIER ECONOMY

Had the Turks not devastated the Alföld in the 16th and 17th centuries, we would probably find a far greater number of villages like those of the Matyó, in more or less modified form. It was the fateful history of the region as one of the great battlefields of Europe that caused the traditional forms to disappear in all but occasional cases. Although the life within these places underwent change, in respect of external form they may be considered as social survivals.

One might perhaps ask whether this form of settlement did not originate under the Turks. We know however that this was not so because it was preserved best in the north, where the Turks did not disrupt the continuity of settlement. It must therefore go back to the nomad inheritance, and the question is only whether it derives from the Cumans or from the Magyars. Now the north lay outside the territory of the Cumans, Jacygians and Haiduks. Moreover the Cuman element in the vocabulary of herding and of the "garden" villages is slight. We must therefore conclude that we are faced by a cultural tradition of Magyar origin which may have been more or less strongly influenced by the Cumans.

The early Turkish invasion and the century and a half of occupation following the catastrophe of Mohacs in 1526 destroyed the old villages of the plain. During this time hundreds of thousands of Hungarian peasants were slain, starved or deported to eastern slave markets. Many villages were burnt. The rest fell to ruin after their inhabitants, to escape the military service and other burdens laid on them by the Turks, or in fear of their lives, had fled. Some of the fugitives hid with their herds in the swamps, but most of them took refuge in the bigger market towns. The latter appear from maps and travellers' descriptions to have had at least the minimal fortification of hedges or fences and moats, which enabled them to withstand pillaging *spahis*. They were further protected by the Sultan, possessing certain privileges, even a measure of self-government. The Turks everywhere abolished the rights of ownership of the conquered, but life was considerably safer under the rule of the fisc than in the country districts given as fiefs to favorites of the Sultan. People were much better treated by officials who

were supervised by the Pascha of Ofen than by the vassals who ruled arbitrarily with their troops. It is therefore not surprising that population became concentrated in the larger villages and towns of the Alföld, under the rule of the fisc. Conditions here were tolerable.

These towns, called by the Turks *Khász*, now began to grow, though not so much from natural increase as from the influx of villagers. In the popular view the extent of this growth has been exaggerated, recent research indicating that in the 16th and 17th centuries the maximum population of such towns was a few thousands. This period saw however the beginning of the great peasant towns that came to characterize the region.

One must remember that the Alföld peasants were never deeply rooted in any one particular place. Their homesteads were frail structures of clay, sticks and reed, an easy prey to fire or flood, and easily built again elsewhere.⁵ Nomad customs seem to have persisted: the Cumans, Jacygians and other peoples who had settled down not so very long before the Turkish wars were probably quite prepared to move on to safer locations.

The Turks were not alone responsible for the tendency of the population to concentrate in larger agglomerations. The small village pattern of settlement was not well adapted to times of unrest. The Tatar invasions, a succession of civil wars and other disturbances, perhaps also natural disasters and changes in trade routes were unfavorable to it. Numerous villages had disappeared even before the time of the Turks, as for example in the neighborhood of Debrecen. The concentration of the population became much more marked under the Turks. In the county of Csongrád, where there were 140 villages before the Turkish era, only 16 survived. But the process of concentration was the result not of the Turkish wars alone but of the turbulence of several centuries.⁶ In any Alföld town people who are interested in local history will tell you of former villages in the neighborhood that have disappeared. Their vanishing seems almost a process of nature.

The lands of abandoned villages were taken over by the towns. The greater part of these lands had been communal holdings and when the villagers left passed automatically under town control. The towns also bought

⁵ Carl von Szepeshazy, J. C. von Thiele and Angus Ellrich, in *Hongarije zoals het is en de Hongaren zoals ze zijn* (Franeker, 1833), pp. 113-14, describe the houses as built of a mixture of clay and straw: "in five minutes a house will burn down, in twenty minutes an entire village . . . but in a few hours a new house is built".

⁶ Kecskemét augmented its territory with the lands of abandoned villages as early as the 13th century, after the Mongol invasion. J. Ecsedi, cited by R. Mayer, "Die Alföldstädte", *Abhandlungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, XIV, Heft 1 (1940), pp. 9-10, investigated the fate of 50 "lost" villages once existing in the territory of Debrecen: 7 or 8 of these were destroyed by Crimean Tatars in the Turkish army in 1593-94 and were never rebuilt; 5 more destroyed in 1594 were rebuilt only to be burnt by Seidi Pascha in 1660; 3 were partly destroyed in 1594 and dragged on miserably to final extinction; 6 were destroyed in the middle ages and 15 others probably so; 4 were destroyed probably a little later; in 8 other cases the date of disappearance is altogether unknown.

both communal and individual property at low prices, or rented it, or had it assigned them by the Turkish authorities. Thus both the towns and the larger villages became great landowners.

The Turks had a much stronger hold in the Alföld than in the hills and mountains of Transdanubia, where their raids were less effective. The following figures from the census of 1720, the first three counties listed being in the plain, the last two in Transdanubia, demonstrate the outcome:⁷

Counties	Number of Municipalities	Population	Average Popu- lation of one Municipality
Békés	13	6,230	479
Csánád	3	2,508	836
Csongrád	7	9,701	1,386
Zala	454	58,332	128
Vas	616	118,606	193

Meanwhile the plain deteriorated. Originally it had been more park land than steppe but in these two centuries the woods fast dwindled, either cut or burnt. The rivers meandered freely, annually flooding more than half the plain. Sand drifted over large areas, roads were obliterated, swamp and alkali spread. Hungary became known all over Europe as an unhealthy country. *Morbus Hungaricus*, believed to come from stagnant water, was probably typhus, which along with dysentery and malaria ravaged both Turkish and Christian army camps. Travellers of the 17th and 18th centuries described the "horrid solitudes" and the "sad face" of this depressing country. The Alföld had become almost entirely a man-made desert (*puszta*).⁸

The population of the peasant towns handled a certain amount of trade with Western Europe and carried on such crafts as weaving, leather work, pottery and goldsmithing, but lived primarily by animal husbandry. The great natural stretches of grazing land on the *puszta* favored livestock breeding of a primitive kind, whereas to plough and sow was anxious work since no one knew who might take the harvest. *Lábasjózsg* (goods on legs) was the safest form in which to accumulate property. To raise the hardy animals of the steppe called for no capital and little labor; even if they perished one could salvage the hides. On word of approaching raiders the herd could always be driven off to inaccessible parts and it could move itself to the nearest market. These are the conditions that typically give rise to livestock breeding in frontier land. The Great Plain was indeed at this period a "frontier" in that

⁷ Imre Takacs, "Die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Folgen der Wiederbesiedelung der ungarischen Tiefebene im 18 Jahrhundert", *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, XIII, Heft 1-2 (July 1933), p. 106.

⁸ *Puszta* originally meant "bare" or "waste", indicating the fact that something formerly present had disappeared, as in the *Wüstungen* of Germany, where villages had disappeared. See J. A. Bendixen, *Verlagerung und Strukturwandel ländlicher Siedlungen*, (Kiel, 1937), on abandonment of villages in Brandenburg.

it attracted all kinds of foreign elements, fugitives from the Turks. South Slavic and Roumanian pastoral tribesmen came, and in quiet years even families of Slovak and Ruthenian herders.

The regression of the Alföld to pastoral nomadism in the Turkish period is of the highest importance in its economic and social history. It was not due to any direct influence from the Turks, who themselves were no longer nomadic and who except for a few traders and artisans operating in the fortified towns did not settle in the Alföld. It was a matter of indirect influence. Prolonged devastation tends to make a people revert to an earlier cultural level. The presence of the Jacygians and Cumans reinforced this tendency. These peoples' experience of farming was quite recent and their land being poor, not very successful. They readily reverted to herding and indeed kept to it long after the Turkish era; the great stock ranges they had in the Bugac and Hortobágy districts are still in existence.

The old system of herding, which persisted for centuries with little change, was to let the animals find their own grazing through the summer and in winter to turn them into swamp areas. Here they fed on dry grass, scratching through the snow. If the snow was too deep a herder would occasionally throw them some wild hay. They would pick up strength with the spring grazing, calves would be branded, swine would be ear-marked, and in a good season some of the animals would be fat enough by autumn to be driven to market. Herds were driven to all the other countries of Central Europe, sometimes to markets as far off as Nüremberg.

Horses, cattle, sheep and swine all ran wild in this way, with special herders for each kind of beast. There was no control over the breeding of the horses. Mares foaling in winter would warm the new-born creature with their breath as best they could. When wolves attacked the mares would put their heads together in a circle with the foals in the centre, and kick outwards, while the stallion kept up a running fight from the outside. The horse-herders traditionally kept large dogs known as *kommondors*, equipped with pointed collars, to help in such fights.

Although the Magyars held horse-breeding in high regard they went in more for cattle, raising horses only for the needs of war and transport. There is an interesting sign of relationship with Turkish-Tatar culture in the fact that fifteenth century Hungarians drank mares' milk, fermenting it in the form known to the nomads of Asia as *kumiss*.⁹ Today the herders will not touch mares' milk except as medicine.

The herders worked in small groups. Five men would suffice for the average herd, which in the case of horses or cattle numbered about 500 head and in the case of swine or sheep, except for milch sheep, up to 1000 head. It was the custom for the proprietor of the herd, who would live in a town,

⁹ Béla Gunda, "The Anthropogeography of Pasturing on the Great Hungarian Plain", *A Földrajzi Közlemények*, LXIII, no. 1 (1940), p. 27.

to give the men a food allowance of one loaf of bread a day; a boy would bring out a week's supply at a time. As the animals grazed further afield, however, the men had to live on starchy wild plants such as *böndö*, *bengyele*, and *glyceria fluitans*; the last-named, from which they made a kind of porridge, was an important item of herders' diet, especially among Slavs, as late as the 18th century. The Hortobagy herders still dig into holes of mice and hamsters in autumn for the stores of wild grain they find there. There are similar customs among the Itelmes of Kamsjatka, the Tungus and the Sagaj Tatars; indeed there are many ethnographic parallels between the life of herders in North and Central Asia and in the Alföld.¹⁰

The Hungarian herders, rough fellows with no family ties, formed a special class. Some did not visit a town in thirty years, spending their leisure in steppe huts with women of ill repute. Often they took to robbery, such bands as terrorized the country in the 16th century under the name of the Free Haiduks, officially denounced as "*patriae pestes*", being recruited from their number. Towns in Little Cumania would allow herders to stay only three days, since they did nothing but drink and fight in the inns. In the 18th century Gunda reports the barbaric penalty of tearing out the tongue being inflicted on them for their scandalous swearing. It was partly from their ranks that the *batyars* came, roving bandits who won romantic fame in the 19th century. The word *batyar* is said to be derived from a Turkish term for bachelor.

The peasant towns of the Turkish period were characteristically spacious, with wide streets and squares. Many were laid out on the same plan as the Matyó villages, with a nucleus of dwelling-houses surrounded by a ring of "garden" where sick and pregnant animals were stabled for the winter, each species having its own pen. A few of the men lived in the stables, but no women. Neither livestock nor fodder were normally brought into the town itself. Most of the animals ranged the steppe all the year round.

When conditions became more settled windscreens of mud-plastered reed were set up here and there in the wide lost land between the towns as shelter for the stock. Sometimes a hut was added for the herders, and a pen (*szállás*) for the weaker animals. These were only temporary structures, the thatch of the roof often being thrown to the animals as winter fodder, but their appearance seems to foreshadow the later development of the tanya.

The townspeople tilled no more land than was absolutely necessary. They had to grow their own cereals, because the roads were too bad and too unsafe for regular grain transport. Methods were primitive. When the soil of one field was exhausted they ploughed up another that had been lying

¹⁰ O. Herman, L. Madarassy, St. Ecsedi and I. Györfy were able to study herders' customs while they still survived. See the latter's "*Die extensive ungarische Vierhaltung*", *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, XVIII (1938). The ethnographic department of the Hungarian Museum in Budapest has a fine collection of material in this field.



Plan of Mezökövesd in 1787. Dwellings, without a courtyard, in the center; surrounding these the fenced-in "gardens". Dotted area the inner pastures. Hatched area the crop land. From *Földrajzi Közlemények*, 1935, p. 231.

fallow; they used no manure.¹¹ Yet they were not entirely unprogressive: a triennial crop rotation was adopted, and the cultivation of maize (known to the Szekler of Transylvania as "Turkish wheat").

Györffy believed that the townsmen organized their operations in a series of concentric circles. Outside the "garden" ring was a zone of pasture, two or three kilometers wide, for tame stock (*kezes*), that is, work animals, milch-sheep (which were the chief source of dairy products), and pigs being fattened. Some of these animals were returned to the garden stables at

¹¹ On the continued indifference of the Hungarians to manuring the soil see A. von Matkovits, *Das Königreich Ungarn volkswirtschaftlich und statistisch dargestellt*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1900), I, p. 207. The ól-stable manure was used as fuel and for building garden partitions, but part of it went to waste.

night. Beyond the pasture zone lay the fields in another circle four to eight kilometers wide, some used as pasture for the half-tame stock that needed stabling only in winter. The outermost zone was for the range cattle (*szilaj, rideg*), bred only for slaughter, and given no shelter but a stray windscreen.

The question now arises whether all the peasant towns of the Alföld as we find them in the 19th century were originally *kertes város*, "garden"-surrounded. Györffy told me that he had no opinion on the matter since the data were inconclusive. Yet there are archival sources, including numerous maps. For our purpose the most important of the maps are those prepared under the orders of Joseph II of Austria between 1786 and 1788. For the radical reforms that he wished to carry out he had the whole country surveyed, and a register of landed estates compiled. These measures were greatly resented and in the reaction that followed his attempts at reform many of the maps were destroyed. Györffy's student, Dr. Edith Fél, has made copies of all surveys of *kertes város* on the surviving maps of Joseph II and also for those on the early 19th century surveys of Franz I; in all she found 82 within the Hungarian boundaries of 1914 and 20 more in Slavonia and the old military borderland. With the exception of the counties of Borsód and Héves they were well distributed throughout the Alföld, especially in the counties of Hajdú, Szabolcs, Békés, Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, with one each in the counties of Győr, Pozsony, Nyitra, and Bacs-Bodrog, in the south.

It is revealing to compare the maps of these two periods. *Kertes város* did not necessarily remain static in form but could alter amazingly over this half century. Some were evolving into the modern type of peasant town while others were expanding their garden belt and still others just developing one. Why this should have been so is hard to explain. Herds, either wild or half-wild, remained the prime element in the economy, with agriculture next, followed by fruit-growing, wine, and household industry, with specialized crafts and trade in last place. It is clear only that the inhabitants of a *kertes város* must have been free peasants, for seignorial rights would have interfered with their stock-breeding and would have cramped their efforts in other directions also. It is significant that the territory of the Cumans and the Jacygians, who had always been free and privileged, is the chief center of the *kertes város*. Again, a certain level of prosperity was needed to maintain the *kertes város* form: communities falling into poverty were obliged to abandon it. Others abandoned it because they turned increasingly to agriculture.

There is another factor that escapes precise definition. This is the tradition of the people in question, their cultural background. The *kertes város* was congenial to people with a long tradition of semi-nomadic life behind them. Mountaineer immigrants to the plain in the 18th century, although they raised stock, rarely built garden towns but turned immediately towards agri-

culture. This is true of the Slovaks who settled in the 18th century in the county of Békés, then practically empty.¹²

There is no means of telling whether all of the later peasant towns had passed through the *kertes város* form. Many are not indicated on any of the old maps, but this negative evidence tells us nothing. Again, if we find a place surrounded by "gardens" on an old map, this tells us only that the place had that form in the year the map was drawn. We have to remember that many places were repeatedly destroyed, abandoned, and rebuilt to new plans. Before drawing any conclusions as to the continuity of the form of a given town we need to be assured that the continuity of settlement was never interrupted.

As to whether the "garden" town form was pre-Turkish in origin, we can say only that this is highly probable. The Turkish period reduced everything to an older, more primitive level. The form may therefore have disappeared and been revived in this period, perhaps partly because of the ease with which it lent itself to defense.

Town archives of the Turkish period—those of Kecskemét, Kiskunhalas, Nagykörös, Debrecen, the Haiduk towns and others have been well preserved—do not clearly disclose any *kertes város* older than the 17th century. Györfy however opined that Kecskemét had been a genuine garden town from Tatar times¹³ and that if only more archives had survived we could prove that Szeged and other towns had taken this form at least from the 16th century. Debrecen seems to have had this form in the 17th century. Its center was surrounded by a moat and a palisade. In 1666 much of the town was destroyed by fire. The building regulations that followed in 1672 forbade any building within twenty-five steps of the moat, and specified that new stables be placed beyond the gardens.¹⁴ It is true that none of the travellers who wrote of their visits to Debrecen mention the existence of *ól*-gardens outside the walls. But it is common knowledge that the evidence of travellers' observations can be used only in so far as it is positive. One cannot argue that something did not exist simply from the fact that travellers did not refer to it.

Many points in the history of the *kertes város*, I must confess, are not yet clear to me. For example, a town of this type could never have had much room for expansion of its residential center. It is therefore difficult to see how it could have absorbed much of the population of the abandoned villages. Possibly the new settlers were too impoverished to seek more than very modest quarters. Perhaps new gardens were added on the outer edge of the

¹² Slovaks from the north in 1718 built Kiskörös, which appears on a Joseph II map as *kertes város*, but generally speaking Slovak immigrants were not absorbed into the plains traditions, holding to their own traditions.

¹³ "A Magyar Tanya", *Földrajzi Közlemények* (1937), p. 86.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

garden zone while its inside edge was converted into dwellings. Frequent fires must have offered opportunities for new layouts. The present view that in the Turkish period the towns acquired proportionately more land than population suggests that there was then no acute problem. But the situation would have become difficult in the 18th century, when the town populations really began to grow. Györffy neither stated nor resolved this problem.

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CISTERCIAN ARCHITECTURAL PURISM

PREAMBLE

Since the end of the first world war scholars have intensified their research on the Cistercian movement and its 12th-century architecture. In this note dealing with the building code and the structures of a minority group an attempt will be made to analyze the historical and theoretical bases which were responsible for the austerity of the Cistercian oratories. The question will have to be asked if and for how long the community was able to achieve and to maintain an ideally neutral type of monastic architecture, which was intended to be of such simplicity that it would not impose any emotions on the viewer.

It is difficult to find an architectural school which successfully based the construction of a series of monumental structures on a set of rigid principles aiming at absolute practicality of the buildings, while at the same time guaranteeing an immediately transparent and subtle expression of the spiritual forces which had shaped it. Even if we knew nothing of the Cistercians except their buildings we would be able to deduce the character of their movement. For an almost absolute unity within a far reaching architectural school presupposes a tightly organized group of men ready to accept with unwavering discipline the laws and the validity of a complete spiritual system which they themselves defined. The communal belief in the values of the chosen way of life will generate a strong need for missionary activity to which the freedom and phantasy of the individual and the liberty of personal creation are sacrificed, to be replaced by regulated behavior patterns producing a unified line of action. If an original and immediately identifiable architectural statement originates within such a group it will be due to a few educated men in central positions who, having recognized the symbolic power of forms, will find a formal vocabulary fitting their needs and expressing their purpose. They will standardize solutions, and ward off impurities such as fantastic decorations or overcomplex structural solutions threatening the unity of their architecture which then stands forth as a tangible monument to their thinking.

The awareness and correct interpretation of the purist ideal of austerity achieved by the twelfth century architects of the Cistercian community antedates that of our own period.¹ It is materially reflected in many European

¹ The publications of Curman, Rüttimann and Rose were followed by M. Aubert's two volume basic work: *L'Architecture Cistercienne en France* (2nd edition, 1947) and M.




Fig. 1. Plan scheme from the notebook of Villard de Honnecourt, c. 1235.

A. Dimier's fundamental *Recueil des Plans d'Eglises Cisterciennes* (1949). The celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of St. Bernard's death in 1953 brought a flood of publications which will be mentioned in the appended bibliographical selection. It is interesting to note that the recent book of F. Cali with photographs of southern French monasteries was prefaced by Le Corbusier. The text implies an affinity between the monastic environment of the twelfth century *milites christi* and the austere world of the twentieth century *homo faber* whose aesthetic ideals might best be characterized by Mies van der Rohe's maxim: "Less is more".

churches whose plan or elevation had grown out of Cistercian building practices.² The many commentators on Cistercian architecture ranged from the abbots of the order assembled for the yearly General Chapter at Cîteaux to numerous clerics and potentates of the Middle Ages. But none was more clearly aware of the principles, possibilities and limitations of the Cistercian plan than the early thirteenth century architect Villard de Honnecourt.³ A




Fig. 2. Morimond.




Fig. 3. Clairvaux II.

drawing in his notebook shows a cruciform building under which he wrote: "This is a church made up of squares which was to be erected for the order of Cîteaux" (Fig. 1). Hahnloser characterized the idea for this building whose measures are based on the width of the crossing as an ideal plan. However, if we compare it with the plan of the abbey church at Morimond built between 1160–80 A.D. we realize how a scale drawing executed in Villard's manner can immediately be related to the 'ideal plan'⁴ (Fig. 2). For Morimond is based on the width of the crossing and the length of a transept bay. The rest of the building can be laid out in multiples or quarters of a crossing

² See Michael, "Geistliche Baumeister des Mittelalters", *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* (Innsbruck, 1908), p. 216; and F. Bucher: *Notre Dame de Bonmont and the Earliest Cistercian Abbeys of Switzerland* (Bern, 1957), p. 124ff. and p. 53, note 5.

³ H. R. Hahnloser, *Villard de Honnecourt* (Vienna, 1935).

⁴ H. P. Eydoux, *L'Eglise Abbatiale de Morimond* (Roma, 1958).

square. Two of them will define the eastern wall of the chevet, two and a half the location of the western wall and so on.

An analysis of the earlier Clairvaux I and II which were built under the supervision of St. Bernard himself reveals a simple square measuring 16 m. per side used for the original oratory erected in 1115.⁵ The second construction which can be dated between 1135-45 A.D. can be defined through one single measure and its half (Fig. 3). We shall see that a reduction of the basic plan and elevation of Clairvaux was to be adopted in numerous oratories throughout the provinces of the order. Over one hundred and fifty of them are still in existence or known through descriptions (Fig. 7). Contrasted with the simultaneous ornate phase of Burgundian Romanesque as represented by St. Lazare in Autun or the abbey church of Cluny, Cistercian architecture must have startled even the contemporaries who knew the historical facts and aesthetic theories in which it found its justification (Fig. 14).

HISTORY AND THEORY

After his first three attempts at an uncompromising monastic reform had failed due to the resistance of the monks, abbot Robert de Molesmes, accompanied by 21 brethren, left his monastery once more. On the feast day of St. Benedict, 1098, they settled in the deserted swamp of Cistercium and founded the *Novum Monasterium*. Independent of the rest of the world, the deeply committed elite was determined to follow the rules of St. Benedict within a tightly knit cenobitic community. Their views toward external interference were so rigid that the *Novi Milites Christi* as they called themselves were threatened by starvation for several years. The saying spread that, having left the world once to enter a Cluniac community, the decision to become a monk in the *Novum Monasterium* meant to leave it a second time. One recalls the admittance of Bernard de Fontaine into the order in 1112. Three years later he founded Clairvaux which was going to hold a central position not only in the affairs of the order but also on the European scene until the death of St. Bernard in 1153. The importance of his personality can be gauged by the spectacular growth of the order. By the end of the twelfth century Clairvaux alone had founded 263 monasteries ranging geographically from Portugal to Sweden.

In terms of architectural history it is interesting to note that in contrast to the centralized organization of the Cluniac congregation the Cistercian order consisted of a federation of monasteries. The abbot was responsible only to the bishop of the diocese and the General Chapter which he had to attend yearly at Cîteaux and which formed one of the first regularly convening

⁵ For plans mentioned see M. A. Dimier, *Recueil de Plans d'Eglises Cisterciennes* (Paris, 1949).

international governing bodies. It planned the spread of the movement with utmost skill. In 1324, notwithstanding a shortlived attempt to stop the expansion, there were seven hundred and forty-one abbeys, some of which housed several hundred monks and laybrothers. Two popes and six hundred bishops had emerged from the Cistercian ranks. The agricultural and intellectual work of the monks commanded widespread respect, which is best rendered in a medieval epigram:

*Tunc subito antiquam mutarunt omnia formam
Aspera quae fuerant, fertiliora facis
Vallis et in medio cella, Christique dedicatam
Ecclesiam adductis, fratribus aedificas.*⁶

We know that four sets of existing theories of an almost exclusively negative nature guided the Cistercian architect. They consisted first of the Augustinian principle demanding a structure without *affectus*, that is without emotional expression. Secondly, corresponding to Benedict's stipulation that the monastic church should be nothing but an *officina*, the oratories were to be ideal workshops for 'the art of holiness'.⁷ To this St. Bernard added that an architecture whose aim it is to create a vivid emotional response would be unworthy of the independent spirit of the 'genus monasteriale', the population of monks, who must according to Bernard transcend 'a meaningless hull of stone'.⁸ Behind all of this lay the awareness of the fact that Cluny had fallen into the trap of what the General Chapter was later to call 'the superfluities which deform the honesty of an old religious order'. In his famous *Apologia ad Vuillermum Abbatem* written between 1123-25 Bernard de Clairvaux challenged Cluny and attacked what was in his terms a purposeless and ridiculously expensive type of architecture.⁹ The basilica of Cluny with its double aisled forechurch, its two transepts, three hundred windows and sixty piers which supported a towering vault 100 feet high became for Bernard a 'super empty' and 'insane' structure. Let us, however, not forget that Bernard who was too intelligent to become an iconoclast made it absolutely clear that he was talking as 'monk to monks', and that he approved of the lavish decoration of secular churches stating in fact that the masses need more than purely intellectual stimulation.

⁶ For spread of movement, agricultural and intellectual achievements see Bucher, *Bonmont*, p. 16, 175.

⁷ M. A. Dimier, "La règle de Saint Benoît et le dépouillement architectural des Cisterciens", *L'Architecture Monastique* (Mainz, 1951); and F. M. André, *St. Bernard est-il seul dans son attitude face aux oeuvres d'art?* (Tamié, 1953).

⁸ M. A. Wolters, *Uebersetzung der Schriften des Hl. Bernhard* (Wittlich, 1935), III, p. 272.

⁹ J. V. Schlosser, *Quellenbuch zur Kunstgeschichte des Abendländischen Mittelalters* (Vienna, 1896), p. 266. Some of St. Bernard's statements are copied almost verbatim from Augustine, Jerome, John Chrisostom, as F. M. André, *op. cit.*, pointed out.

There has recently been some doubt if Bernard's *Apologia* might not have been primarily directed against rebellious factions within the Cistercian order itself. For the laws passed by the General Chapter included also a detailed policy concerning the arts, a policy which was enforced through an elaborate system of visitations. The decree banning figural art and stained glass windows issued in 1134 had to be repeated. In 1152 the lighting was reduced to two candles or preferably one. In 1157 the construction of towers was forbidden and the weight of the two bells, of which only one at a time could be rung, limited to five hundred pounds. By the end of the twelfth century the color scheme was redefined. The doors still had to be painted white. For simple purely geometric wall patterns one color could be used. This decree had to be reemphasized in 1213, 1218, and 1256. In several cases transgressing abbots had to watch while a tower which they had dared to build or a nonconforming floor decoration was destroyed under the eyes of a stern emissary from another abbey.

The slow relaxation of building laws, the introduction of paintings and tomb figures, accepted first in isolated cases and later generally, presents us with the step by step disintegration of the moral discipline within the order. On the other hand it also proves the desperate thirst for representative art and decorative motives which had been excluded from the stripped architecture. Respecting the innumerable restrictions the architect was free to shape his building in whatever way he wished. But by the time of the most vigorous expansion all eyes were turned towards Clairvaux where Bernard, probably with the help of the architect monk Achard had started to build a model church for the order in 1135. For having ridiculed the magnificence of Cluny III Bernard had to prove that a truly monastic architecture using modern vaulting techniques was possible on a monumental scale. After the counter attacks from Cluny the Cistercian oratories had to be an answer in stone (Fig. 14).

NEUTRAL ARCHITECTURE

1. *The Plan*

Clairvaux II was consecrated after a speedy construction of about ten years. A basically Romanesque square schematism had been adopted for the plan (Fig. 3). One side of the crossing gave the basic module. Multiplied seven and a half times it defined the length of the church which was ca. 107 m. Four squares including the crossing defined the length of the transept measuring ca. 54 m. Straight walls enclosed the main apse and the ten secondary chapels. This plan was easily adaptable to current needs. In Pontigny II (consecrated 1170) four chapels were added to the ends of the




Fig. 4. Fontenay.

transept. Cîteaux III, consecrated in 1194, contained 23 chevet chapels while in Ebrach, built in the early thirteenth century, sixteen chapels surrounded a rectangular ambulatory.¹⁰ This loosely standardized scheme was further simplified to a pilot plan used in hundreds of abbey churches. We find it in its first preserved monumental stage at Fontenay, a daughter foundation of Clairvaux. The oratory was rapidly constructed between

¹⁰ M. A. Dimier, *Recueil, op. cit.*, Plans 83, 236, 80, 100.

1139–47 and consecrated, probably in the presence of St. Bernard, by the former furnace tender of Clairvaux, Pope Eugene III. Due to a smaller community western transept chapels were not included (Figs. 4, 15). The number of altars was reduced to six including the altar for the laybrothers placed in the nave. If we shrink this plan in total length to about 50 m. we arrive at what could be called the Cistercian standard church.




Fig. 5. Bonmont.




Fig. 6. Hauterive.

Probably the first preserved example of this standard church is Bonmont above the Lake of Geneva.¹¹ Formerly a hermitage or, in St. Bernard's words, "a synagogue of Satan", it was adopted by Clairvaux as its eighth daughter. Close to a Roman road leading to the Alpine passes its strategic location warranted an especially austere architectural statement. The span of the nave arcades was increased due to the height of the transverse barrel vaults (Figs. 5, 11). Thus the Romanesque square schematism was dropped in favor of a more flexible system. This idea was soon repeated in nearby Hauterive founded by a daughter abbey of Clairvaux in 1131. During the

¹¹ Bucher, *Bonmont*, and *Congrès Archéologique de France, CX session* (Paris, 1953), p. 191.




Fig. 7. Chevet-solutions from abbeys founded by Clairvaux (Esser).

construction a change of plan occurred and the span of the last three arcades was increased even further (Figs. 6, 9). A few years later Frenisberg, founded by Lützel whose origin went back to Cîteaux, was built as an almost exact copy of the two above mentioned churches.¹² In the third quarter of the twelfth century the abbey of Tennenbach near Freiburg, Germany, was founded by Frenisberg and adopted a plan which corresponded in size and proportion to the one used for the three already discussed oratories.¹³ Simultaneously we find the plan in Italian, Swedish, German, Polish and Portuguese examples of almost identical size and number of bays. Previous to Dimier's plan publication there was still some doubt that this represented the typical Cistercian plan since the ambulatory with radiating chapels was

¹² Bucher, *Bonmont*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹³ H. P. Eydoux, *L'Architecture des églises Cisterciennes d'Allemagne* (Paris, 1952), Plan p. 43.

introduced within the order immediately after the death of Bernard. The evidence points unmistakably to the fact that the monasteries founded by St. Bernard adopted the standardized scheme consistently. K. H. Esser's comparison of chevet solutions as seen in Fig. 7 shows the twenty-two known structures begun under the direct supervision of St. Bernard (left column) in which the rectilinear solution of usually moderate size has been used without exception. In the oratories which were dependent on Clairvaux and which were constructed after the death of the saint in 1153 the proportion changes radically (Column 2 & 3). In twenty-one of the forty-seven structures a more fashionable plan of Romanesque or Gothic character has been adopted. If we analyze other filiations depending on other major centers of the order as, for instance, Cîteaux we find that the more usual




Fig. 8. Cross-sections. Left: Hauterive. Right: Convent of the Maigrange.

polygonal or semicircular chevet with or without ambulatory occurs only in 51 out of 154 known early plans.

It seems that the standardized Cistercian plan schema which emphasizes the Benedictine search for '*ordo et equilibrium*' goes back to St. Bernard himself, and K. H. Esser has correspondingly called it the 'Bernardine plan'. This designation can, moreover, be justified through an evaluation of the prestige which Clairvaux had assumed within the order. As late as 1224 it prompted Abbot Wigbold to send an emissary to Clairvaux for the purpose of measuring the church which was to be copied at Aduard in Friesland. And even more directly we know that Bernard sent out one of his architects, Magister Achard, to plan and to supervise the construction of the German abbey at Himmerod.¹⁴ The rectilinear plan influenced the church and cathedral architecture of Burgundy, the Rhône valley and of communities neighboring Cistercian abbeys of Europe in general. It seems that already

¹⁴ H. Hahn, *Die frühe Baukunst der Zisterzienser* (Berlin, 1957), p. 314. Includes extensive study of proportions. K. H. Esser: "Ueber den Kirchenbau des Hl. Bernhard von Clairvaux", *Archiv für Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte*, 5. Jahrg. (1953), p. 195ff. Bucher, *Bonmont*, op. cit., p. 184.




Fig. 9. Above: Convent of the Maigrauge. Below: Hauterive.

in the twelfth century the Cistercian plan had in itself become a symbol of austerity. It is more than conjecture to assume that Arducius de Faucigny, Bishop of Geneva (1135–85) completed his cathedral on the Cistercian ground plan as an atonement for the betrayal of his former associate St. Bernard during the Schism.¹⁵

It might be useful to sum up the practical advantages of the plan (Figs. 1–7). No complex curves had to be laid out and no vault thrusts had to be precalculated in the chevet foundations. At the same time the plan pre-

¹⁵ Louis Grodecki, *L'Architecture Monastique* (Mainz, 1951) discusses the influence of St. Bernard on Suger's architecture.

determined one vault type of different sizes. The speed of construction could be increased already during the planning period. In actual practice the average construction time of the fifty earliest churches of the order was only nineteen years which is amazingly short for a series of monumental buildings emerging from workshops counting as little as twelve monks and a small number of hired hands. Thus it is not astonishing that the technical skill of the semi-professional Cistercian architects became so well known that they were often asked to supervise other, including secular, constructions, until the General Chapter had to intervene. The standardized Cistercian plan with its chevet which allowed for an indefinite increase of altars, its adaptable nave reserved for a sometimes large number of *Conversi* was certainly the most practical solution for the needs of the monastic communities. If we add that there is no hesitation to drop the transept altogether in the convent where few altars were needed, it becomes clear that not even the cherished traditional cross symbolism produced by a protruding transept was felt to be essential (see Figs. 8, 9).

2. Elevation

Basing ourselves on the churches erected before the death of St. Bernard we suggest that a tendency toward a standardized and highly efficient approach existed also for the elevation of the Cistercian oratories. For obvious practical and possibly also accoustical reasons there had to be a stone vault. At the same time a stable structural solution had to be found. A system of transverse barrels over the side aisles could function as buttresses to the main vault (Figs. 8, 11). The fact that they do not meet the major point of thrust which would be higher, was counteracted by a thick masonry mantel above the arcades which acts as a continuous buttressing wall. The main barrel over the nave was further strengthened through a not uncommon omission of the clerestory which had frequently served for the unification of the nave and side aisles under one roof. This absence of windows over the nave represents a startling departure from the established basilical scheme. Most of the vaults were constructed according to the simple tiers-point method which produced a comfortably broken barrel vault. Its form would verticalize the thrust of the massive stone cover and would not be steep enough to express heaven bound energy. Technically this combined system was so effective that none of the still existing churches in which it was put to use has shown any dangerous signs of dislocation. Even a later destruction of two or three bays of the nave made necessary in some cases where the community had shrunk to a fraction of its former numbers, did not affect the remaining, carefully balanced vaulting scheme which had from the very beginning been conceived as a unified system of structurally independent units.




Fig. 10. Bonmont. Longitudinal section.




Fig. 11. Bonmont. Cross-section.




Fig. 12. Section through a typical Cistercian church.

The independence of the stone baldachin was made clear through a recurrent illogical characteristic. Transverse arches, if present, were rarely continued down to the floor as engaged shafts. Having become unnecessary they disappear in the wall. Sometimes transverse arches vanish altogether and the vault becomes an integral part of the nave (Fig. 10). This continuous broken barrel vault reduces construction time even further, allows for an even distribution of light entering through the rose window and the eastern windows and is probably acoustically more effective. In this connection we must recall St. Bernard's stress on auditory perception.

One may further ask if there might not be a relationship between the proportions of the Cistercian elevation and the Vitruvian or, even more likely, Neoplatonic concepts to which St. Bernard had been exposed, though here again practical considerations may have determined the simplicity of approach.¹⁶ Twice the width of the nave usually determines the height of the main vault (Figs. 8-12). Double the width of the side aisles gives the height of the side aisle vaults. Since this elevation can be inscribed in a square, that is, a form without vertical or horizontal energy, it contributes to the desired lack of emotional effect. It becomes apparent that the objective

¹⁶ H. Sedlmayr, *Die Entstehung der Kathedrale* (Zurich, 1950), Chapter eight; O. v. Simpson, *The Gothic Cathedral* (New York, 1956), Chapter two.




Fig. 13. Fontenoy crossing.




Fig. 14. Fontenoy interior.

of the Cistercian builder was not merely to construct a durable shelter fully adapted to its proposed use but also a building which would be formally abstract. He would have to use the stipulated economy of means in such a way that it would not become obvious barrenness. His knowledge of architectural effects would produce a passive interior which would in effect be neutral. He would be following a statement found in a French paraphrase of Augustine stating that "the similarity, equality, and integration of the parts of a building will interact to give it a unity conducive of thought".

Thus for instance the interior of Fontenay at its most sensitive point, the crossing, produces a minimum reaction on the observer (Fig. 13). The clearly interbalanced simplicity of all the elements, the containing shape of the windowless vaults, throw us back upon ourselves. The unity of the elevation, which even today has shocked some of the more systematic art historians by its nonconformity to the established categories, must be considered as an original, most effective creation of the Cistercian architects influenced markedly by the personality of the abbot of Clairvaux (Fig. 14).¹⁷ It may have been inspired by the monumental solutions offered in St. Vorles at Châtillon-sur-Seine, St. Philibert in Tournus, perhaps Farges and a series of small Burgundian churches with which St. Bernard was familiar. It is possible that the one storey elevation combined with transverse vaults over the side-aisles originated experimentally in Clairvaux II. In any case we find it in the earliest preserved examples of the order such as Fontenay, Bonmont, Escale-Dieu, Silvacane, Trois Fontaine, Bonneval, San Joano de Tarouca and ten other partially ruined buildings.¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS

The Cistercian oratory represents probably the best practical solution for a group of monastic churches ever devised. The rectilinear chevet solution provided for a stable and simple vault construction whose thrusts were met by transverse barrels. Since very little light was needed for the celebration of the memorized services the clerestory was eliminated (Fig. 15).

Ten consecutive steps sufficed to build the church from the foundations to its roof.¹⁹ Including the rose window, the doors and the abstract sculptural ornamentation only ten to twelve separate but repeated elements were needed

¹⁷ E. Lefèvre-Pontalis, "Les nefs sans fenêtres dans les églises romanes et gothiques", *Bulletin Monumental*, 1922, p. 257; J. Valléry-Radot, "La limite méridionale de l'école romane de Bourgogne", *Bulletin Monumental*, 1936, p. 273; Julius Baum, *Romanische Baukunst in Frankreich* (Stuttgart, 1928), 2nd edition, p. XIV.

¹⁸ M. Aubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-241.

¹⁹ The ten steps necessary to erect a typical Cistercian church can easily be reconstructed if one takes a convenient basic measure and starts out with the square which will be the crossing between nave and transept.




Fig. 15. Fontenoy isometric perspective.

to create the whole interior. The same drastic simplification took place for the exterior. The straight eastern end, the simple facade, the unifying roof lent to these structures the almost barnlike appearance stipulated by St. Benedict for the monastic oratory (Fig. 16).

The Cistercian concept was introduced at an important moment in architectural history. Romanesque, especially in Burgundy, had reached a stage after which further refinement was impossible. In the Ile de France, Suger was building St. Denis in the forms of the new Gothic style. If St. Bernard and his architects were not conscious of the modern trend they certainly created with it, striving to achieve a unification of space within their churches. The continuous nave-vault included now the crossing. A freer flow of space was often emphasized by the absence of transverse arches (Fig. 10). The buttressing through high tranverse barrels over the side aisles helped to produce an interior which can be immediately encompassed visually and comprehended structurally. The even, undramatic light originating from the blank glass of the usually ample fenestration illuminated an interior which would not be conducive to unrestrained mystical fantasies. The square cross section produced a balance between horizontal and vertical elements. The more and more pronounced width of the arcades checked a nervous movement towards the chevet. The sparse decorative orchestration served only



Fig. 16. Bonmont. West façade.

to clarify a few not completely defined points in the building. A balance between additive and divisive elements had been reached. This functional austerity offered no external stimuli, satisfied no emotional needs and demanded no attention. All these characteristics created a *clear definition of parts within a more unified space*. This concept was to be at least as influential as the technical virtuosity expressed in the Cistercian vaulting scheme in eliminating the mature Romanesque architectural vocabulary and in spreading the readiness to accept the modern Gothic style all over Europe.

The Cistercian oratories built during the first sixty years of the existence of the order ultimately express the search for order of a deeply rational and independent group within the emotional twelfth century society. In the 'officina' chance and fantasy have been excluded. Its austerity which demands transcendence addresses itself only to a spiritual elite, to the 'genus monasteriale' as defined in the strictest terms by St. Benedict and St. Bernard.

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THE NEW ENGLAND PLAIN STYLE

Purism represents the conscious effort of a culture to reject a commonly accepted iconography and the meanings implicit in its canons of proportion, taste and esthetic, and to substitute in their place a pragmatic solution of the artistic problem involved.¹ What is not always recognized is that this solution must be the consequence of the terms of the problem; and the statement of these terms, indeed the selection of the problem itself, are both culturally determined.

To perceive this relationship is not always easy and may indeed require considerable detachment on the part of the critic or historian. In our times the parallel term, "functionalism", as applied to architecture has produced many different architectures with results as distinct as those of Mies van der Rohe, Wright, and Le Corbusier.² To a degree Wright and Le Corbusier rationalize this difference by indicating that different sites and purposes produce different buildings and therefore styles. Actually these architects do more than this: they produce different iconographies which reveal wholly different world views and methods of formulating their artistic problem. If this larger function is recognized the continuity of terms from Greenough and Davis to Wright and the discontinuity of their works need produce no difficulty or confusion.³ Each architectural writer has simply given new visual content to the terms of his text. Function, form, etc., have in each instance been redefined.

In a more distant period I raised much the same sort of question and, although I at the same time advanced far less well substantiated hypotheses on other issues, my suggestions as to the origin of the plain style in American Protestantism seemed to touch on sensitive, if not hypersensitive, aspects of

¹ This statement represents a list of the characteristics of purism more than a definition. *Webster's New International Dictionary* (Springfield, 1959) defines "purism" as following a rule or strictness.

² See François Bucher, "Cistercian Architectural Purism", *CSSH*, III, p. 89, note 1.

³ Horatio Greenough, *Form and Function, Remarks on Art* (Berkeley, 1947); Alexander Jackson Davis, *Rural Residences* (New York, 1837); Frank Lloyd Wright, *An Autobiography* (New York, 1932).

popular mythology.⁴ The chief assumption of two very excellent critics was that like forms imply similar esthetic and pragmatic formulations. Thus, the plain meeting house was dictated by isolated frontier conditions and not by inherited or acquired tradition of Protestant church architecture.⁵

That these conditions limited the quality and complexity of the final solution could scarcely be denied. However, since Catholics in New France and New Spain, Brazil and the Philippine Islands, all equally isolated frontiersmen, arrived at wholly different solutions, it remains to be demonstrated that the frontier conditions of New England dictated the form of the New England meeting-house.⁶

Why, for example with the superb quality of New England grave sculpture, was no effort made to enrich the meetinghouse fabric? Why in a sophisticated center of cabinet making like Boston did church pews remain straightforward, simple boxes?⁷ Stated in these terms the answer is obvious. The problem was to design a counter-Baroque church. Therefore all elaboration, all development must remain within the straight line of an anti-Catholic liturgy, iconography and esthetic. On the other hand, where Puritan theology permitted elaboration there elaboration and sophistication developed. Since New England was in part at least a theocracy, one might expect church forms to extend their influence into domestic design, and once again our expectation is fulfilled. Finally, if these forms were not accidental consequences of the environment but had acquired a definite meaning for the members of the society producing them, one would expect them to change as the society changed, and once again this expectation seems fulfilled.

In any event a brief account of the principles and development of purism in the Puritan colonial church may be helpful.

Henry VIII's reformation of the English Church, the advanced reforms of Edward VI, and the espousal of parallel principles by the Puritans under the early Stuarts laid down certain indefinite rules of architectural design.⁸

⁴ *Architecture and Town Planning in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven, 1951), p. 130ff.

⁵ Sumner C. Powell, "Seventeenth-Century Sudbury, Massachusetts", *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, XI, 3-15. M. C. Donnelly, "New England Meeting-houses in the Seventeenth Century", *Old Time New England*, XLVII, 85ff. See also Garvan, "Origin of the Plain Style", *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* (September, 1950). Superb documentation of the continental movement is found in the paintings of Pieter Saerndam. Geurt Brinkgreve, "Saerndam, le Peintre des Eglises", *Connaissance des Arts*, XCV (January, 1960), 32-41.

⁶ This point was particularly brought home to the writer during World War II. "A Philippine Mission Church", *Liturgical Arts*, XIV, 90ff.

⁷ Compare J. Frederick Kelly, *Early Meetinghouses of Connecticut* (New Haven, 1948); Harriet M. Forbes, *Gravestones of New England* (Boston, 1927); Luke V. Lockwood, *Colonial Furniture in America* (New York, 1926).

⁸ The profound effect of the Reformation upon intellectual history has tended to detract attention from its equally important impact upon material culture, and many areas remain undetailed. A provocative general discussion is Lewis Mumford, *Technics*

These sprang from their reform of Church ritual and their attack on Catholic or Roman visual iconography. The first led to the redesign of the church both in plan and later in elevation, the second to the removal of statuary, relief, carving, painting and stained glass.

The constant shifting of official dogma which followed the royal succession produced a variety of architectural formulas and liturgical rules for English Protestant worship of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The more measured but no less universal changes of the nineteenth century have conspired to all but remove the very clear concept of worship and its setting which the radical reformers of the seventeenth century developed and brought to New England.⁹

Recent scholarship has confirmed the primary role of the order of communion in English Protestant reform. Focusing its attack upon the communion as practiced by the Catholic Church at the end of the fifteenth century, Reformed doctrine hit directly at the doctrine of transubstantiation, and while reserving at first the formula for the practice of communion, clearly distinguished between the act of communion as symbol and as actual miracle.¹⁰

Although radical reformers won many compromises, their doctrine by no means controlled the design of most English places of worship. Instead these buildings chiefly reflected their long history as centers of religious controversy. In most instances the external fabric of the building remained but its interior was sharply altered. The rood screen was stripped of its crucifix and attendant figures or removed altogether. Clear glass was substituted for stained; statues were removed, and in some instances the vaulting obscured by horizontal roofing¹¹ (Fig. 1).

Changes in the fabric of the church also were extended to the church furniture. Simple box pews were substituted for the carved and ornamental seats of the medieval period. Elaborate hatchments commemorating the achievements and heritage of the distinguished faithful appeared along the walls and on piers in the Dutch fashion. Portrait funerary monuments in three-quarter relief and often brightly colored were set into the walls of large and small churches¹² (Fig. 2 and 3b).

Finally and most important, significant changes in liturgical theory reshaped

and Civilization (New York, 1934). Clifford W. Dugmore, *The Mass and the English Reformers* (London, 1958), is the most recent account of liturgical changes.

⁹ Although elements of the plain style have lingered until the present day the publication in 1841 by Augustus W. Pugin of *Contrasts* (London) marked its conclusion as a major architectural theory.

¹⁰ C. W. Dugmore, *The Mass*, pp. 111ff.

¹¹ Francis Bond, *Screens and Galleries in English Churches* (London, 1908), p. 126, 142-3, 149; Gerald Cobb, *The Old Churches of London* (London, 1942), p. 18.

¹² Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, *Essex*, III, 12-13, 24; William Dugdale, *The Antiquities of Warwickshire* (London, 1730), p. 740ff.



Fig. 1. The interior of St. Catherine Cree substantially as altered by Inigo Jones.
(G. Goodwin, *Churches of London*, 1835.)




Fig. 2. The Speaker's seat in St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, reflects a concept of personal privacy and rank that extended into English public worship at home and in the colonies. (T. Wilson, *Ornaments of Churches Considered*, 1761.)




Fig. 3a. St. Paul's, London, and London Meeting of the Society of Friends in 1736.
(B. Picart, *Ceremonies et Coutumes Religieuses*, 1736.)




Fig. 3b. St. Paul's, London, and London Meeting of the Society of Friends in 1736.
(B. Picart, *Ceremonies et Coutumes Religieuses*, 1736.)



Fig. 4a. The Old Ship Meeting at Hingham, Massachusetts, 1682.
(E. Whitefield, *The Homes of Forefathers*, 1879.)




Fig. 4b. Plan of 1670 New Haven meetinghouse drawn by Ezra Stiles as it was in 1757.
(Ezra Stiles manuscripts, Yale University Library.)



Fig. 5. Mid-eighteenth century pulpit with carved tablets, reader's desk and box pews of Chestnut Hill Meeting, Millville, Massachusetts. (Historic American Buildings Survey.)



Fig. 6b. Headstones of the children of John and Martha Cutler, Charleston, 1680.
 Photographs by Allan Ludwig.



Fig. 6a. Headstones of Ann Erinton, Cambridge, 1653; Rebekiah Row, Charleston, 1680.
Photographs by Allan Ludwig

the altar and the sanctuary. First and most important, the Ten Commandments lettered on two or more tablets were hung over the altar or altar table. In addition the king's arms were displayed on the choir loft or other prominent spot. The reformers, unable to agree upon the location of the altar in church service, often removed the large traditional block and substituted for it an imposing but portable altar table¹³ (Fig. 3a).

Likewise, new emphasis upon the explication of biblical texts focused increased attention upon the pulpit. Partly as a consequence of the destruction and removal of carved and painted imagery and partly as a result of its enlargement and handsome decoration, the pulpit emerged as the most significant piece of church furniture, quite equal in visual significance to the tablets of the law or the king's arms and often surpassing the altar table and sanctuary proper.¹⁴

In lesser objects liturgical change brought marked redesign. The tabernacle for the chalice gave way to well-bound copies of the Bible and prayer book. The many candles of medieval practice were reduced to two. Most important, the chalice began to come under some criticism and in Reformed churches gave way to multiple beakers and other containers.¹⁵

It is difficult to assess just how far these changes had proceeded prior to the great Puritan migration to New England and the American islands in the 1630's. Certainly if the writings of the Puritans are to be believed, almost all these radical changes had been tried, but few of them had been universally applied. In any case it is important to note that the English migrant carried with him nearly a century of Protestant experience in the redesign of church interiors but, unlike the continental Protestant, little or no tradition of exterior design.¹⁶ In such matters his principal article of faith, the Westminster Confession of 1645-'47 is maddeningly indefinite and vague. Certainly the Englishman's experience of continental Protestant architecture, while it might encompass its principles, did not comprehend its details. Instead, his heritage was largely negative and at the outset deliberately counter to recent Christian tradition. Wherever his theological

¹³ George W. Addleshaw and Frederick Etchells, *The Architectural Setting of Anglican Worship* (London, 1948), pp. 22-36.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-84. John C. Cox, *Pulpits, Lecterns and Organs in English Churches* (London, 1915), p. 98ff.; Charles W. Budden, *Old English Churches, Their Architecture and Furniture* (Liverpool, 1925), pp. 134-135.

¹⁵ Edward Alfred Jones, *The Church Plate of the Diocese of Bangor* (London, 1906); *Old Silver Sacramental Vessels of Foreign Protestant Churches in England* (London, 1908); *The Old Church Plate of the Isle of Man* (London, 1907).

¹⁶ On the continent the persecution of the Huguenot in France and Catholic separation in the Low Countries created a real demand for complete church architectural designs. Murk D. Ozinga, *De Protestantsche Kerkenbouw in Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1929), pp. 12-19; Jacques Pannier, *Salomon de Brosse* (Paris, 1911), pp. 86ff. Much of the continental attitude toward church design can be surmised from the paintings of topographical artists. See Geurt Brinkgreve, "Saendram, le Peintre des Eglises", *Connaissance des Arts*, XVC (January 1960), pp. 32-41.

convictions agreed with tradition he seems to have avoided innovation. Elsewhere he designed a non-liturgical, non-symbolic architecture that seemed to reflect perfectly his puristic concept of church architecture. The negative aspects of its design were sought deliberately, not imposed by the environment. The quality of the execution of the design can be judged by implication. Apparently, the colonists' lack of experience in the design of large structures in wood led to improvisation as at Hingham or more commonly to early decay as at New Haven¹⁷ (Fig. 4a and 4b).

Whatever the guide used in the improvisation of the construction and exterior of the New England meetinghouse, the decision to depart from traditional English ecclesiastical design represented at the outset an effort to design an audience chamber suitable for sermons, well lit, plainly ornamented and totally free from liturgical symbolism.¹⁸

What is especially noteworthy is that this purism, adopted as an outward manifestation of Puritan protest, became with the passage of time the traditional symbol of the New England establishment and before 1750 had elaborated into a modest iconography. That these Puritan symbols were strong enough and explicit enough to mold even the structures of late eighteenth-century Anglican and Catholic insurgent edifices demonstrates that although the architecture had become by that time traditional its meaning was nevertheless clear to New England colonial society.

In one sense the attribution of meanings to Puritan Church architecture was implicit with the township's choice of site and the builder's orientation of the building. Located centrally among the home lots often facing the common, in a few instances actually built upon the common for the purpose of convenience, the meetinghouse became a focal point in town and street design. There is substantial evidence that its location determined the value of neighboring house sites and that the more wealthy and active town founders gained further prestige from the proximity of their dwellings to the meetinghouse.¹⁹

More important, the anti-liturgical tradition demanded that the building be oriented on a north-south axis or have a symmetrical plan. The latter alternative was often followed in the seventeenth century. Complexity and the absence of an English architectural tradition led to a choice of square plan in preference to the round or polygonal often preferred by

¹⁷ John Frederick Kelly, *Early Meetinghouses of Connecticut* (New York, 1948), II, 3-10.

¹⁸ Assembly of Divines at Westminster, *The Directory for the Publick Worship of God* (1645), Appendix; *A Platform of Church Discipline . . . by the Synod of Cambridge* (1640), Preface; *A Confession of Faith . . . Saybrook, 1708* (New London, 1710). — *The Directory for the Publick Worship of God*, Westminster (Philadelphia, 1745), pp. 10-30; Kelly, *Early Meetinghouses*, I, 20.

¹⁹ See John Brockett map of 1641, Ms. copy Yale University Library, and James Wadsworth Mss. Map of New Haven, 1748. The account of Harwinton is an eighteenth-century example. Garvan, *Architecture and Town Planning*, p. 69.

Dutch and German Protestants. The square plan, though often praised as a utilitarian solution of the problems of an audience chamber, produced almost as many problems as it solved. The location of the pulpit could not be easily solved since its central position placed many listeners behind it and its location along one wall condemned worshippers along that wall to a very imperfect view, if adequate hearing, of the preacher and at the same time eliminated a gallery along one quarter of the potential wall length. Moreover the square plan was ill-suited to the celebration of communion. The altar table carried into one of the alleys or passageways, quite filled the space and made its use awkward and crowded²⁰ (Fig. 4b).

Although narrative and representational art recalled Catholic tradition, some interior ornament had wide Puritan appeal. Pulpits, pews and altar tables were enriched by contemporary and traditional moldings and more rarely with Renaissance arcades and inscriptions (Fig. 5).

An indirect visual effect was given by the use of clear light introduced most commonly by two rows of light sash which admitted light at gallery and floor level.²¹ This practice combined utility and theological rationalization, since it both retained the tradition set by the destruction of medieval stained glass, avoided the optical illusions and *trompes-d'oeil* so well developed by counter-Baroque Catholic architects, and at the same time gave the whole assembly a clear light by which they might follow the service (Fig. 7).

The aim of Puritan builders seemed clear. Like early reformation architects they designed an interior space which was brightly lit and uniformly colored. The square or nearly square floor plan and low ceiling removed the emotional stimulus of a strongly dominating dimension. Moreover, high box pews and the central pulpit further divided the space and turned it inwardly about the pulpit. Even this element, prominent though it was, had much of its visual impact reduced by its divisions. In every respect space was limited, measurable, divided and rectilinear.

By 1725 most congregations had adopted a rectangular plan for new construction and alteration; by 1750 an attached bell tower had become common practice; by 1800 pedimented porticos were grafted to one narrow facade. Meanwhile the interior too began to alter. In many instances the altar table had become so firmly placed as to be in fact a simple altar. The introduction of classical orders, the refinements of moldings, the multiplication of church plate, painting and the improvement of box pews reflected the wealth and status of the worshippers and the continued social importance

²⁰ See Ezra Stiles plan of New Haven meetinghouse as it was in 1757, drawn in 1772: Ezra Stiles Mss. "Itinerary", Yale University Library. Reproduced Garvan, *Architecture and Town Planning*, Fig. 67, 21. Kelly, *Early Meetinghouses*, I, 49, 148, 270; II, 8, 157-9, 292. Ezra Stiles "Itinerary", Ms. II, 414.

²¹ President Clap's chapel for Yale College (1776) illustrated the matured tradition perfectly. Daniel Bowen, *A Front View of Yale College and the College Chapel, New Haven*, engraved 1786, New Haven.

of their meetinghouses, whose towers punctuated harbor landscapes. Significantly, by the last half of the eighteenth century in the square simple meetinghouses of the older towns the visitor found the Quaker, the Baptist, Methodist and even Anglican, who all shared the role of protest groups and who significantly adopted the discarded symbols of Puritanism.

The search for appropriate symbols extended from church design into the decorative arts and though the full account of these extended uses is still fragmentary, it does suggest the broad outlines of the development of an iconography, its extension into daily life, its acceptance as commonplace and its final discard.

Most obvious of all the Puritan symbols were the tablets of the law authorized for over a century of English reform.²² Designed initially to instruct the congregation, taken with the royal arms they symbolized the reform of English worship and its emphasis upon the Old Testament, personal reading and individual worship, as opposed to late medieval emphasis upon the New Testament, selected readings and visual iconography (Fig. 3a).

Incised or painted upon boards of a traditional Hebraic shape, the tablets in New England most often appeared without the accompanying royal arms. Moreover, the utilitarian instructional device of the sixteenth century reformer became by the late seventeenth century an important and perhaps controversial symbol partly of Christian and partly too of secular status. The evolution of this symbol is a microcosm of the almost inevitable evolution of successful puristic devices. Conceived as simplifications of over-elaborate visual solutions, the simplifications themselves become the basis for a new iconography which gradually extends to an elaboration nearly equal to that of the parent system it replaced and which, in turn, sometimes engenders revolts and reformations equal to the enthusiasm for reform which brought puristic form into being.

The design had by the time of the Puritan migration in 1630 the prestige given by more than three generations of tradition. Its first use, not without English precedent, was as the outline of burial headstones²³ (Fig. 6). Stone-cutters, wishing to avoid the implications of the traditional cross and at the same time finding table type tombs too elaborate for general use, hit upon the use of the tablets, an eminently Protestant symbol, at least as early as 1653.²⁴ The form interested them and served as the binder for the development of a whole wide range of gravestone symbols. Some transition in the

²² In 1560 Elizabeth ordered "that the tables of the Commandments be comely set or hung up in the east end of the chancel". Cardwell, *Documentary Annals*, I, 262, quoted in Addleshaw and Etchels, *Architectural Setting*, 35.

²³ Harriet M. Forbes, *Gravestones of New England*, is the standard authority. Allen Ludwig has undertaken a more extensive project and has completed an analysis of more than 300 such stones. My text follows his initial attributions and photographs. He has in preparation a serious and extended analysis of New England funerary symbols.

²⁴ Ann Erinton, 1653, Cambridge, 19½" x 18¾" slate.




Fig. 7. North elevation of Chestnut Hill meetinghouse, Millville, Massachusetts.
(Historic American Buildings Survey.)

design of these tablets occurred quite independently of the development of local characteristics. The simplest forms followed closely common architectural plaques with little or no border.²⁵ Gradually two separate panels of vertical ornament were added framing the arched central portion.²⁶ About 1675 in a few instances these bands of ornament were developed into a tripartite design which incorporated other and additional symbolic elements in two similar panels on each side of a substantial central carving.²⁷ In their stone work the Puritans seem to have felt little or no concern with the introduction of direct symbolism, death, the sun of resurrection, the hand of God and many other symbols being introduced quite freely and apparently having values attached to them that differed little if at all from their medieval meanings.²⁸

While the selection of the tables of law for extended use may be rationalized with the bitter enmity and pious concern that Samuel Sewall expresses over the use of the cross at funerals, as gesture and in the national ensign, there still remains the larger question of just which emblems the Puritans chose to employ and which they avoided. Why, for example, are not the emblems of the evangelists, the seven-branched candlestick, the emblems of the Virgin

²⁵ Marcy Allin, 1678, Malden slate, Dorcas Brokenberry, 1682, Charlestown, 20" x 17" slate, and many similar examples.

²⁶ John, Elizabeth and Thomas Gill, c. 1671, Cambridge, slate. John Foster, 1681, Dorchester.

²⁷ The Cutler children, 1680, Charlestown, 32¾" x 19" slate.

²⁸ H. Forbes, *Gravestones*, touches on this interesting matter. The work of Ludwig should be definitive.



Fig. 8. Eighteenth century New England desk. (Drawing by Robert Widder after Wallace Nutting, *Furniture Treasury*, 1933.)

and the Holy Ghost more portrayed? The avoidance of certain traditional symbols may be as significant in the explanation of the popular interpretation of Puritan theology as the use of other devices.

In the last years of the seventeenth century and early years of the eighteenth, New Englanders extended their architectural use of the decalogue at the same time that carving of direct allegorical symbols became common on grave-stones (Fig. 4a). Pairs of simple arched windows which followed the somewhat sharp and narrow proportions of the decalogue were let into the outside wall to frame the pulpit.²⁹ Ostensibly to provide light, their very prominent position suggests the weight of the symbolism they conveyed and that in this instance puristic principles, which could have been equally well served by a rectangular window, had been foregone in favor of iconography however simple. The later use of Palladian windows for the same or like purpose may have been made more palatable by the earlier tradition. It would be too much, I think, to assume that in this later form the pulpit or altar-table window still conveyed an important religious meaning.

Somewhat the same problem exists in furniture. Once again the familiar narrow arch appears, but once again its meaning, if any, is confused by the strong probability that the decorative arcade was borrowed directly from Italian Renaissance models imported by the court or from Continental furniture makers working in England (Fig. 8). It may well be that the close resemblance between the classical arch and the Hebraic tablets consciously or unconsciously led to the more frequent selection of such elements by furniture makers. Certainly few other elements of Italian Renaissance furniture were so freely borrowed.³⁰ In all probability such a confusion of symbols could only lead as did the Palladian window to a loss of religious significance in the symbol itself and its ultimate confusion with a host of other classical motifs.

Illustrated New England imprints are very rare before 1750, but one of the commonest if slimmest is the ubiquitous *New England Primer* (Fig. 9). This work contains both in its alphabets and in some of the exercises precise images of the tablets and a few other religious symbols. In general it would appear that the difficulties of cutting ornaments led to the inclusion of many head and tailpieces familiar to English typesetters and little if at all related to new England Puritanism.³¹ The work of John Foster indicates how directly and clearly Puritan symbolism was understood by the faithful in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Graduate of Harvard in 1667, school-teacher in Dorchester and probable author of the Richard Mather portrait

²⁹ St. Paul's Church, Wickford, Rhode Island, 1707. Old Ship Meetinghouse, Hingham, Mass.

³⁰ Wallace Nutting, *Furniture Treasury* (Framingham, 1928), I, Fig. 444, 446, 448, 456, 458.

³¹ *The New England Primer* enlarged (Boston, 1727, 1938). Paul L. Ford, *The New England Primer* (New York, 1897).




Fig. 9. The book and heart were familiar ornaments of the *New England Primer*.
(Redrawn by Robert Widder.)

woodcut of 1670, he sometimes included in his imprints vignettes of angels blowing trumpets to awaken the dead from their coffins. Since his own celebrated gravestone of 1681 embodies a somewhat similar allegory (the dowsing of his life candle, set on the measured mathematical world, by death restrained by time), there can be little doubt that he and probably most printers attributed a conscious meaning to the ornaments which they cut themselves, but they often contented themselves with English imports.³²

The attribution of meanings to the scant symbols of New England puritanism can be measured also in the craft of the silversmith, which touched both secular and religious life. Owing to the unique place of plate in the Puritan value scheme and to the absence of an official mint, the colonial silversmith enjoyed great social prominence and importance. Massachusetts coinage following the precedent of the Commonwealth avoiding traditional heraldry in 1652 issued the first of a series of small silver pieces which had on their face a die-struck image of a tree, in some instances a bare deciduous tree, in others a pine tree.³³

The act of October 19, 1652, which spelled out the outline of the coin's design, although it specified a tree, did not indicate the reason for the

³² Sinclair Hamilton, *Early American Book Illustrators and Wood Engravers, 1670-1870* (Princeton, 1958), pp. 1-4.

³³ Sylvester Crosby, *The Early Coins of America* (Boston, 1875), pp. 41ff.




Fig. 10. Casement window catch found in New England. Smithsonian Institution. Drawing by Robert Widder.

choice.³⁴ The suggestion of a plantation is of course obvious. A far more sophisticated use of the same device was made by Thomas Simon for Oliver Cromwell's funeral in 1658, where an olive tree was used to signify the Protector.³⁵ While the importance of Hugh Peters, the Saltonstall and Winthrop families might assure this later medal's circulation in the colony, the origin of the 1652 design remains obscure. In any event it seems a deliberate rejection of the design of official currency which during the Protectorate linked the Irish harp and St. George's cross much as did the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁵ Henry W. Henfrey, *Numismata Cromwelliana* (London, 1877), p. 167-8.

publication of official acts of the time.³⁶ Since the tree does not appear on gravestones but does appear in printed tailpieces with the Tudor rose and Scotch thistle, it seems a conscious step in the establishment of an independent political iconography.

This absence of ecclesiastical symbols in coinage is especially noteworthy in view of their extended domestic utility. One of the most elaborate uses of iconography is to be found in the piercings of porringer handles (Fig. 11). Huguenot silversmiths introduced the silver ecuelle shortly after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 into England and the colonies. For some time these piercings have been regarded as mere geometric patterns. However, it can be demonstrated that Huguenot silversmiths introduced the silver ecuelle shortly after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes into England and the colonies and that this French ecuelle became a favorite Puritan vessel.³⁷ Significantly, although Philadelphia, Delaware and New England silversmiths all produced handles with similar piercings, it was only in New England that the porringer became well established. Here the familiar form of the Hebraic tablets was used at the base of the porringer handle, presumably to suggest the religious duties and aspects of Puritan marriage theory.³⁸ But the more celebrated aspects of married love were not neglected. Lilies or tulips, hearts, bows and crescents appear as symbols of conjugal love and the "cheerful Discharge of all the duties which belong . . . in that Relation".³⁹

A recent discovery suggests that the extension of such direct symbolism into architecture may have been more frequent than heretofore believed. Malcolm Watkins found at Gloucester, Massachusetts, a wrought iron case-ment with a decorative catch that embodies crescents, hearts and decalogue tablets (Fig. 10). Interestingly enough, the piece also includes diamond and circular piercings which may have been meant to suggest the hatchments used in funerals, church decorations and occasionally in the home.⁴⁰

On the other hand, ceramics indicate few if any such direct connections. One shard found at the James Kettle kiln, Danver, has a strong suggestion

³⁶ Great Britain Parliament, *An Act for the Promoting and Propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ* (London, 1649).

³⁷ Anthony Garvan, "The New England Porringer, An Index of Custom", *Smithsonian Institution Annual Report 1958* (1959), p. 547; John F. Hayward, *Huguenot Silver in England, 1688-1727* (London, 1959), p. 55.

³⁸ Garvan, "New England Porringer", *Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report 1958*, p. 549.

³⁹ Samuel Willard, *Compleat Body of Divinity* (Boston, 1726), pp. 679-680.

⁴⁰ For illustrations of funeral achievements or hatchments see *Encyclopedia: or a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and Miscellaneous Literature* (Philadelphia, 1798). The arms of man and wife are both carried, those of the deceased on a black ground and the background of whole escutcheon being black. Abraham Rees, *The Cyclopaedia or Universal Dictionary* (London, 1819), "Hatchment". The diamond shape is generally indicated as the ground and frame for such hatchments in Holland, England and America.




Fig. 11. Porringer handle by Benjamin Hiller, Boston, C. 1700. Mabel Brady Garvan Collection, Yale University. (Drawing by Robert Widder.)

of decalogue outline, but is too fragmentary to justify a definitive attribution.

The use of a tablet form is common in mirrors, sconces and other wall hangings. Once more such pieces seem to fall into the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, but thus far no careful study has been made of them to determine their provenance and geographical origin.

The decline of the use of the tablets, hearts and flowers on both tombstones and silver porringers coincided with the decline in relative importance of the plain style in meetinghouse architecture. To both after 1725 the New Englander brought the attractions of fashion: the sinuous forms of the rococo to silver, the crisp finish and improved workmanship of London classicism to the meetinghouse. The disappearance of tablets from domestic vessels, the introduction of new forms of furniture, the great increase and elaboration of the visual symbols on gravestones all suggest that the Puritan plain style, initiated in meetinghouses about a century earlier, had about run its course. Architecturally, the plain style still determined the exterior of meetinghouses. Within, more elaborate detail and liturgical differences had begun changes

which were to end only with the rise of the Gothic revival and the triumph of nineteenth-century medievalism.

In many respects the course of Cistercian architectural purism is not comparable to the New England puritan plain style because the two movements had such different social functions. The very great effort of New England Puritanism to establish a theocracy meant that its church architecture from the outset had an important social role and that in large measure it reflected the rise and subsequent decline of theological politics. Moreover it reflected other less vital currents of daily life. The introduction of Netherland church architecture by Sir Christopher Wren found its way to New England through printed views and new migrants. Ministers could do little or nothing to control the use of religious devices as ornament on furniture or silver, although they could prevent its official use on coinage. Thus from the beginning the architecture included major compromises with important social forces.

Cistercian architecture remained the architecture of a reform fragment of the clergy far nearer in spirit to self-examining, disciplined Quakers than the congregational and diverse Puritans. Its rigid rules of proportion and limitation of ornament provided a functional, low cost and monumental setting for the worship of religious orders. Its eventual compromises were with the members of its own order who strove to elaborate its detail or plan its simplicity. For the laity it condoned a more elaborate iconography.

Both architectures manifestly changed in less than a century and for quite different apparent reasons. In the earlier, the limitation of the goals of the Cistercian Order to its abbeys and members circumscribed its influence and eventually forced compromises. In the later, the extension of Puritan influence into secular activities gradually enlarged the original symbols and forms and in consequence destroyed their meaning.

The readoption of puristic formulas by other church reform movements both Catholic and Protestant suggests that the changed role of a church body from a protest to a controlling or at least influential movement may be the major explanation of the modification of puristic reform architecture. Certainly this change was important, but at the same time cannot be the whole cause since a very sizeable fraction of the most careful thinkers in both religious movements seemed totally unaware of any real decline in their architectural tradition but, on the contrary, found cause for holy zeal in the elaboration and enlargement of their religious edifices.

Another, to this writer, more fruitful speculation is the possibility that certain general laws are operative in this phenomenon and that these partake of the nature of syllogistic rules. Thus in a sense Cistercian rules of proportion and Puritan concern with the sermon become initial postulates from which conclusions, not immediately perceived, are with the passage of time

evolved by many minds endeavoring to extend these premises and thus achieve a larger Cistercian church or an extension of Puritan ornament to domestic life. To the protagonists such extensions are mere evidences of zeal and conservatism, as natural as the conclusions of an Aristotelian syllogism. Only to the initiators of a puristic movement do such extensions appear reprehensible. Only they can see the inevitable confusion of idea and symbol which must soon follow. When such critics die or lose power the movement they sponsored must inevitably change. It may be that the process of elaboration is more rapid in cultures which stress the need for personal achievement. Some interesting comparative analyses have been made of the length of cultural cycles. Art styles might develop a far less controversial and more easily measured control for such studies.

In both Cistercian and Puritan architecture and in many other instances a certain minimal time span would seem required before really significant change takes place. This suggests a different sort of operative principle, one which is related to organic processes and to the learning process. The length of this delay indicates that at the outset these purist revolts against iconography are meaningful to their protagonists. Well aware of the architecture they are simplifying, they are not likely to revert to its iconography. Moreover for such persons the original iconography still retains a degree of meaning however abhorrent. In order to revolt they underwent a period of forced analysis of the traditional scheme and then achieved their own style of revolt. Allowing for the difficulty of mastering their craft and for a subsequent 25-year period of accomplishment, they have reached 50 to 60 years of age from their first mature construction.

Their successors play a different role. To them the reformed architecture after twenty-five or fifty years of building represents all or a large part of traditional work they know. In both the twelfth-century monastic order and the New England town the original archetype against which the early purists railed was little known to the younger generation. To them the revolutionary architecture itself seemed traditional, almost unchallenged, a nostalgic symbol of an older time, a quite susceptible base for the elaboration of a new architectural development. The functional devices of an earlier era became symbols of a victory won, no longer functional tools in the controversy. The tablets became a hallowed shape, the frequent use of which dulled their meaning until the ecclesiastical revolt of the nineteenth century sought in its antithesis, the Gothic Revival, new symbols to revitalize Christian worship. The physical limitations of the single Cistercian bell tower became irksome to later builders who felt deeply the need for more elaborate and extended chimes.

If then the extension of the architectural style, its refinement and elaboration are all blocked to the practitioners of the second generation, the style itself, however pragmatic and utilitarian, becomes a symbol. Its use suggests

that its original function has been forgotten and its form long familiar had become early in the life of the artisan his natural esthetic choice for his later years, consciously or unconsciously evoking a nostalgic image.

Thus the double arch form when initially used in porringer handle piercings suggests a conscious symbolism by its association with other meaningful piercings. When, however, it is used on ceramics, as in the Danver shard or on furniture so as to confuse Renaissance arcades and the simple tablets, then it is probable that for the artisan the form has retained its visual attraction but lost its specific meaning.

The adoption of puristic architectural forms by quite disparate groups, as for example Catholics in England after 1688 or the Bishop of Geneva (1135-85), demonstrates the widespread acceptance of the architecture as symbol, no longer of revolt, but of established society. When, as in the Protestant church in New England, Puritanism represents the established faith and begins to graft on to its plain style fabric classical and rococo ornament the confusion of symbols had become chaotic.

The confusions can be avoided only by a relatively resigned attitude toward style development, one which recognizes the need of later generations to develop their own visual effects with the dictionary of forms which they inherit. These organic needs and their many manifestations purism seldom filled, but the many efforts to establish a puristic tradition in architecture suggest that a chronological study of the rise and decline of other epochs might prove an especially rewarding investigation.

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